George Garza A/K/A George Osborne v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-12-00240-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; July 3, 2013; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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George Garza, also known as George Osborne, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop by Officer Allen Dial, a K-9 officer. The stop occurred in Corpus Christi, Texas, where Officer Dial's K-9 alerted him to the presence of drugs in Garza's vehicle, leading to the discovery of ten grams of cocaine. Garza was charged with possession of cocaine, a second-degree felony enhanced to a first-degree felony due to a prior conviction. 

Throughout the proceedings, Garza filed multiple motions, including for a speedy trial, Brady material, and to suppress the evidence. The trial court granted some of these motions but did not formally deny the motion to suppress. Following a plea bargain, Garza pleaded guilty and was sentenced to seven years in prison, with the trial court certifying his right to appeal issues raised prior to trial.

During the suppression hearing, Officer Dial testified about his role as a K-9 officer and the training of his dog, Kallen, who was certified to detect various narcotics. He was informed by narcotics officers about a vehicle suspected of involvement in drug transactions, which prompted him to stop Garza's vehicle. On cross-examination, Officer Dial admitted that he did not document the call from narcotics officers in his report, considering it unimportant at the time. The court ultimately reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Officer Dial initiated a traffic stop on appellant for failing to signal continuously for 100 feet during a lane change, acknowledging that the stop was pretextual due to suspicions of narcotics. During cross-examination, he confirmed that he initially asked the appellant about his residence and travel plans, which were unrelated to the traffic violation investigation. After the appellant provided his name, “George Garza,” Officer Dial informed him he would not issue a ticket for the violation but believed the stop's purpose continued as he needed to verify the appellant’s information and check for any warrants.

Officer Dial subsequently ran a background check on “George Garza,” which returned clear of any criminal history or outstanding warrants. He communicated with narcotics agents during the stop, indicating no reason to doubt the appellant's name at that point. After confirming there were no warrants, Officer Dial returned to the appellant's vehicle, asking further questions about the vehicle's purchase and insurance. He noted the appellant's nervousness, which he found suspicious, stating it was more pronounced than typical nervousness associated with being pulled over. Ultimately, he believed there was reasonable suspicion to continue the encounter based on the appellant's demeanor and the circumstances.

Officer Dial observed that the appellant appeared unusually nervous during a traffic stop, noting that this nervousness suggested the possibility of the appellant hiding something. Dial described the appellant's behavior, including reaching out of the window in a way that seemed to indicate an attempt to appear calm, despite his nervousness persisting even after Dial indicated no citation would be issued. Dial claimed to have noticed the appellant's elevated pulse, estimating it to be over 100 beats per minute, which he associated with anxiety. He had been trained to recognize signs of elevated pulse rates. 

During the initial interaction, Dial felt apprehensive about the appellant's movement toward the front of the vehicle, suspecting he could be hiding a weapon or contraband. However, Dial admitted he did not document this observation in his report, which referenced a video that did not clearly show the appellant's actions. After the appellant exited the vehicle, Dial asked about weapons, to which the appellant responded negatively. Dial conducted a pat-down, justified by the appellant's loose clothing and initial movements, and found no weapons. 

Dial acknowledged that the appellant was detained at this point. During the encounter, the appellant disclosed a prior prison record, which Dial interpreted as indicative of potential deception regarding his identity. Dial did not verify the appellant's name at the scene. Further questioning about weapons and drugs yielded negative responses from the appellant, who denied hiding anything in the vehicle. When Dial requested consent to search the vehicle, the appellant refused. Subsequently, Dial instructed the appellant to sit on the curb while he removed another individual from his vehicle.

Officer Dial conducted a drug detection test using Kallen, a trained canine, around the appellant’s vehicle. Kallen did not alert during the first pass but did alert by sitting at the driver’s side door during the second pass, indicating the presence of cocaine, which was later found. Officer Dial affirmed that he did not cue Kallen to sit and noted Kallen's consistent success in certification tests prior to this incident.

The State contended that the appellant did not preserve the issue for appeal because the trial court did not explicitly rule on his motion to suppress. The trial court certified that, despite being a plea bargain case, written motions were filed and ruled upon prior to trial, allowing for appeal. The State argued there was no record of the trial court’s intent to rule on the suppression motion before the guilty plea. To preserve an issue for appeal, a ruling—explicit or implicit—is required. During the plea hearing, the trial court acknowledged the motion to appeal but did not explicitly rule on the suppression motion. The trial court had granted other motions related to the case but did not address the motion to dismiss or the motion to suppress explicitly. The State suggested that the trial court's certification of the right to appeal might have pertained to the motion to dismiss, but there was no hearing or indication that this motion had been considered.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress and supported it with a memorandum, requesting a hearing that the trial court conducted with two witnesses testifying. At the plea hearing, the court affirmed appellant's right to appeal pretrial motion rulings. Appellant’s counsel deemed the motion meritorious, which the trial court acknowledged. Appellant sought bond pending appeal on this motion, which was granted by the court. The trial court indicated it would consider the case law cited by appellant before making a ruling. Although the State argued that the trial court's certification of appellant's right to appeal might refer to a motion to dismiss, there was no evidence in the record to support this claim. As such, the court implicitly denied the motion to suppress, and the appellant preserved error for appeal.

Regarding standing, the State claimed appellant lacked the right to challenge the vehicle search due to insufficient evidence of ownership or interest in the vehicle, referencing *Flores v. State*. However, unlike in *Flores*, where the defendant had no interest in the vehicle, the evidence showed appellant was the driver and had purchased the vehicle a week prior. Thus, the court concluded that appellant had standing.

On investigatory detention, appellant argued that Officer Dial unlawfully detained him after the traffic stop's purpose was fulfilled. Appellant asserted that once Officer Dial ran his information and indicated no citation would be issued, the stop should have ended. The trial court’s rulings on suppression motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, applying a bifurcated standard.

Deference is given to the trial court's findings of historical fact supported by the record and to mixed questions of law and fact that involve credibility and demeanor. Mixed questions of law and fact that do not depend on credibility are reviewed de novo. Evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and any unaddressed relevant fact by the trial court is implied to support its ruling if supported by the record.

Investigative detention constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, necessitating the state to demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. A temporary investigative detention is constitutional if (1) the officer's actions are justified at the outset, and (2) the detention's scope is reasonably related to the initial justification. Officers must cite specific articulable facts that warrant the detention. Furthermore, the duration of an investigative stop must be limited to what is necessary for the investigation. 

In the context of traffic stops, an officer must have probable cause for a traffic violation. During a routine traffic stop, officers can request a driver's license and registration and conduct a computer check. The stop must end once the officer confirms the driver’s license is valid, there are no outstanding warrants, and the vehicle isn’t stolen. Officers are not required to follow a specific order in investigations; they can check for suspected criminal activity and conduct routine checks simultaneously. However, if a routine check unduly prolongs the detention, it may be deemed unreasonable. Additionally, questioning unrelated to the initial stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as it does not extend the duration of the detention. Continued detention after the initial investigation concludes requires the officer to develop reasonable suspicion of further criminal conduct based on observations and information.

An appellate court evaluates the reasonableness of a detention using an objective standard, assessing whether a reasonable officer would believe the detention was justified based on the facts known at the time. The duration of the stop is deemed appropriate if the police acted diligently to confirm or dispel their suspicions. Although there is no strict time limit for an investigative stop, prolonged questioning beyond the scope of the initial stop may render it unreasonable. 

In this case, Officer Dial targeted the appellant's vehicle after receiving a call suggesting possible involvement in narcotics transactions but lacked reasonable suspicion initially. He waited for a traffic violation, which occurred when the appellant made an illegal lane change, prompting the stop. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Dial asked for identification and questioned the appellant regarding the vehicle's temporary buyer's license plate. The appellant revealed he had no paperwork from the seller, but the court found that this fact alone did not establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 

Officer Dial conducted a computer check on the appellant's driver’s license and the vehicle's status, which confirmed the appellant was clear of any issues. Despite this, Officer Dial continued the detention after consulting with a narcotics agent and investigating the vehicle identification number. During this process, he asked the appellant to exit the vehicle, citing concerns from the initial stop. The officer's rationale for further detention was challenged, particularly since the criminal history check returned clear. The court concluded that, based on the totality of circumstances, Officer Dial did not possess reasonable suspicion justifying the extended detention.

The court determined that the stop of the appellant concluded before he made a statement that could justify his detention. Officer Dial's belief that the appellant was engaged in criminal activity was based on his excessive nervousness and a forward movement during the initial stop. However, the court found no supporting actions from Officer Dial that would substantiate his concerns about potential weapons or contraband. Officer Dial did not ask the appellant to exit the vehicle after observing the movement and continued the stop without addressing the alleged nervousness or movement. The court referenced a prior ruling (Hamal v. State) indicating that nervousness alone does not establish reasonable suspicion for further detention. Consequently, the facts presented by Officer Dial did not justify a reasonable belief for continued detention. The trial court's refusal to suppress evidence was deemed an abuse of discretion, leading to the reversal of that denial and remand for further proceedings.