Donald E. Carter v. Attorney General of the State of Texas

Citation: Not availableDocket: 04-13-00424-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 6, 2014; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio, Texas, affirmed the trial court's decision regarding Donald E. Carter's appeal against the Attorney General of Texas. The trial court had previously established that Carter was in arrears for child support payments amounting to $28,504.04 based on a 1994 order. Carter filed a suit in 2013 challenging the validity of a 2007 order that found him in arrears, claiming the Attorney General failed to enforce the original judgment in a timely manner and that the trial court had lost jurisdiction after his youngest child’s emancipation in 2008.

The court noted that Carter's claims involved issues of res judicata, revival of a dormant judgment, alleged inaccuracies in child support records, and procedural errors in his appeal. The trial court denied Carter's petition and granted the Attorney General's motion to dismiss, stating that the November 6, 2007, order was final and that Carter was barred from litigating those issues again. Carter's later attempts to amend his petition were also dismissed, with the court finding no waiver of sovereign immunity and deeming his arguments insufficient. The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling, confirming that all of Carter's claims were barred by res judicata and dismissing his pleadings with prejudice.

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction challenges the trial court's authority over a cause of action, and such motions are reviewed de novo. If a trial court dismisses a case with prejudice without specifying grounds, an appellate court will affirm based on any supported legal theory. In the case at hand, Carter argues that the trial court incorrectly dismissed his petition citing jurisdictional issues and res judicata. The Attorney General counters that Carter admitted during a prior hearing that he had previously attempted to litigate the same issues in 2007, thereby invoking res judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents parties from re-litigating matters already adjudicated, as well as claims that could have been raised in the earlier action. The elements required to establish res judicata include: 1) a final judgment on the merits by a competent court; 2) identity of parties or privies; and 3) a second action based on the same claims that were or could have been raised in the first action. The doctrine applies to final judgments, including divorce decrees and arrearage judgments.

The court found sufficient evidence to support that: 1) a competent jurisdiction issued a final judgment in 2007; 2) the same parties were involved in both the 2007 and 2013 hearings; and 3) the claims presented in 2013 were the same as those from the 2007 action. Consequently, the trial court correctly determined that Carter’s claims were barred by res judicata. Carter's inaction regarding the 2007 judgment culminated in final judgments, and he acknowledged ongoing efforts to resolve the case since 2007, while the Attorney General did not demonstrate any violation of the child support order related to the 2007 judgment.

Carter contests the arrears calculated by the trial court in a 2007 order, claiming discrepancies in the amount. He also argues that his prior motion for a new trial and a default judgment against the Attorney General’s Office in 2007, which was overturned due to lack of notification, addressed the same issues. However, since these arguments were previously litigated, they are barred by res judicata, and the trial court's dismissal of Carter's claims is upheld. 

Carter asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce a dormant judgment from May 17, 1994, but the Attorney General argues that the dormant judgment statute does not apply to child support judgments under the Texas Family Code. The Texas Legislature amended section 34.001 in 2009 to clarify that it does not apply to child support judgments, making Carter's reliance on an earlier version of the statute incorrect. Consequently, the trial court's enforcement of the 1994 judgment in the November 6, 2007 order is deemed proper.

Regarding Carter's complaint about the Attorney General's failure to maintain accurate records of child support payments, this issue was not raised before the trial court, and therefore, the appellate court does not address it. All issues presented by Carter related to the arrearages and the enforcement of judgments are overruled.

Carter failed to preserve his appellate issues by not raising them in the trial court, as required by TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1, which mandates that complaints must be timely made through requests, objections, or motions. His first three appellate issues relate to the late filing of the court reporter’s record, which Carter claims occurred without notice or extension and negatively impacted his ability to contest the record's accuracy. However, he did not cite any legal authority supporting a claim for relief based on the late filing. The court noted that while pro se pleadings are reviewed with leniency, the same standards apply as to those drafted by attorneys. Carter's issues were found to be insufficiently briefed under Rule 38.1, leading to their overruling. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.