Pioneer Land & Cattle Co. v. Leanne Farrell Collier

Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-12-00320-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 15, 2013; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Pioneer Land Cattle Co. appeals a summary judgment from the 72nd District Court in Lubbock County, which ruled against all of Pioneer’s claims in favor of Leanne Farrell Collier. Pioneer, a Texas corporation established in 1992, is solely owned and operated by Greg Collier, who, after a tumultuous marriage, divorced Leanne in 2007. Notably, Pioneer was not included as a party in the divorce proceedings. During the divorce, Greg argued that certain property, particularly horses, belonged to Pioneer, while Leanne asserted they were community property. The trial court ruled in favor of Leanne, determining that Greg could not overcome the community presumption concerning the ownership of the horses. This characterization was upheld in subsequent appeals. Following the divorce decree, Pioneer claimed ownership of specific items awarded to Leanne and subsequently filed suit for conversion, breach of contract, quantum meruit, interference with business relations, and attorney's fees. After Pioneer amended its claim to include a request for declaratory judgment, Leanne successfully moved for summary judgment, resulting in a final judgment that dismissed all of Pioneer’s claims. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Pioneer raises 18 issues in its appeal, with the first ten targeting the trial court’s no-evidence summary judgment rulings. These include challenges to summary judgments on: (1) declaratory judgment action, (2) conversion claims, (3) breach of contract claim, (4) quantum meruit claim, (5) interference with business relations claims, and (6) attorney’s fees claim. The remaining eight issues contest traditional summary judgment rulings, specifically: (7) collateral estoppel defense, (8) statute of frauds defense, (9) limitations defenses, (10) impossibility defense, and (11) justification defense.

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, considering evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and crediting favorable evidence while disregarding contrary evidence unless it cannot be dismissed by reasonable jurors. When both no-evidence and traditional summary judgments are filed, the no-evidence standard under Rule 166a(i) is assessed first. A no-evidence motion acts as a pretrial directed verdict, allowing a party without the burden of proof to seek summary judgment by demonstrating a lack of evidence for essential elements of the opposing party's claims or defenses. The motion must specify which elements lack evidence, and if the nonmovant fails to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, the court must grant the motion. Conversely, if the nonmovant provides more than a scintilla of evidence, a no-evidence summary judgment is inappropriate. For traditional summary judgments, the movant must prove no genuine issue of material fact exists and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, with summary judgment granted if an essential element is conclusively negated or an affirmative defense is established.

Pioneer seeks a declaratory judgment asserting ownership of certain horses listed in its petition. Leanne argues that Pioneer has no evidence of ownership for four horses awarded to her in a divorce decree. In response, Pioneer submitted an affidavit from Greg, its President, claiming ownership of the horses Sea, SI Ripcord, and VLW Imadriftertoo, stating they were purchased by Pioneer. However, the affidavit does not mention Ciderwood Whiskey. Additionally, Pioneer provided three Horse Ownership Summaries indicating ownership of Ciderwood Whiskey, Sea, and VLW Imadriftertoo, alongside other documents, including a check related to Ripcord and records from the American Quarter Horse Association (AQHA) noting the sale of these horses in February 2009.

While Greg's affidavit suggests Pioneer owned the horses, it lacks sufficient factual support and is deemed conclusory and self-serving, failing to raise a genuine issue of material fact. The only identification of the Horse Ownership Summaries is Greg's claim that they are Pioneer’s business records, but these records include unrelated documents, undermining their credibility. Although the AQHA records indicate past ownership, they confirm the horses were sold on February 10, 2009, which negates any current ownership claim by Pioneer. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Pioneer did not provide adequate evidence of ownership for any of the horses in question, affirming the denial of Pioneer’s claims.

The trial court's decision to grant Leanne's no-evidence summary judgment is upheld, as Pioneer failed to present sufficient evidence regarding its claims of conversion. Pioneer alleged that Leanne converted various properties, including a dog, washer and dryer units, three saddle racks, four horses, registration and breeding records, and three internet domain names. Leanne's summary judgment motion asserted that Pioneer could not prove ownership, possession, or entitlement to these items, nor that Leanne wrongfully controlled them.

To establish conversion, Pioneer needed to demonstrate ownership or entitlement, unlawful control by Leanne, and refusal to return the property. The trial court previously determined that Pioneer lacked evidence of ownership of the four horses, which undermines its conversion claim concerning them. Regarding the domain names, evidence presented through Greg's affidavit did not substantiate Pioneer's ownership, as the affidavit merely stated that the names were used by Pioneer and did not indicate they were transferred. Thus, Pioneer's claims concerning the domain names were also unsupported.

