Tamara Timmons v. University Medical Center and John P. Thomas, M.D.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-10-00186-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 20, 2011; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Tamara Timmons appealed the trial court's order that granted University Medical Center's (UMC) plea to the jurisdiction concerning her medical malpractice claim. Timmons underwent hernia surgery on February 16, 2007, performed by Dr. John P. Thomas, during which a sponge was inadvertently left inside her abdomen. After experiencing complications, she sought further medical treatment, leading to the sponge's discovery and removal on August 31, 2007. 

Timmons filed her lawsuit on August 17, 2009, against UMC and Dr. Thomas. UMC responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted, leading to Timmons' appeal. She raised three main issues: (1) UMC allegedly waived its governmental immunity by using tangible personal property; (2) the statute of limitations for healthcare liability claims should override the notice requirement for claims against governmental entities; and (3) even if the notice provision applies, it unfairly restricted her access to the courts due to the nature of her injury.

The core issue on appeal was whether Timmons’ failure to provide UMC with notice of her claim within six months following the relevant procedure deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The appellate court found that it did, affirming the trial court's order. The court noted that sovereign immunity generally protects governmental entities from lawsuits unless expressly waived by the Legislature, and there was no indication that such a waiver applied in this case. The ruling was made under a de novo standard of review, as jurisdiction is a legal question.

The Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) waives sovereign immunity for governmental entities in limited circumstances, particularly for personal injury or death caused by the condition or use of tangible property. A claimant must provide notice of a claim to the governmental unit within six months of the incident. This notice must include a reasonable description of the injury, the time and place of the incident, and details of the incident itself, as outlined in TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. 101.101(a). The Texas Code Construction Act establishes that this notice requirement is jurisdictional, meaning it is essential for the court to have authority over the case.

In parallel, the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) imposes a two-year statute of limitations for healthcare liability claims, with special provisions for minors. Timmons's claim is categorized as a healthcare liability claim against a governmental unit, raising a potential conflict between the notice requirement of section 101.101 and the statute of limitations in section 74.251. Timmons argues that section 74.251 should take precedence, allowing her to proceed with her suit if filed within its two-year limit. However, UMC contends that both provisions apply and that compliance with both is theoretically possible. UMC emphasizes that Timmons failed to provide the required notice within six months, leading to the trial court granting its plea to the jurisdiction.

Timmons challenges this decision, claiming that section 101.101 does not apply to her situation due to the purported conflict with section 74.251. She acknowledges her failure to give written notice within the required timeframe and does not assert that UMC had actual notice of her claim. Timmons cites the 'notwithstanding any other law' language in section 74.251 to argue for its primacy over section 101.101, referencing the Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of this phrase in prior cases.

In Chilkewitz, the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether the predecessor to section 74.251, which contained 'notwithstanding any other law' language, prevented the application of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28, allowing a party to sue or be sued in an assumed name. The court noted that prior cases interpreting 'any other law' focused on issues related to the timeline of statute of limitations, which did not pertain to Rule 28. Consequently, Rule 28 does not affect the statute of limitations, and thus, is not considered 'any other law' under former section 10.01. The analysis clarified that 'any other law' refers to laws impacting the timing or operation of section 74.251. 

The court drew parallels to Bala v. Maxwell, where conflicting statutes of limitations were examined, concluding that the limitations period of section 74.251 superseded conflicting provisions. The court noted that section 101.101 does not influence when section 74.251's limitations period begins or toll it, indicating no conflict between the two statutes. Section 101.101 serves a different purpose, focusing on ensuring timely notice to governmental units for managing claims, and is a jurisdictional prerequisite that can deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction if not met. In contrast, section 74.251 serves as a statute of limitations, functioning as an affirmative defense rather than affecting jurisdiction. The court ultimately concluded that sections 101.101 and 74.251 are not in conflict.

Section 101.101's provisions do not affect the limitations period established in section 74.251(a), allowing both sections to operate independently. Despite Timmons's assertion that the Open Courts Provision of the Texas Constitution should excuse her from the six-month notice requirement due to the nature of her injury from a retained object, she failed to provide written notice within the mandated timeframe. Timmons argued that injuries from retained objects are inherently difficult to discover, referencing a Texas Supreme Court case (Walters v. Cleveland Reg’l Med. Ctr.) where the Open Courts provision allowed claims to proceed despite the statute of limitations. However, Timmons did not raise this issue in the trial court, failing to preserve it for appeal. The court concluded that the discovery rule does not apply to section 101.101’s notice requirement due to its explicit language, and while the application may seem harsh, the statutory scheme governing claims against the State must be adhered to. Consequently, Timmons's failure to comply with section 101.101 deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over her claim, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's order granting UMC’s plea to the jurisdiction.