Rudy Pena v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-10-00206-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 27, 2011; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Rudy Pena appeals the trial court's order adjudicating him guilty of possessing chemicals with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, resulting in a twenty-year sentence. Initially, in December 2009, he entered a plea bargain for deferred adjudication community supervision for ten years, with a $5,000 fine and $280 restitution, agreeing to abide by the law. Shortly thereafter, the State alleged he violated this supervision by fleeing from a peace officer, Aaron K. McWilliams, during an attempted arrest. The trial court found the allegation true, leading to the adjudication. 

Pena appeals, raising four points of error regarding the sufficiency of evidence that he knew McWilliams was a peace officer and was attempting a lawful arrest. These points are interpreted as a challenge to the trial court's discretion in adjudicating his guilt. The court's review focuses on whether the trial judge abused discretion, requiring evidence that supports the decision to adjudicate. Evidence must show, by a preponderance, that Pena violated his supervision conditions, and the judge's findings are upheld if there is any supporting evidence. The judge serves as the trier of fact, assessing credibility during the adjudication hearing. The appellate court affirms the trial court's decision.

Appellant's four points of error contest the sufficiency of evidence regarding his knowledge that McWilliams was a peace officer and that McWilliams was attempting to arrest or detain him. Texas law requires that a defendant must know a peace officer is trying to make an arrest to be guilty of evading arrest or detention. Appellant claims he was unaware of McWilliams' status as a peace officer or of the attempted arrest. However, the evidence presented contradicts this claim. 

Captain McWilliams and Deputy Farmer were on routine patrol when they observed appellant driving recklessly, committing multiple traffic violations, and failing to yield to police authority. After following appellant for some time and witnessing further violations, McWilliams activated his emergency lights and siren to conduct a traffic stop. Despite this, appellant continued to evade. During the pursuit, he drove dangerously, causing another vehicle to veer off the road and eventually collided head-on with McWilliams' vehicle after reversing toward it. 

Appellant, the sole occupant of his vehicle, was pinned and questioned McWilliams about the incident, suggesting he believed he had been chasing the officers. The marked police vehicle further indicates that appellant should have recognized McWilliams as a peace officer attempting to detain him. The evidence supports that appellant knew or should have known McWilliams was a law enforcement officer trying to arrest him.

The pursuit initiated in Hutchinson County when Officer McWilliams activated his lights and siren, prompting the appellant to engage in evasive maneuvers and drive recklessly at high speeds. The chase extended approximately two miles in Hutchinson County and continued into Carson County while McWilliams maintained a distance of thirty to fifty yards behind the appellant. The pursuit lasted two to three minutes, concluding when the appellant reversed his vehicle and struck the police car. Testimony confirmed that the lights and siren were activated throughout the pursuit. The court found sufficient evidence to conclude that the appellant intentionally fled from McWilliams, recognizing him as a peace officer attempting a lawful arrest, which constituted a criminal offense and violated the appellant's deferred adjudication community supervision terms.

The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, overruling the appellant’s claims, including a venue-related argument. It noted that the State must prove by a preponderance of evidence that venue is proper, but for adjudication proceedings, this standard does not apply as these are considered administrative matters. Furthermore, the commission of the offense of evading arrest or detention does not necessitate that the action occur within Hutchinson County, as venue is not an essential element of the crime.

The State successfully proved that the appellant was aware or should have been aware that McWilliams was a peace officer executing a lawful arrest in Hutchinson County. An insurance company refused to cover defense costs for a state court case, citing policy exclusions similar to J(5) and J(6). The court determined that the exclusions did not apply, as the damage to the well stemmed from negligence related to a specific component (the tubing and well bore) rather than the entire well. Although Evanston sought to rely on the reasoning from the Houston Bldg. case, the court found that the facts were distinguishable; in Houston Bldg., the damages arose directly from work on the subject of the contract, which was not the case here. Thus, the present case did not warrant the same exclusions. The court concluded that D&L’s interpretation of the exclusions was reasonable, affirming the trial court's decision to grant D&L’s motion for summary judgment and overruling Evanston’s sole issue. Justice Pirtle dissented without a written opinion. The court noted that there was consensus on the existence of the commercial general liability policy throughout the dispute.