Desmond Monroe Limbrick v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 09-09-00229-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 19, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Desmond Monroe Limbrick, the appellant, pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) and injury to a child under plea bargain agreements. He appeals the sentences stemming from both offenses, arguing they are excessive and constitute cruel and unusual punishment, violating the Eighth Amendment and relevant Texas constitutional provisions. Limbrick also claims ineffective assistance of counsel during his sentencing hearing. 

The trial court initially placed Limbrick on community supervision for five years for the cocaine charge and four years for the injury to a child charge. Approximately three years later, the State sought to revoke his community supervision, to which Limbrick admitted violating conditions. The trial court then found him guilty in both cases, sentencing him to ten years' confinement for possession of cocaine and two years for injury to a child, with the sentences stacked.

Limbrick contends that his sentences are excessive, but the State argues he waived this issue by not presenting a timely objection during the trial, which is necessary to preserve errors for appeal. Case precedents indicate that failure to object to a sentence's proportionality or to raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment in the trial court can forfeit the right to challenge these aspects on appeal.

In Trevino v. State, the court determined that a defendant forfeits claims regarding a trial court's sentence being cruel and unusual if he fails to preserve the error. Similarly, in Solis v. State, it was established that a defendant waives complaints about sentence disproportionality by not objecting in the trial court. Limbrick, having not raised objections during sentencing or filed post-sentence motions regarding his sentence length, is deemed to have waived such complaints, leading to the overruling of his first two issues. 

In his third issue, Limbrick argued ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting his attorney failed to object to the sentences and did not file post-judgment motions. Under the Strickland v. Washington standard, a claim of ineffective assistance requires demonstrating that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant's defense. The defendant must show that counsel's actions fell below professional standards and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for those errors. 

While courts are generally deferential to trial counsel's decisions, a sentence within the range set by law is typically not deemed excessive, cruel, or unusual. However, a sentence may contravene the Eighth Amendment if it is grossly disproportionate to the committed crime. The evaluation of gross disproportionality involves comparing the severity of the offense to the sentence's harshness, and may also consider sentences for similar crimes in the same or other jurisdictions.

Limbrick did not file post-trial motions, limiting his trial counsel's opportunity to explain their strategy at the punishment hearing. Without evidence of ineffective assistance, the court could not conclude that trial counsel's decisions were unreasonable based on the case's facts. Limbrick argued that he received excessive sentences, citing several cases, including Atkins v. Virginia, to support claims of mental impairment. However, the court noted that Limbrick had not provided evidence of mental retardation and that his medical conditions had been acknowledged during the punishment hearing. The court found no exclusion of relevant evidence regarding Limbrick's mental health and noted that he failed to demonstrate how his conditions affected his understanding of the legal proceedings or communication with counsel. Limbrick's cited cases involved different offenses, and he did not compare his sentences to similar offenses within Texas or other jurisdictions. His sentences, while the maximum authorized, fell within the legislative guidelines for the crimes committed. The trial court had discretion to cumulate sentences as they were not from the same criminal episode. Consequently, the court upheld the trial court's judgments, concluding Limbrick did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and affirmed the decisions in the specified trial cause numbers.