Stephen Jonathon Vogt v. State

Citations: 421 S.W.3d 233; 2013 WL 6637661; 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 15131Docket: 04-12-00637-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 17, 2013; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Stephen Jonathon Vogt was convicted of capital murder for the death of Mario Alberto Raygoza on September 6, 2009, and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Vogt raised three issues: (1) the jury instruction related to the law of parties was inaccurate, (2) the State's closing argument undermined his right to a fair trial and due process, and (3) the judgment did not sufficiently establish his ability to pay attorney’s fees. The appellate court reformed the judgment to remove the attorney’s fees and affirmed the judgment as reformed. 

The State's evidence included testimonies from multiple officers and video recordings of interviews with Vogt. Vogt admitted that he and Garza planned to kill someone to steal a car to escape to Colorado, targeting Raygoza, whom he met on MySpace. After luring Raygoza under the pretense of needing help moving, Vogt and Garza attacked him in the vehicle with a knife and a box cutter. Raygoza managed to escape but died from his injuries in a parking lot. Vogt and Garza fled to Colorado, where they engaged in theft before being apprehended for shoplifting. Vogt was subsequently identified as a suspect in Raygoza's murder after officers linked him to a previous BOLO and his MySpace account activity. Despite being read his Miranda rights multiple times, Vogt initially denied knowledge of the murder during police interviews.

Detective Hassell interviewed Vogt, who waived his Miranda rights and expressed a desire to speak about Garza. During the interview, Vogt admitted to killing Raygoza and described a failed suicide attempt with Garza using rat poison and Lime-A-Way. He recounted the events leading to Raygoza's stabbing, explaining that after the attack, he and Garza fled to avoid suspicion. Vogt provided details about their route, including gas stops, and stated that they dyed their hair to change their appearance, not to evade capture. He explained that Raygoza was chosen as a victim because he was someone Vogt could manipulate into picking them up, as they had no significant ties to him. Vogt described the attack as apologetic, with himself inflicting minor wounds while Garza delivered the fatal stabs. After the initial interview, Vogt was re-Mirandized and spoke again, clarifying details of the case. 

To support his defense, Dr. Joann Murphey, a psychologist, testified about Vogt's mental health history, noting familial patterns of mental disorders and Vogt's own diagnoses of depression, anxiety, and ADHD from a young age.

Vogt's childhood records reveal significant psychological issues, including irritability, sleep disturbances, auditory hallucinations, and paranoia, which included fears of the devil and anthrax. He displayed behaviors such as duct-taping his head to block out voices. Dr. Murphey diagnosed Vogt with multiple severe psychological conditions, including depression, anxiety, ADHD, bipolar disorder, thought disorder, and schizophrenia, all contributing to impaired judgment and a lack of foresight regarding violent situations. Prior to the murder of Raygoza, Vogt and Garza mixed toxic substances for a suicide pact, with Vogt consuming his mix first. Dr. Murphey noted Vogt's intense emotional dependency on Garza, describing him as “obsessionally involved,” leading Vogt to deny reality and take blame for actions he did not commit. She opined that Vogt's extreme emotional state prevented him from foreseeing the violence that occurred. Contrarily, the State presented evidence that Vogt had periods without delusions or hallucinations, with symptoms improving after treatment. However, Dr. Murphey maintained that Vogt's symptoms re-emerged when counseling ceased and attributed his inability to rationally consider harming someone to significant stress, including homelessness and fear of losing Garza. Vogt also contested the jury instructions regarding the law of parties, arguing that the jury was not properly informed about his role in the crime, as Garza was the one who inflicted the fatal blows. Defense counsel argued that Vogt should only be found guilty of aggravated robbery for providing the knife to Garza. The trial court denied the request for specific instructions, believing the jury could understand the law as presented. Vogt's defense counsel preserved objections to the jury charge, which must accurately reflect the law and essential elements of the offense.

