Rio Bravo Subdivision Property Owners Association, on Behalf of 203 Qualified Voters in the Rio Bravo Subdivision and the Said 203 Qualified Voters v. City of Brownsville, Texas

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-09-00246-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; October 7, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The appeal involves the Rio Bravo Subdivision Property Owners Association and 203 qualified voters (collectively "Rio Bravo") challenging a summary judgment favoring the City of Brownsville regarding their petition for disannexation and declaratory relief under Texas Local Government Code section 43.141. Rio Bravo asserts that the City acted in bad faith by not providing "additional or new services" post-annexation after the City annexed the subdivision on November 5, 2002. In 2005, a majority of registered voters in the subdivision filed a disannexation petition, claiming the City failed to deliver promised services. The City did not respond within sixty days, prompting Rio Bravo to seek judicial relief. 

During pre-trial proceedings, both parties stipulated that the City had followed all annexation procedures and that the disannexation request was based solely on the alleged failure to provide new services. Consequently, Rio Bravo did not dispute the legality of the annexation or claim a failure to provide services as per the municipal service plan. The City maintained it had fulfilled its obligations. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment, rejecting Rio Bravo's claims.

The annexed area is under the jurisdiction of Valley MUD No. 2, which holds a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (CCN) from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) for water and sewer services. This CCN prohibits the City from providing these utilities in the area. Post-annexation, the City did provide certain municipal services as stipulated, complying with the municipal service plan and Texas Local Government Code section 43.056. The entities responsible for municipal services before and after annexation are outlined, including law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, solid waste collection, and maintenance of public roads. The trial court found no genuine issues of material fact, granting the City's motion for summary judgment while denying Rio Bravo's motion. The appeal process highlighted the need to determine the type of summary judgment at issue, as Rio Bravo's appeal did not specify the applicable standard of review or the nature of the motion being contested. The City’s motion referenced both traditional and no-evidence summary judgment procedures.

A traditional motion for summary judgment in Texas requires the movant to demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue of material fact" and that they are "entitled to judgment as a matter of law," as outlined in Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). The City’s motion asserts a lack of evidence regarding its compliance with the service plan for Rio Bravo, but the motion primarily aims to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the City is entitled to judgment. The trial court, in granting summary judgment, confirmed that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the pleadings.

Summary judgment is reviewed de novo, with evidence viewed in favor of the non-movant, and the moving party must prove the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. When both parties file for summary judgment and one is granted while the other is denied, the court must resolve all questions and render the judgment that should have been issued. 

Statutory construction is also reviewed de novo, focusing on the legislature's intent as expressed in the plain language of the statute. The statute is interpreted as a whole, ensuring consistency among its provisions. Words in a statute are presumed to be deliberately chosen, and additional language may only be inserted to clarify legislative intent when necessary.

According to Texas Local Government Code section 43.141(a), if a majority of voters in an annexed area petition for disannexation due to the municipality's failure to provide services, the governing body must respond within 60 days. If it fails to do so, petitioners may initiate a lawsuit for disannexation in district court, which must order disannexation if a valid petition is confirmed and the municipality is found to have not fulfilled its service obligations.

Rio Bravo argues that the trial court wrongly granted the City's summary judgment motion by claiming the City did not perform in "good faith" under section 43.141(b) by failing to provide new services after annexation. However, the court finds no error in the trial court's ruling. For disannexation, two criteria must be met: a valid petition must be filed, and the municipality must have failed to perform in good faith. The court acknowledges that Rio Bravo's disannexation petition is valid. Rio Bravo contends that the City did not provide new or additional services post-annexation, as required by section 43.141(a), which allows disannexation if a municipality fails to provide services. However, evidence shows the City provided all legally permissible municipal services after annexation. The court emphasizes that the statute does not require the provision of new services, and Rio Bravo's argument lacks merit, as it does not demonstrate that the interpretation of the statute would lead to absurd results. Additionally, Rio Bravo fails to substantiate its claims about legislative intent or other relevant factors. Therefore, the court concludes that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City, affirming the decision.

A list of 156 voters is provided, which includes names such as James E. Regan, Margie Jane Regan, and Norman Elwood Kight, among others. The excerpt clarifies that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166(i) is not applicable to summary judgments. Instead, it notes that this rule allows for a conference regarding the exchange of expert witness lists prior to trial. It suggests that the City may have intended to reference Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) and 166a(i) instead, which relate to summary judgments.