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Rudy Pena v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-10-00206-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 27, 2011; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Rudy Pena appeals a trial court's order adjudicating him guilty of possessing chemicals with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, resulting in a twenty-year sentence. Initially, Pena had entered a guilty plea in December 2009 under a plea bargain, receiving ten years of deferred adjudication community supervision, a $5,000 fine, and $280 in restitution. A condition of his supervision was to avoid any violations of law. The State later moved to adjudicate his guilt, claiming he violated this condition by fleeing from peace officer Aaron K. McWilliams during an attempted arrest. The trial court found the State's allegations credible and adjudicated Pena guilty. In his appeal, Pena raises four points of error, primarily contesting the sufficiency of evidence regarding his knowledge of McWilliams's status as a peace officer and the nature of the attempted arrest. The court applies a standard of review focused on whether the trial court abused its discretion in adjudicating guilt, requiring only that there exists some evidence to support the ruling. The court emphasizes that the State's burden is to prove the violation of community supervision by a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial judge serves as the trier of fact and evaluator of credibility. Appellant's venue-related arguments are dismissed. Typically, the State must prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence, but this does not apply to adjudication proceedings, which are administrative and lack the rights associated with formal trials. Only the court where the original charge was tried may revoke community supervision unless jurisdiction has shifted. The State must demonstrate that the appellant committed an offense, such as evading arrest, which does not necessitate the action occurring in Hutchinson County. Venue is not an essential element of the offense. Even if it were required for the appellant to know that McWilliams was a peace officer attempting to arrest him, evidence shows he was aware. Captain McWilliams testified that while on patrol, he observed the appellant driving recklessly and committing multiple traffic violations. After signaling for a traffic stop with lights and siren, the appellant failed to yield, continued driving recklessly, and ultimately collided with McWilliams' vehicle during the pursuit, which lasted two to three minutes. The collision concluded the chase, and the appellant was arrested after expressing confusion about the officers’ pursuit. Deputy Farmer corroborated McWilliams' account of the events. Appellant demonstrated awareness that McWilliams was a peace officer attempting a lawful arrest, as evidenced by his actions. Prior to the activation of emergency lights and siren, appellant executed a U-turn towards the marked police vehicle, indicating recognition of the officer's presence. The pursuit, initiated when McWilliams activated the lights and siren, involved appellant making evasive maneuvers and driving recklessly at high speeds. The chase lasted two to three minutes, covering approximately two miles in Hutchinson County and extending into Carson County, during which McWilliams maintained a close distance behind appellant. Ultimately, appellant collided with the police vehicle while reversing. The trial court found sufficient evidence to conclude that appellant intentionally fled from McWilliams, which constituted a criminal offense and breached the conditions of his deferred adjudication community supervision. The trial court's decision is upheld, and the judgment is affirmed.