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Amber Whitworth v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: 12-10-00038-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; September 1, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Amber Chrie Whitworth appeals her conviction for family violence assault stemming from an incident involving William Tuburen, the father of her daughter. The altercation occurred after a two-week period of Whitworth's depression postpartum, during which Tuburen suggested she leave if unhappy but prevented her from taking their child. During a confrontation, Whitworth physically assaulted Tuburen, leading to him calling the police. The police documented his injuries, including bite marks and scratches, while Whitworth made self-incriminating statements despite being too agitated for a formal interview. The indictment charged Whitworth with intentionally or recklessly causing bodily injury to Tuburen by biting him on March 29, 2009. Although Tuburen later sought to dismiss the charges and struggled to recall the specifics during the trial, his previous statements corroborated the details of the assault. The arresting officer confirmed Tuburen's account and presented photographic evidence of his injuries. Whitworth moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Tuburen did not testify to any pain caused by the bite, claiming insufficient evidence for a jury decision. The court denied this motion. Testifying in her defense, Whitworth claimed mutual physical aggression occurred during the argument, and she presented photographs of her own bruises. The jury ultimately convicted her, leading to a sentence of ninety days in jail, probated for one year, and a $200 fine. Whitworth later filed two motions for a new trial based on insufficient evidence, which the court denied without a hearing. Two jurors claimed they were pressured to vote guilty due to the lunch hour, leading to a motion for new trial alleging jury misconduct. The trial court held a hearing where Juror Griffin testified that, although she believed the defendant was not guilty, she felt compelled to vote guilty. Despite objections from the State regarding the absence of a sworn affidavit to support the misconduct claim, the court proceeded with the hearing. Juror Griffin expressed regret over her vote and highlighted instances during deliberations where other jurors indicated bias against the defendant. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, emphasizing that the defendant must either request a mistrial or file a supported motion to preserve claims of juror misconduct. Since the appellant did not move for a mistrial or provide an affidavit, her complaint was deemed waived. Even if the issue were preserved, the appellant failed to demonstrate that misconduct occurred or that it resulted in harm. The trial court's determination that no misconduct occurred is binding unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. A new trial is warranted if the jury receives outside evidence during deliberations, but jurors are generally barred from testifying about their deliberative process, except under specific circumstances outlined in Texas Rule of Evidence 606(b). No evidence of external influence on the jury was presented, and testimony regarding jury deliberations was deemed inadmissible under Rule 606(b). Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, leading to the overruling of the appellant's first and fourth issues. In addressing the appellant's second and third issues concerning evidentiary sufficiency, it was argued that the State failed to prove that the bite inflicted on the victim, Tuburen, caused any physical pain or impairment. The legal sufficiency standard requires that any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence viewed in favor of the verdict. The jury holds the sole authority to judge witness credibility and resolve evidentiary conflicts. If evidence is deemed legally insufficient, it results in acquittal. Factual sufficiency reviews require weighing all evidence and determining if the proof of guilt is weak or outweighed by contrary evidence, with the conviction only set aside if it is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. The law outlines that family violence assault occurs when a person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury, defined as physical pain or impairment. Pain is recognized as an unpleasant sensation stemming from various causes. The definition of "bodily injury" is interpreted broadly, including minor physical contacts that exceed mere offensive touching. In Lane v. State, it was established that a victim's lack of testimony regarding pain does not negate a conviction for aggravated assault, as demonstrated in Goodin v. State, where a defendant's actions caused the victim physical harm. The court emphasized that terms like "physical pain" are commonly understood and do not require precise definitions. Jurors can draw reasonable inferences from evidence, suggesting that the victim's bruises and strains indicate bodily injury. In the case at hand, the appellant argued that insufficient evidence of bodily injury was presented since the victim did not explicitly state he experienced pain from a bite. However, evidence included the victim's prior statements about the assault, testimony from arresting officers, and the appellant's admission to biting the victim, which caused her to release him. Photographs showing the bite and scratches supported the claim of bodily injury. The court found the evidence legally and factually sufficient to uphold the conviction for family violence assault, leading to the overruling of the appellant's arguments regarding the insufficiency of evidence and the motion for an instructed verdict. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.