Diane Maddox v. Winda Lou Cindy Maddox

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-10-00055-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 8, 2011; Texas; State Appellate Court

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After a divorce following over forty years of marriage, R.V. and Winda Lou Cindy Maddox were awarded equal shares of an employee savings plan accumulated during R.V.'s employment. Upon R.V.'s death, the remaining balance of $139,188.12 was distributed to his widow, Diane Maddox. Cindy contested this distribution, asserting her entitlement to half of the corpus based on the divorce decree. The trial court ruled in Cindy's favor, awarding her $69,594.06. Diane appealed, arguing that federal law, specifically the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), applied, making her the rightful beneficiary.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, noting that Diane failed to preserve ERISA-related arguments for appeal, as these were not raised during the trial. The court emphasized that without a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), ERISA did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction; rather, it would have introduced a conflict between state community property law and federal law regarding beneficiary rights. The decree's language was determined to leave the corpus undivided, and the references to payment types did not affect the corpus issue. The case was originally appealed to the Twelfth Court of Appeals but was transferred to the Sixth Appellate District without conflict in relevant precedents.

Cindy is entitled to one-half of the value of the savings plan corpus as determined at R.V.'s death, but there is disagreement on the decree's treatment of the corpus. Diane asserts that the decree grants the entirety of the corpus to R.V., while Cindy argues that it was intended to be divided between them. If the decree is found not to divide the corpus, Cindy claims it remains undivided community property, jointly owned by her and R.V. The court must interpret the divorce decree as a contract, adhering to standard contract interpretation rules. It will determine if the decree is clear or ambiguous; if it is unambiguous, the court will enforce it as written, focusing on the parties' intentions. The decree stipulates that R.V. receives half of the yearly payments from the savings plan and must pay Cindy the other half within ten days of receipt. Each provision must be harmonized, ensuring all clauses serve a purpose and are given their ordinary meaning. The court cannot modify the contract under the guise of interpretation. The decree designates R.V. as a constructive trustee for Cindy’s benefit regarding the payments from the plan.

The employment-benefit catch-all provision in the decree grants R.V. all benefits from past, present, or future employment, excluding the Champion Savings Plan pin number 3336. Diane claims that the plan's corpus should pass to R.V. under this provision, while Cindy argues for an equal division or an undivided status of the corpus. The decree is deemed unambiguous, necessitating a literal interpretation without modification by the court. The decree specifies the distribution of yearly payments from the plan but does not explicitly address the corpus, leaving it undivided. It cannot be interpreted to award half the corpus to Cindy or to allocate it to R.V., with the exclusion of plan benefits from the catch-all provision being clear. The phrase "as set forth above" refers to prior distributions, not to limit exclusions. The trial court correctly determined that the decree addressed the yearly checks but did not distinguish them from the plan's balance. The funds in the plan were identified as community property at R.V.'s death. Diane's argument citing Stephens v. Marlowe misinterprets the presumption of partitioning, which requires proof that previous decrees did not cover the property in question. Cindy bore the burden of proof regarding the corpus's disposition, and the trial court appropriately awarded her half of it. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.