Rudy Pena v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-10-00206-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 27, 2011; Texas; State Appellate Court

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Rudy Pena appealed the trial court's ruling that adjudicated him guilty of possessing chemicals with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance, resulting in a twenty-year sentence. Pena had originally pleaded guilty in December 2009 under a plea bargain, receiving ten years of deferred adjudication community supervision, a $5,000 fine, and $280 in restitution. The State moved to adjudicate guilt two months later, alleging that Pena violated supervision terms by fleeing from a peace officer, Aaron K. McWilliams, who was attempting a lawful arrest. The trial court found this allegation substantiated and adjudicated Pena guilty.

Pena raised four points on appeal, challenging the sufficiency of evidence regarding his knowledge of McWilliams’ status as a peace officer and the nature of the detention. The court interpreted these points as claims of abuse of discretion in the adjudication process. Under Texas law, the State must prove by a preponderance of evidence that a defendant violated community supervision terms. The court emphasized that the standard for reviewing such cases is whether the trial court abused its discretion, with the evidence viewed favorably to the court's decision. The trial court's role as the trier of fact allows it to assess the credibility of testimonies, and the record must contain some evidence supporting its decision for the adjudication to stand. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court's ruling.

Appellant's four points of error challenge the sufficiency of evidence regarding his knowledge that McWilliams was a peace officer attempting to arrest him. For a conviction of evading arrest, it is crucial that the defendant is aware of the officer's intent to arrest. Appellant argues he was unaware McWilliams was a peace officer. However, the evidence presented contradicts this claim. Captain McWilliams, while on patrol with Deputy Farmer, observed Appellant driving erratically, committing multiple traffic violations, including speeding and failing to signal. After following Appellant and witnessing further violations, McWilliams activated his emergency lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop. Despite this, Appellant failed to yield and recklessly drove, causing a collision with the police vehicle after reversing toward it during the pursuit. Testimonies indicated that Appellant, upon being apprehended, questioned the officers about the chase, suggesting he recognized their pursuit. Additionally, he had performed a U-turn towards the clearly marked police vehicle before the lights and siren were activated. This evidence indicates that Appellant knew or should have known that McWilliams was a peace officer attempting to detain him.

A police pursuit initiated by McWilliams in Hutchinson County involved the appellant, who made evasive maneuvers and drove recklessly at excessive speeds after McWilliams activated his lights and siren. The pursuit lasted two to three minutes, covering approximately two miles in Hutchinson County and extending into Carson County, during which McWilliams maintained a distance of thirty to fifty yards behind the appellant. The appellant ultimately reversed his vehicle, colliding with the police vehicle. Farmer corroborated that the lights and siren were activated throughout the chase. The court referenced Rogers v. State, stating that evidence can be sufficient even without direct proof of knowledge when a suspect flees from a marked police vehicle. The trial court found that the appellant intentionally fled from McWilliams, a known peace officer, which constituted a criminal offense and breached the terms of his deferred adjudication community supervision. The court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court's judgment, overruling the appellant's points of error.