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Rukmi Indah Idniarti, Rubby Valentina Issakh, Yohannes Roditya, Mulyani Irianti, Dina Novia Sari, Novianti Debby Putri, Drrj Tri Saputra, and Siti Sarah v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. and Bell Helicopter Korea, Inc.
Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-12-00045-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 9, 2013; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Appellants Rukmi Indah Idniarti and others appeal a no-evidence summary judgment in their wrongful death suit against Appellees Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. and Bell Helicopter Korea, Inc. The case stems from a February 2001 helicopter crash involving a helicopter assembled by an Indonesian company under a licensing agreement with Bell. The helicopter, purchased by the Indonesian Forestry Department, was maintained by PT Dayajasa Transindo Pratama at the time of the crash, which resulted in the deaths of the pilot, co-pilot, and passenger. Idniarti's initial lawsuit, filed two years post-crash, included claims of negligence, product liability, misrepresentation, fraud, and gross negligence but faced multiple dismissals for jurisdictional issues. The case was reinstated in Tarrant County in June 2009 after Idniarti filed a motion to reactivate it. Following several trial date extensions, the trial court granted summary judgment in November 2011. Idniarti argues that the trial court erred in granting Bell's no-evidence motion for summary judgment, primarily contesting the striking of her expert Arthur Childers’ affidavit and the denial of depositions for key Bell witnesses. She claims the trial court abused its discretion by excluding other evidence and denying her motion for a continuance. The ruling states that if an appellee raises multiple independent grounds for evidence exclusion and the appellant fails to challenge all grounds on appeal, the appellant waives the right to contest the ruling. Idniarti has forfeited her complaints on appeal regarding the trial court's decisions on the affidavits of Childers and Wells, as well as Sparks’s affidavit, due to her failure to address the grounds for sustaining Bell’s objections. Additionally, her argument about the trial court improperly striking her fact witnesses lacks merit because she did not contest whether her late designation of witnesses prejudiced Bell, another basis for exclusion. The trial court sustained multiple objections from Bell against the affidavits, while allowing some objections to be overruled. Although Idniarti claimed she was not allowed to depose Bell’s key witnesses, the court’s order only quashed specific deposition notices and did not prevent depositions entirely. Idniarti did not challenge the grounds for the quash order on appeal, which led to another forfeiture of her complaint. Lastly, in addressing the no-evidence grounds for Bell's summary judgment motion, Idniarti only contested two grounds; however, since the trial court did not specify which grounds were relied upon for its ruling, the summary judgment can be affirmed based on any meritorious theory presented. Consequently, Idniarti’s first, third, fourth, and parts of her fifth and sixth issues have been overruled. When a trial court's judgment is based on multiple independent grounds, the aggrieved party must challenge each ground to avoid affirmance on unchallenged grounds. In this case, Bell argued that Idniarti failed to provide evidence of the accident's cause or any defect in the helicopter, undermining Idniarti's claims of strict product liability (including unsafe design, manufacturing defect, and inadequate warning), as well as claims related to express and implied warranties, misrepresentation, and negligence. The trial court granted no-evidence summary judgment for Bell. Idniarti contended that her negligence claim was supported by negligence per se and fleet liability, and that res ipsa loquitur established causation for her design and manufacturing defect claims. However, she did not adequately challenge each independent ground for summary judgment. Idniarti alleged design and manufacturing defects related to a gearbox failure and non-compliance with safety standards, arguing that res ipsa loquitur applied due to the helicopter's crash shortly after sale. Nonetheless, expert testimony indicated insufficient evidence to determine the cause of the accident, with a lack of relevant records ten years post-crash, including no documentation of the helicopter’s condition or operational history. Relevant case law is cited to clarify the criteria for establishing manufacturing and design defects, as well as the application of res ipsa loquitur, which requires proof that an accident typically does not occur without negligence and that the instrumentality was under the defendant’s control. Idniarti contended that the trial court erred by denying her a short continuance for the November 2, 2011 summary judgment hearing and the November 7, 2011 trial. However, she was not entitled to a continuance due to a lack of diligence in utilizing civil procedure rules for discovery, as established in case law. The determination of whether a nonmovant had adequate time for discovery is specific to each case and subject to an abuse of discretion standard. The record indicates that Idniarti had already received multiple continuances prior to her October 17, 2011 motion, including a 60-day extension for discovery responses and several rescheduled trial dates. Despite difficulties conducting discovery from Indonesia, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance. Consequently, Idniarti's issues were overruled, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed.