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Metropolitan Christian Methodist Episcopal Church v. Frank Vann, Barnabas Investors,Inc., John Ottinger, Jr., Senior Housing Services, Inc., Cornerstone Capital Advisors, Inc. and George Dixon, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Cecil Brooks

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-12-00332-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 9, 2013; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case involves the Metropolitan Christian Methodist Episcopal Church's appeal following summary judgments against it in a complex litigation concerning a failed healthcare management organization (HMO) venture. The Church initially sued multiple parties, including Barnabas Investors, Inc., various associated entities, and individuals, for breach of contract, fraud, and other claims related to a mortgaged property and financial dealings. The trial court granted summary judgments in favor of Barnabas and George Dixon, the latter due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The Church contested the dismissal, arguing the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, but the appellate court upheld the dismissal, citing established precedents permitting personal jurisdiction assessments before subject matter jurisdiction. The Church's failure to provide timely evidence of damages or to assert claims for attorney’s fees as damages resulted in the affirmation of the no-evidence summary judgment. Additionally, claims under the Texas Insurance Code were dismissed due to procedural inadequacies. The appellate court upheld the trial court's rulings, including the denial of sanctions against the Church's counsel, effectively affirming the summary judgments in favor of Barnabas and Vann, and dismissing the Church's appeal on all grounds.

Legal Issues Addressed

Collateral Source Rule and Attorney's Fees as Damages

Application: The Church's argument regarding attorney's fees as damages was dismissed due to lack of evidence and failure to timely assert this claim.

Reasoning: At that time, the Church had not presented evidence concerning damages, which justified the summary judgment under TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

No-evidence Summary Judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i)

Application: The trial court granted a no-evidence summary judgment in favor of Barnabas when the Church failed to provide evidence of damages, as required when the motion shifts the burden to the nonmovant.

Reasoning: Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), a no-evidence summary judgment can be granted if the opposing party fails to produce evidence on essential claim elements, effectively acting as a pretrial directed verdict.

Personal Jurisdiction Determinations in Federal Court

Application: The federal court properly dismissed George Dixon for lack of personal jurisdiction despite lacking subject matter jurisdiction, as allowed by Supreme Court precedent.

Reasoning: The trial court dismissed Dixon's case due to a lack of personal jurisdiction, ruling that the dismissal order was valid despite later findings of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Reassessment of Personal Jurisdiction after Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Application: The Church was barred from re-litigating personal jurisdiction over Dixon, aligning with Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., which allows addressing personal jurisdiction first.

Reasoning: The Church is barred from re-litigating this jurisdictional issue, as established by Supreme Court precedent in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.

Requirement for Timely Filing of Responses and Evidence

Application: The Church's late submission of pleadings and evidence without court permission was not considered, leading to the upholding of the summary judgment against it.

Reasoning: Late filings of summary judgment evidence are only permitted with leave of court, and if no leave is granted, late submissions are presumed not to be considered by the court.