Angel Soto v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-12-00058-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 5, 2012; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas reviewed the case of Angel Soto, who was found guilty of failure to stop and render aid after striking Cornilio Hernandez with his vehicle, leading to Hernandez's death. Soto was sentenced to six years in confinement, enhanced by a deadly weapon finding. On appeal, Soto contested the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the deadly weapon finding and the exclusion of evidence regarding the complainant's intoxication at the time of the incident.

The appellate court determined that while the trial court correctly excluded the complainant's drug-related evidence as irrelevant, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's deadly weapon finding. Consequently, the court modified the trial court’s judgment to remove the deadly weapon designation while affirming the judgment as modified. The incident occurred on September 19, 2010, when Soto struck Hernandez and fled the scene, later confessing to law enforcement. Testimonies from witnesses established Soto's involvement and actions post-accident. The trial court had sustained objections to evidence concerning the complainant’s alleged drug use, deeming it hearsay and irrelevant to Soto's failure to stop and render aid.

Dr. Lloyd White, a contract pathologist for the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office, conducted the autopsy on the complainant. Appellant sought to cross-examine White regarding the complainant’s toxicology report, questioning the relevance of the complainant's intoxication to his cause of death. The trial court permitted a voir dire, during which the State objected to the evidence as irrelevant. The court ruled that, since White concluded the cause of death was blunt force trauma from the accident and that intoxication was not a contributing factor, testimony on the complainant's intoxication was irrelevant and prejudicial. 

The jury convicted Appellant of failure to stop and render aid, also determining his vehicle was a deadly weapon. Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for this deadly weapon finding, which both parties acknowledged was lacking. The court noted that the relevant timeframe for assessing Appellant's use of the vehicle as a deadly weapon pertains to the period after the complainant was struck. Citing precedents, the court found no evidence that Appellant drove recklessly after the accident, concluding that the evidence did not support the deadly weapon finding. 

While the court partially sustained Appellant’s argument regarding the deadly weapon finding, it clarified that since this finding did not influence the offense's grade or punishment range, the appropriate remedy was to delete the deadly weapon finding and affirm the trial court's judgment without a new trial on punishment. Appellant also argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the complainant’s intoxication, asserting its relevance to both the cause of death and the complainant's fault in the accident.

The court addressed the appeal of Angel Soto, who was convicted for failure to stop and render aid after striking Cornilio Hernandez with his vehicle, resulting in Hernandez's death. The key points include:

1. The offense solely concerns actions taken after the accident, making the complainant's sobriety and fault irrelevant to the charge against Soto.
2. The appellate court partially upheld Soto's appeal, modifying the trial court's judgment by removing the deadly weapon finding due to insufficient evidence, while affirming the remainder of the trial court's judgment.
3. The trial included testimonies from witnesses who observed Soto leave the scene and identified him as the driver. Soto later confessed to leaving without rendering aid.
4. The trial court excluded evidence concerning the complainant's intoxication, which Soto argued was relevant to his defense, but the court deemed it irrelevant.

Ultimately, the judgment was affirmed as modified, specifically deleting the deadly weapon finding.

The trial court questioned the relevance of the complainant's drug use to Appellant's failure to stop and render aid, concluding it did not constitute a defense to the charged offense. Appellant contended that this information was part of the full narrative necessary for jury understanding. The State objected to the introduction of drug use evidence under Rule 404, and the trial court upheld this objection, citing hearsay concerns. A motion in limine was granted, requiring Appellant to approach the bench before inquiring about any substances in the complainant's system. Dr. Lloyd White, who performed the autopsy, was later called to testify. Appellant sought to cross-examine him regarding the toxicology report, particularly about the complainant's intoxication and its relation to the cause of death. The trial court allowed a voir dire but ruled that testimony about the complainant's substance use was irrelevant, as it did not contribute to the cause of death, which was determined to be blunt force trauma from the accident. The jury subsequently found Appellant guilty of failure to stop and render aid, also ruling that his vehicle was used as a deadly weapon. Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the deadly weapon finding, which the State agreed with. The court noted that the relevant time frame for assessing the use of the vehicle as a deadly weapon was post-accident, referencing the Cates case, which established that evidence must show the vehicle was operated in a manner capable of causing serious harm after the accident. Both parties acknowledged the lack of eyewitness accounts of reckless driving from Appellant after the incident, and the court evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, ultimately finding no supporting evidence for the deadly weapon finding.

The jury could have concluded that the Appellant's actions while operating his vehicle could result in death or serious bodily injury, as he failed to stop and provide aid after striking the complainant. The Appellant's request for a new trial on punishment is only partially sustained; however, since the deadly weapon finding does not affect the offense's grade or punishment range, the proper action is to delete the deadly weapon finding and affirm the modified judgment, rather than remanding for a new trial. The Appellant's second issue, which concerns the exclusion of evidence regarding the complainant’s intoxication, is overruled. The court determined that the complainant's state at the time of the accident does not pertain to the Appellant's obligation to stop and render aid. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is modified to remove the deadly weapon finding, and the remainder of the Appellant's issues are overruled, affirming the judgment as modified.