Shannon Keith Finley v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-10-00218-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 19, 2011; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Shannon Keith Finley was convicted of a third DWI offense and sentenced to seventeen years in prison. He appealed, raising four issues: 1) the trial court's denial of his change of venue motion, 2) the refusal to suppress evidence from a traffic stop, 3) the omission of a jury instruction regarding the legality of the traffic stop, and 4) the inclusion of his blood test results, which he claimed were obtained by an unqualified person. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Regarding the change of venue, Finley's request was based on past accusations of murder and significant media coverage surrounding both the murder case and his subsequent DWI arrest. The court noted that a defendant must demonstrate an inability to secure an impartial jury for a change of venue to be warranted. The ruling on such motions is reviewed for abuse of discretion. While a community's opinion influenced by media may necessitate a change of venue, mere publicity does not automatically imply prejudice against the defendant. The court found that Finley did not meet the burden of proof for a change of venue.

To obtain a change of venue due to media attention, a defendant must demonstrate that the publicity was pervasive, prejudicial, and inflammatory. The trial court can use voir dire to assess community sentiment, but evidence presented at the venue hearing may necessitate a venue change to ensure a fair trial. In support of his motion, Finley submitted two news articles. The first, published on October 21, 2009, noted that Finley and Crostley, charged in connection with the death of McClelland, maintained their innocence, highlighting that charges were dropped when a truck driver claimed responsibility. The second article, from January 21, 2010, identified Finley as a key figure in the investigation of McClelland's death following his DWI indictment. The State contested the claim that local publicity had tainted the jury pool, presenting additional articles from January 22, January 27, and November 10, 2010, which reiterated Finley's involvement in the cases and the lawsuit he filed for defamation. Private investigator Ray Ball testified about the community's divided sentiments regarding Finley and Crostley, indicating heightened racial tensions. During voir dire, eleven potential jurors acknowledged familiarity with Finley, with nine dismissed for cause. However, only two remained who claimed they could be impartial. There were mixed opinions among the jurors, but ultimately, none of the challenged veniremembers were selected for the jury, and there were no objections to the final panel.

A defendant seeking a change of venue due to excessive media attention must demonstrate that the publicity was pervasive, prejudicial, and inflammatory, as established in *Rodgers v. State*. If evidence regarding the media coverage's impact is conflicting, the trial court has discretion to deny the motion. In Finley’s case, the media coverage included the revelation that murder charges against him were dropped after a truck driver admitted potential responsibility for the victim's death, which introduced mixed perceptions about Finley's guilt. Testimony indicated that none of the jurors had prior knowledge of Finley, allowing the court to conclude that he could receive an impartial trial. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the venue change.

Regarding the motion to suppress evidence, the court utilizes a bifurcated standard of review, deferring to the trial court on historical facts while reviewing legal applications de novo. The ruling on the suppression is upheld if supported by the record. Law enforcement can briefly detain individuals based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. Officer Sain observed Finley swerving within his lane and making an unusually wide turn, prompting an investigative stop. The totality of circumstances supported the officer's reasonable suspicion, which was deemed lawful based on the evidence presented, including video documentation of Finley’s driving behavior.

Sain, based on his training and experience, suspected Finley was driving while intoxicated (DWI). Finley contended that video evidence did not show any violations of the Texas Transportation Code. However, the law does not require a traffic violation for an officer to have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. Previous cases confirm that an officer can justify a DWI stop based on observed behavior, such as swerving within a lane, even without a formal violation. The trial court could accept Sain's observations—specifically, Finley's weaving and wide turn at night—as credible, leading to a reasonable inference of intoxication. The review of the video supported the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress evidence.

Regarding jury instructions under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23, such instructions are only mandatory when there is a factual dispute about the legality of the search. To warrant this instruction, a defendant must demonstrate: 1) the jury heard evidence raising a factual issue, 2) that evidence must be contested, and 3) the issue must materially relate to the lawfulness of the evidence collection. During the trial, Sain reiterated his belief in Finley’s intoxication based on observed behavior, despite acknowledging that those actions were not necessarily illegal. In contrast, Finley presented an expert who reviewed the arrest video and found no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, noting that any lane deviation occurred only when signaling a lane change.

Finley did not use the white line on the road as a reference during the traffic stop, and his driving did not exhibit significant weaving within the lane, as noted by witnesses. The jury need only consider facts that decisively affect the admissibility of evidence. Ball's testimony, which was the only evidence presented against the reasonableness of the traffic stop, pertained solely to the video recording and did not cover Finley’s driving prior to its commencement. As a result, it failed to challenge Sain's justifications for the stop, which were based on Finley’s earlier driving behavior, including weaving and an unusually wide turn that were not captured on video. Consequently, while Ball's testimony raised factual issues, it was not material to the legality of the traffic stop, thus the trial court's refusal to provide a jury instruction under Article 38.23 was deemed correct. 

Regarding the admission of Finley’s blood test results, he argued that the blood was drawn illegally by Jennifer Neighbors, a non-certified phlebotomist. The admissibility of evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. According to Texas Transportation Code Section 724.017, only qualified personnel may draw blood. The trial court deemed Neighbors a "qualified technician" because of her training, despite her lack of certification. Testimony indicated that she had prior experience as a phlebotomist and was trained and supervised in the procedure. Thus, the court found no error in admitting the blood test results.

Section 724.017 of the Texas Transportation Code permits individuals identified as 'qualified technicians' to draw blood without requiring them to hold a specific license or certification, as long as they demonstrate qualification through training and experience. A related case, Turnbow v. State, supports the admissibility of blood analysis results performed by unlicensed phlebotomists. Legal precedents emphasize that the term 'qualified technician' encompasses those deemed competent by medical facilities to perform venesection. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has clarified that defendants challenging blood test results on the grounds of the technician's qualifications bear the burden of proof regarding any statutory violation. In this case, the trial court found no abuse of discretion in determining that the technician was qualified to draw blood. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.