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Charles Williamson A/K/A Charles J. Williamson v. State of Texas and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-09-00248-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 16, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Charles Williamson appeals a trial court order that denied his motion to intervene and quash a garnishment of his funds by Wells Fargo Bank, initiated by the State of Texas to satisfy a judgment related to a student loan. The State applied for the writ of garnishment on February 9, 2009, without proof of service to Williamson. A judgment was entered on February 24, 2009, and amended on March 3, 2009, acknowledging that some of Williamson’s funds were exempt. Williamson, aware of the garnishment, filed an amended motion to intervene on March 10, 2009, citing lack of notice and other defenses. However, the trial court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to address the motion due to a failure to hold a hearing within ten days as per Rule 664a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Williamson contended that the rule was designed to protect the debtor's rights and should not deprive him of the opportunity to intervene. The court noted precedents indicating that the ten-day rule is not jurisdictional, allowing for flexibility and agreements between parties regarding timing. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's order, affirming Williamson's right to intervene. Williamson contends he was informed by a court employee about a three-week delay in obtaining a hearing. The notice requirement and intervention opportunity aim to ensure the debtor's due process rights, as established in Hering v. Norbanco Austin I. Delays in court dockets should not disadvantage the debtor, and Rule 664a does not prevent the trial court from addressing the case's merits. The trial court noted that thirty days had elapsed since the judgment was entered, as a court's plenary power expires thirty days after timely motions for new trials or judgment modifications are overruled, supported by Sims v. Fitzpatrick. Williamson filed his verified motion to intervene and quash the garnishment within this thirty-day timeframe. Lacking a specified statutory time frame for motions related to garnishments, the court treats Williamson's motion as a post-judgment motion to vacate the judgment. The trial court ruled within the appropriate time limits, thus confirming its jurisdiction. The decision negates the need to address other issues raised by Williamson's appeal. The court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, Rule 663a mandates proper service of the writ on the defendant, and courts have ruled that a trial court errs in granting a garnishment when service does not strictly comply with statutory requirements, regardless of actual notice. The absence of Williamson’s motion to intervene from the clerk’s record complicates matters, while Wells Fargo argues that Williamson's notice of appeal is untimely since it was directed at the order rather than the final judgment. However, the court retains jurisdiction to assess the trial court's jurisdiction. It is noted that Williamson did not seek a hearing until after ten days had passed, although the trial court may have been unable to schedule a hearing within that period.