The charge must not only avoid misleading the jury but also guide them to prevent confusion. It must clearly outline the conditions under which a conviction is authorized, refer unambiguously to other relevant jury charge paragraphs, and logically combine them. Merely incorporating allegations from the charging instrument is insufficient; the charge must apply the law to the trial facts. When reviewing potential jury charge errors, appellate courts follow a two-step inquiry: first, determining if an error exists, and second, assessing whether the error caused sufficient harm to warrant reversal. If an objection was made at trial, the court looks for "some harm," while errors raised for the first time on appeal require a search for "egregious harm." In this case, due to a timely objection, Vogt's conviction can be reversed if the error harmed his rights. The analysis considers the jury charge as a whole, counsel arguments, the evidence presented, and other relevant factors, requiring proof of actual harm rather than just theoretical harm. The jury was instructed that a person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if they contribute to the commission of the offense either through their conduct or by aiding another, emphasizing that mere presence does not constitute participation. The charge specifically accused Vogt of intentionally causing the death of Mario Alberto Raygoza while committing or attempting to commit robbery.

Defense counsel requested the trial court to differentiate between the charges against Stephen Jonathon Vogt as a principal and as a party in the context of a capital murder case. The prosecution alleged that on September 6, 2009, in Bexar County, Texas, Vogt intended to assist James Garza in committing murder during a robbery, specifically by aiding Garza in stabbing the victim, Mario Alberto Raygoza, with a knife capable of causing serious harm. 

The analysis found no error in the jury instructions provided by the trial court. Unlike the precedent set in Jaycon v. State, where the defendant was not present and acted solely as a party, Vogt was present and actively participated in the crime by using a box cutter to stab Raygoza. Under Texas law, a person can be criminally responsible for an offense either through their own actions or through the actions of another if they acted with intent to assist in the commission of the offense. Sufficient evidence supported the jury's ability to convict Vogt as a party, and the trial court's charge required the jury to determine if Vogt caused Raygoza's death, whether acting alone or in concert with Garza, during the commission of a robbery.

The jury received instructions that mere presence at the scene was insufficient for a conviction; it needed to establish that Vogt either intentionally caused Raygoza's death or was criminally responsible for the actions of another that led to the death, as per Texas Penal Code. Vogt did not provide any argument or legal precedent to show how the jury might have been misled by these definitions. A reasonable jury could understand the law of parties without additional repetition in the application section. 

Vogt's claim that he could only be charged under the law of parties because the State acknowledged Garza caused the fatal wound was countered by the jury's discretion in evaluating witness credibility and evidence. The medical examiner's report attributed Raygoza's death to stab wounds, and Vogt's own statements indicated he used a box-cutter, allowing the jury to convict him either as a principal or under the law of parties. 

If evidence clearly supported Vogt's guilt as a principal, any potential error regarding the law of parties instruction would be deemed harmless. The jury was explicitly instructed to find Vogt guilty only if it determined he caused Raygoza's death, whether acting alone or in conjunction with Garza. The record provided ample evidence for Vogt's guilt as either a party or principal, and thus, there was no error in the jury charge. Even if error existed, it was considered harmless, as reversal requires proof of harm to the defendant's rights.

To assess the harm under the Almanza standard, an appellate court evaluates (1) the complete jury charge, (2) the evidence presented, including contested issues and probative weight, and (3) the arguments of counsel along with any pertinent information from the trial record. The jury charge must be examined in its entirety, with evidence indicating that Vogt and Garza engaged in a suicide pact, and upon its failure, decided to flee San Antonio for Colorado, contemplating that one would need to die for this plan to succeed. Vogt identified Raygoza as the target due to a lack of personal ties, provided the knife to Garza, and coordinated with him to arrange Raygoza's pickup. After the stabbing, both defendants left Raygoza to die and attempted to alter their appearances while escaping. The State charged Vogt under three theories of culpability: acting alone, as a party, or as a conspirator. The jury was instructed to consider whether Vogt conspired with Garza to commit aggravated robbery, which resulted in Raygoza's death. The charge required the jury to find that Vogt (1) agreed with Garza to cause Raygoza’s death, (2) took action to further this agreement, and (3) should have anticipated the potential for murder. The defense did not object to the charge but argued that Vogt lacked the mental capacity for conspiracy. The inquiry focuses on whether Raygoza’s murder was committed in furtherance of the robbery and whether it was a foreseeable outcome of the conspiracy. It is established that Raygoza was indeed killed during the aggravated robbery, making Vogt's prior intent irrelevant if the liability elements were satisfied at the time of the crime.

