Richard Mendoza, Jr v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-13-00146-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; July 3, 2014; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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On July 3, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas upheld the conviction of Richard Mendoza, Jr. for murder, sentencing him to fifty years of confinement and a $10,000 fine. Mendoza's appeal raised several issues: he argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, primarily citing uncorroborated accomplice testimony; he claimed the trial court erred by not including an accomplice-as-a-matter-of-fact jury instruction; he reiterated the insufficiency of the evidence; and he contended that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a recording of a conversation between him and a detective. 

The case background reveals that in November 2002, Mendoza, aged seventeen, drove three younger individuals to a field under the pretense of mushroom hunting, while carrying a shotgun. Witnesses testified that Mendoza shot his best friend, Christopher Daigle, in the back of the head. Following the shooting, Mendoza instructed his companions to assist in disposing of Daigle's body, leading to actions that included moving the body and burning their clothes. Mendoza later fabricated stories about Daigle's whereabouts, which he communicated to a detective, claiming he had last seen Daigle at a mall. Additionally, he confessed to a friend that he shot Daigle. The court ultimately denied Mendoza's motions for rehearing, affirming the original judgment.

In January 2009, Daigle’s mother recognized Hall at a restaurant, who confirmed hearing a rumor that Mendoza had killed Daigle. At her request, Hall contacted detectives and guided them to a field where Mendoza claimed to have shot Daigle. In July 2011, another witness, Fretz, led detectives to a nearby field, later corroborated by Rodriguez, where a bone fragment was discovered. DNA analysis indicated the fragment was significantly more likely to belong to Daigle than any other Caucasian individual. Detective McKinnon submitted an affidavit stating that Phillip Gardner saw Daigle in Mendoza’s truck with Rodriguez and Fretz on the day of his disappearance, though Gardner’s earlier statement did not mention Fretz. During the trial, Detectives Tippit and McKinnon testified the offense occurred in Fort Bend County, and McKinnon relayed that Brittany Parker indicated Nick Camerillo, not Mendoza, was responsible for Daigle’s death. Additionally, Detective Stepp noted possible gang involvement in Daigle's case, while Tobias Tzur claimed to have seen Daigle after the alleged murder date.

Mendoza argued on appeal that Fretz and Rodriguez should be considered accomplice witnesses, which would necessitate a jury instruction on accomplice testimony. The court’s decision not to provide this instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Under Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, accomplice testimony must be corroborated by other evidence. For a witness to be deemed an accomplice, they must have taken affirmative actions promoting the offense. Mere knowledge or concealment of the crime does not qualify a witness as an accomplice. The presence of a witness at the crime scene or involvement in a different offense does not automatically classify them as accomplices. If evidence is conflicting regarding a witness's status, the jury may determine their status, but if evidence clearly indicates they are not accomplices, a jury instruction is not necessary.

Mendoza argues that Fretz and Rodriguez are accomplice witnesses due to their involvement in concealing Daigle's murder by moving his body and burning his clothes. However, the court distinguishes that these actions do not constitute an affirmative act to promote the murder, as established in the Druery case, where witnesses who did not warn the victim or actively participate in the murder were not deemed accomplices despite receiving compensation and assisting in body disposal. Similarly, even if Fretz and Rodriguez were aware of Mendoza's intentions to confront Daigle, their lack of affirmative assistance in the actual assault or murder excludes them from being classified as accomplice witnesses. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled that their testimony did not require corroboration, and it was within its discretion to omit an accomplice instruction from the jury charge since no factual dispute existed regarding their status as accomplices.

Regarding the sufficiency of evidence for conviction, the standard of review entails evaluating all evidence in favor of the verdict to determine if any rational fact-finder could conclude that all elements of the offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasizes that both circumstantial and direct evidence contribute equally to establishing guilt, and any conflicting inferences are to be resolved in favor of the verdict.

Mendoza asserts that his conviction lacks legal support for several reasons: (1) he claims the Fort Bend County trial court lacked jurisdiction due to insufficient evidence that the offense occurred there rather than in Brazoria County; (2) he argues the detective’s affidavit for his arrest warrant contained false information; (3) he contends the State did not indict him within ninety days of his arrest; (4) he points out the State failed to present witness interview reports, did not call a medical examiner to testify about Daigle’s death, and did not introduce physical evidence; (5) he emphasizes a detective’s testimony that Brittany Parker said Nick Camerillo, not Mendoza, killed Daigle; (6) he highlights testimony regarding potential gang involvement in Daigle’s disappearance; and (7) he mentions Tobias Tzur’s testimony that he saw Daigle after the alleged date of the murder.

The court finds Mendoza's first claim unpersuasive, as testimony from Detectives Tippit and McKinnon establishes that the offense occurred in Fort Bend County, affirming the court's jurisdiction. Regarding the second point, while the affidavit contained discrepancies, testimony from Rodriguez and Fretz supports the jury's conclusion that Fretz was present on the day Daigle went missing. Mendoza's third argument about the timeline for indictment is dismissed, as the relevant statute does not affect the admissibility or weight of evidence. 

On the fourth point, the court notes that the State provided sufficient evidence, including eyewitness and DNA evidence, to support the jury's conclusion regarding Daigle’s death and Mendoza’s involvement. Finally, though Detective McKinnon referenced a statement from Parker implicating Camerillo, the testimonies of Rodriguez, Fretz, and Hall collectively affirm that Mendoza, not Camerillo, was responsible for Daigle’s death. The court upholds the jury's findings, concluding that sufficient evidence supports Mendoza's conviction.

Mendoza was convicted of murdering Daigle, with conflicting testimonies regarding the identity of the killer. Detective Stepp indicated gang involvement, but witnesses Rodriguez and Fretz identified Mendoza as the perpetrator, and Hall claimed Mendoza confessed. The jury's resolution of these conflicting inferences favored the verdict, confirming sufficient evidence that Mendoza killed Daigle. Mendoza argued the evidence was insufficient due to testimony from Tobias Tzur, who claimed to have seen Daigle alive after the alleged murder date; however, the jury again resolved this in favor of the prosecution.

The trial court's decision on evidence admission is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs only if the decision is irrational. Mendoza challenged the authenticity of a recorded call with Detective Stepp, but the court found it properly authenticated under Texas Rule of Evidence 901(b). The speaker self-identified as Mendoza and provided detailed accounts consistent with the case, supporting the call's admission as evidence.

In conclusion, the court upheld Mendoza's conviction for murder, finding the evidence sufficient, and ruled that the trial court correctly admitted the recorded conversation without requiring an accomplice jury instruction for Fretz and Rodriguez, affirming the lower court's judgment.