Rosalinda Salinas Balderas, Elda Salinas Ponce, D-Fox, Ltd., Elodia Salinas, Linda Mandes, Veronica Casas Campbell, and Cynthia M. Villarreal F/K/A Cindy Casas Reyna v. Anna Maria Salinas Saenz, Joel Saenz, Hermelinda Benavides, Leoncio Salinas, Romulo Benavides III, Reynaldo Garcia, Simon Ramon, Jr. Gumecinda Ramon, Jacinto A. Garcia, Sr., Diana E. Conde, Minerva Castillo, Josue Garcia, Blanca Estella Garza, Arnoldo

Citation: Not availableDocket: 04-11-00873-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 29, 2013; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio, Texas, reversed and remanded a trial court's ruling that had granted a no-evidence summary judgment in favor of the appellees regarding a dispute over royalties related to mineral interests. The appellants, Rosalinda Salinas Balderas and others, claimed they were entitled to damages for royalties that were allegedly owed to them but paid to the appellees, Anna Maria Salinas Saenz and others. The case stemmed from a severance of claims from a prior cause involving a common source of title to mineral interests owned by the Salinas family.

Juan and Ines Salinas originally owned 1,284 acres and a 15/32 mineral interest. After dividing the property among their children, the appellants challenged the validity of a Partition Agreement and counterclaimed that the appellees were overpaid royalties due to a miscalculation of mineral ownership by oil and gas companies. The appellants alleged that the companies incorrectly believed Juana owned a 1/11 mineral interest in specific tracts of land.

The trial court granted the appellees' no-evidence summary judgment motion, which contended that the appellants could not establish a factual basis for their claim of overpayment. The appellants argued they did not receive proper notice for the hearing on this motion because the notice referenced only the original cause number. The court noted that insufficient notice is a non-jurisdictional defect. Ultimately, the appellate court determined that the trial court's judgment was in error and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A party receiving untimely but adequate notice to attend a summary judgment hearing must either file a motion for continuance or raise a written complaint about the late notice, supported by affidavit evidence, and must address the issue during the hearing. If no notice is received, the complaint must be included in a post-trial motion to preserve the error. In this case, the appellants waived their notice complaint by not raising it before the trial court or in a post-trial motion, leading to the overruling of their first issue.

Regarding summary judgment affidavits, the trial court was found to have erred in striking the affidavits attached to the appellants’ response. The affidavits, from representatives of oil and gas companies, included details of royalty payments based on a title opinion that was later deemed erroneous. The first affidavit, by Thorp Petroleum's landman, detailed the incorrect ownership interests that led to overpayments. The appellees objected to the affidavits on hearsay grounds and claimed reliance on secondhand information lacked personal knowledge. However, objections to affidavits must be made in writing, and oral hearsay objections are ineffective. Thus, the trial court's decision to strike the affidavits based on verbal objections was erroneous, and the appellate court would treat the affidavits as unchallenged.

Testimony from a witness without personal knowledge is deemed as no evidence, according to the Texas Supreme Court (Ketlin v. Arias). The appellees argue that objections made orally during summary judgment hearings are waived, referencing Browne v. City of San Antonio, where the court distinguished between substantive and formal defects in affidavits. The court clarified that a hearsay objection is a formal defect, not substantive, and noted that trial court rulings on objections must be documented in writing. In this case, the trial court's order lacked a ruling on verbal objections, suggesting that the lack of personal knowledge in affidavits is a substantive defect. Cheesman’s affidavit claimed personal knowledge despite reliance on other sources, which does not breach the personal knowledge requirement. The trial court erred in striking Cheesman’s affidavit. 

Regarding evidence of overpayment, the court applies the legal sufficiency standard used for directed verdicts, determining that a no-evidence summary judgment is improper if the respondent presents more than a scintilla of evidence. Cheesman’s affidavit indicated that royalties were paid based on an erroneous title opinion and included a spreadsheet detailing the overpayment, thus providing sufficient probative evidence to contest the appellees' claim. Consequently, the trial court’s no-evidence summary judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.