For the remaining items, Greg's affidavit claimed ownership but was deemed conclusory and insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Additionally, evidence indicated that during divorce proceedings, Greg claimed ownership of the dog as his separate property, further complicating Pioneer's ownership assertions. Consequently, the trial court's judgment in favor of Leanne is affirmed.

Pioneer presented an affidavit from Greg to support its claim regarding possession of property, including saddle racks and a washer and dryer, asserting that these items were last in Leanne's possession. However, the affidavit lacked specific details about when this property was last known to be with Leanne, failing to meet evidentiary standards. For the registration and breeding records, Greg claimed these documents were kept in a location accessible only to him and Leanne but did not identify the records, preventing a determination of ownership or wrongful possession. Consequently, the court ruled that Pioneer did not provide sufficient evidence to establish ownership or Leanne's unlawful possession, affirming the trial court's no-evidence summary judgment in favor of Leanne.

In addressing the breach of contract claim, Pioneer argued that a contract existed for the purchase and installation of windows at Leanne’s residence. Leanne's no-evidence motion highlighted Pioneer’s failure to demonstrate the existence of such a contract. The elements of a breach-of-contract claim require proof of a valid contract, performance by the plaintiff, a breach by the defendant, and resulting damages. Greg's affidavit, which claimed a contract existed, was deemed conclusory and insufficient to establish the essential elements of the breach claim. Although Home Depot statements could suggest evidence of performance, they did not substantiate the existence of a contract. Thus, the trial court's decision to grant Leanne's no-evidence summary judgment on the breach of contract claim was upheld.

Lastly, Pioneer claimed entitlement to quantum meruit damages for health insurance provided to Leanne in late 2008, expecting reimbursement, but further details on this claim were not elaborated in the excerpt.

Leanne's no-evidence motion for summary judgment argued that Pioneer failed to provide evidence of having paid health insurance premiums for November and December 2008. For Pioneer to recover under quantum meruit, it needed to demonstrate: 1) provision of valuable services or materials; 2) acceptance by Leanne; 3) that Leanne was aware Pioneer expected payment; and 4) reasonable notice of this expectation. Pioneer referenced Greg’s affidavit, its financial records, and a statement from FirstCare as evidence of premium payments. However, Greg’s affidavit did not specifically confirm payments for November and December 2008, indicating only that insurance was provided sometime between November 2008 and March 2009 and detailing a liability of approximately $3,021.58 due to non-payment. Pioneer's financial records showed two $500 payments for insurance during the relevant months, with one payment made per court order, but lacked evidence linking these payments directly to Leanne's premiums. The FirstCare statement was an invoice for January 2009 and did not identify Leanne. Consequently, the court found that Pioneer did not provide sufficient evidence for its claims, affirming Leanne’s summary judgment. 

Regarding Pioneer's claims of interference with business relations, it contended that Leanne disrupted its relationship with Hodge, a company with which Pioneer had a service contract, by canceling the contract after filing for divorce from Greg. Leanne argued that Pioneer could not demonstrate a valid contract with Hodge. Additionally, Pioneer claimed Leanne interfered with its rights to three domain names she canceled, but Leanne contended there was no evidence of Pioneer's ownership or contractual rights to those names. To succeed on these claims, Pioneer needed to establish: 1) a valid contract; 2) intentional interference by Leanne; 3) that the interference caused damage; and 4) actual damages suffered.

Leanne's no-evidence motion successfully challenges Pioneer's claims of tortious interference, as Pioneer fails to provide sufficient evidence of a contract with Hodge or Ingenux, Inc. Although Pioneer cites Greg's affidavit and several checks and invoices as evidence of a services contract with Hodge, these do not substantiate the existence of such a contract, merely suggesting a possibility. Additionally, Pioneer cannot demonstrate that any alleged interference by Leanne caused damages related to this contract. Regarding the domain names, Pioneer’s assertion lacks evidence of a gift from Leanne. The service agreement with Ingenux does not reference the domain names in question, and Greg's affidavit does not mention Ingenux, leading to the conclusion that there is no evidence supporting Pioneer's claims of interference with business relations.

Pioneer also seeks attorney’s fees but fails to establish a legal basis for recovery since it is not a “prevailing party” under breach of contract claims, nor does it argue that the trial court's denial of fees was inequitable. Consequently, the court upholds the trial court's no-evidence summary judgment regarding attorney’s fees.

Pioneer’s challenges to other summary judgment issues are rendered moot due to the affirmation of the no-evidence judgment. Leanne's motion for damages based on the claim of frivolous appeal is denied, as the appeal, though unsuccessful, is not deemed frivolous. The trial court's decision to grant Leanne's motion for no-evidence summary judgment is affirmed.