Evidence regarding the foreseeability of Raygoza’s death primarily came from Dr. Murphey, but Vogt's own statements indicated he understood that someone would likely die as a result of their plan. This understanding supports the jury's determination of Vogt's guilt as a conspirator under Texas Penal Code section 7.02(b) and as criminally responsible for Garza’s actions under section 7.02(a). The State argued that Vogt was guilty of either intentionally causing Raygoza's death during a robbery or aiding Garza in committing capital murder. The co-conspirator theory posits that if one felony is attempted, any resulting felony that should have been anticipated makes all conspirators guilty, regardless of intent.

The defense focused on Vogt’s mental state, arguing that he could not have formed the intent to kill or foresee Raygoza’s death due to mental health issues, while conceding guilt for aggravated robbery. The defense highlighted three main points against the capital murder charges: (1) Vogt did not stab Raygoza, (2) he did not assist Garza with the intent to kill but rather to steal a car, and (3) he could not have anticipated a murder in the course of robbery.

Ultimately, the arguments presented by both sides did not suggest that the jury charge harmed Vogt’s case. The State maintained that Vogt was guilty from the outset as he had orchestrated the events leading to the robbery and stabbing. Evidence, including Vogt’s own statements, indicated he intended for Raygoza to be killed, and his involvement in the stabbing demonstrated his understanding of the situation. Therefore, the overall evidence did not reflect any harm to Vogt from alleged errors in the jury charge.

The conclusion asserts that after reviewing the evidence, it is determined that the jury was not misled by the court's charge and that Vogt's rights were not compromised under an Almanza analysis, leading to the overruling of Vogt's first issue. Vogt claims that the State improperly suggested that the trial judge disapproved of the lesser included offense of murder, which he argues violated his due process rights.

During the State's closing argument, it clarified that the presence of aggravated robbery in the jury charge does not imply the judge's endorsement of it, and the jury needed to consider all evidence presented. The defense objected to this characterization, but the objection was overruled. The State further argued that the evidence for aggravated robbery was weak, referencing a witness's credibility.

Proper jury arguments are outlined as including summation of evidence, reasonable deductions, responses to opposing counsel, and pleas for law enforcement. Arguments outside these areas generally do not lead to reversible error unless they are extreme, manifestly improper, or introduce new harmful facts. The reviewing court assesses the entirety of the argument in context.

Vogt contends the State's remarks were intended to undermine the court's charge, referencing case law that condemns such behavior. The case of Dunbar v. State is cited as a precedent where similar prosecutorial comments led to a reversal due to direct references to the trial court's beliefs about the case.

The State sought to clarify a complex charge to the jury, arguing against the defense's suggestion to convict on a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, asserting that Vogt was guilty of capital murder despite the lesser charge. Although the court noted potential issues with the State's argument regarding the trial court's position, it found that the State's comments were not "extreme and manifestly improper" and did not constitute a deliberate attempt to undermine Vogt's right to a fair trial, in accordance with the four-prong test established in Brown.

Vogt was appointed counsel on November 18, 2009, with various attorneys representing him over three years. His current counsel was appointed on October 1, 2012, with a mandate to serve until specific conditions were met. Although no affidavit of indigency was found in the record prior to the trial, the court concluded that Vogt was indigent based on the representation history, affirming that a previously determined indigent defendant is presumed to remain so unless financial circumstances change. Consequently, the trial court erred in assessing attorney’s fees against him.

In conclusion, while the jury charge was deemed correct and any potential error was found not to have harmed Vogt, the trial court's assessment of attorney’s fees was erroneous. The judgment and bill of costs were reformed to remove the requirement for Vogt to pay these fees, while the trial court's judgment was affirmed as modified.