Edward Joseph Moya v. State

Citations: 426 S.W.3d 259; 2013 WL 1341078; 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4225Docket: 06-12-00121-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; April 3, 2013; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Edward Joseph Moya was convicted of manslaughter for the deaths of thirteen-year-old Jocelyn Roberts and four-year-old Kameron Jones, who were struck by Moya's speeding vehicle while attempting to cross a busy street in Mount Pleasant, Texas. Moya received a ten-year prison sentence. In his appeal, he raised two primary issues: (1) he argued that law enforcement delayed taking him before a magistrate after his arrest, and (2) he contended that the evidence supporting the claim that he acted recklessly was insufficient for a conviction.

The incident occurred late at night as Jocelyn and Kameron, along with a third child, were crossing Jefferson Avenue after leaving a movie theater. Traffic in the southbound lanes had stopped, allowing them to enter the center turn lane. A white sedan, driven by Moya, entered the turn lane to overtake stopped vehicles without braking, striking both children. Moya did not stop at the scene but later checked his vehicle for damage before being apprehended hours later. After being treated for an injury, Moya was interrogated by police, recorded his statement about the incident, and was jailed before being presented to a magistrate. His recorded interview and handwritten statement were admitted as evidence during the trial.

Moya argues that his handwritten confession and video-recorded interview should be excluded from trial evidence because he was not taken before a magistrate prior to the interrogation, violating Articles 14.06(a) and 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 14.06 mandates that an arrested individual must be presented to a magistrate without unnecessary delay, within 48 hours of arrest. Article 15.17 outlines the magistrate’s responsibilities, including informing the accused of their rights, such as the right to counsel and to remain silent. Moya was arrested between 3:30 and 4:30 a.m. on May 8, 2011, received medical treatment, and was not taken before a magistrate until he was booked later that morning. He asserts that he should have been informed of his rights before the interview and confession. However, the determination of "unnecessary delay" is case-specific. Past rulings indicate that delays for completing investigations are not considered unnecessary. A police officer testified that Moya required medical treatment post-arrest, which took approximately 2.5 to 3.5 hours, after which the interview occurred. The court found no unreasonable delay in presenting Moya to a magistrate, noting that even if there was a delay, Moya must demonstrate a causal connection between the delay and the interview to invalidate the evidence, which he failed to do. The record showed that any delay was justified by the need for medical attention and investigation procedures.

A violation of the requirement for a defendant to be promptly taken before a magistrate does not invalidate a voluntary confession if the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights beforehand. In Moya's case, he was properly advised of his Miranda rights prior to making statements to the police, as shown in a video recording and his signed statement. Consequently, the trial court correctly admitted Moya's written confession and the video evidence. 

Additionally, Moya challenged the sufficiency of evidence regarding his alleged reckless conduct leading to Jocelyn’s death. The review of legal sufficiency involves evaluating the evidence favorably towards the jury's verdict, considering whether a rational jury could have found all elements of manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury charge, which was based on a hypothetically correct version of the law, indicated that Moya acted recklessly by driving in a manner that posed a substantial risk. For recklessness to be established, the defendant must consciously disregard a significant and unjustifiable risk. Moya claimed there was no evidence suggesting the likelihood of causing death and argued he could not perceive the risk of hitting children in the turn lane. He referenced a previous case (Johnson v. State) to support his argument, noting that it involved different circumstances.

The court found that Johnson did not commit negligent homicide, emphasizing that an "apparent danger" of causing death must exist. The circumstances in Johnson differed significantly from the current case involving Moya, who drove at high speed in a turning lane around stopped traffic, unlike Johnson, who proceeded slowly before an unexpected pedestrian entered the roadway. Moya referenced Bounds v. State, concerning mental state and deceptive business practices, but the court deemed it irrelevant to the current analysis of recklessness.

Culpable mental states, including recklessness, can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, as supported by case law. For instance, evidence of recklessness was established when a truck driver ignored construction warnings for up to 3,000 feet before a stop. The court clarified that awareness of a specific risk of death is not necessary for a manslaughter charge, as demonstrated in Griffith v. State, where a defendant struck a victim with a van immediately after she exited another vehicle. Other cases cited also illustrated situations where sufficient evidence of recklessness was determined, such as excessive speed near warning signs or dangerous curves.

Witness Jason Parker observed the accident scene, noting that traffic had slowed significantly and was well-lit. He saw two children waiting in the turning lane as Moya's vehicle approached rapidly from the left without any attempt to slow down or stop, ultimately striking the children. Parker's testimony highlighted the lack of caution exercised by Moya, reinforcing the court's findings regarding recklessness.

At approximately 11:00 p.m. on the night of the accident, Allison Cain witnessed two children cross the southbound lanes of a busy avenue, where traffic had stopped to allow them to cross. While in the center lane, the children were struck by a white car driven by Moya, who did not brake before the collision and continued driving south afterward. There were no crosswalks or traffic signals in the area. Moya had consumed about six beers that evening, which the jury could consider indicative of conscious disregard for a substantial risk. The evidence suggested that Moya acted recklessly by maneuvering around stopped vehicles in the turn lane and exceeding the speed of surrounding traffic after drinking. The trial court's judgment was affirmed, supporting the finding that a rational jury could conclude Moya's actions demonstrated recklessness.