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David A. Marquez v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-10-00366-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 30, 2011; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
David Anastacio Marquez appealed the revocation of his community supervision, specifically contesting the assessment of $637.50 in court-appointed attorney’s fees. Marquez had initially pleaded guilty to first-degree felony arson in February 2009, agreeing to ten years of probation, a $1,000 fine, $5,000 in restitution, $285 in court costs, and $337.50 in attorney’s fees, based on a financial affidavit indicating indigence. Following a motion to revoke his supervision due to failure to pay these fees, a second attorney was appointed, and the court ultimately revoked his supervision in August 2010, increasing the attorney’s fees owed to $637.50. Marquez argued that the trial court erred by ordering the higher fee without evidence of his ability to pay. The court's findings did not include an assessment of his financial resources, which is necessary to impose such fees under Texas law (article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). The State acknowledged the lack of a relevant determination but maintained that Marquez should be required to pay the original $337.50 as per his plea agreement. The court modified the judgment to reflect the initial agreed-upon amount, affirming the decision as modified. A factual basis must be established to determine a defendant's ability to repay attorney's fees, as supported by Barrera v. State. A plea agreement is treated as a contract between the State and the defendant, with the defendant presumed to have accepted the terms knowingly and voluntarily unless proven otherwise. The appellant did not argue that his plea was unknowing or involuntary. The trial court explicitly stated the appellant would pay $337.50 in attorney's fees, which was also documented in the plea papers and community supervision order. The court concluded that the appellant had the financial ability to pay this amount, which was part of a previous judgment. However, there was insufficient evidence regarding the appellant's ability to repay an additional $300.00 in fees imposed in a subsequent judgment. Consequently, the judgment was modified to require payment of $337.50 instead of $637.50, and the trial court’s modified judgment was affirmed, with Justice Pirtle dissenting.