Alton Leon York v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 10-11-00413-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; June 20, 2012; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Alton Leon York was indicted on nine counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and three counts of indecency with a child, resulting in convictions on all twelve counts. The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment for the aggravated sexual assault counts (I-IV and VIII-XII) and twenty years for the indecency counts (V-VII), with the former running concurrently and the latter consecutively. 

C.Y., York's biological daughter, testified that the abuse began when she was six and continued until she was thirteen, involving various forms of sexual conduct. She reported that her mother witnessed inappropriate behavior but instructed her not to disclose it.

York raised two issues on appeal. First, he argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State to question an expert witness, Detective Kimberly Clark, about the truthfulness of C.Y.'s allegations. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision since the detective did not provide a direct opinion on C.Y.’s credibility. 

Second, York contended that the jury charge incorrectly included the culpable mental state of "knowingly" in relation to the indecency counts. The appellate court reviewed the jury charge's application paragraph and upheld it as it aligned with the statutory requirements for the offense.

The appellate court modified and affirmed the judgments.

The charges against York in Counts VI and VII utilized the terms "intentionally or knowingly," though they involved different means of committing the offense. To establish indecency with a child through contact, intent to gratify a sexual desire must be proven. The application paragraph required a finding of York's intentional or knowing engagement in sexual contact. A prior case, Bazanes v. State, indicated that using both mental states with specific intent constituted charge error, but York did not object during the trial. Consequently, he must demonstrate egregious harm to succeed on appeal, which requires proving that the charge error significantly impacted the case's foundation or deprived him of a critical right. The assessment of harm considers the jury charge, evidence presented, arguments made, and other relevant record details. The jury was correctly instructed regarding the necessity of York's specific intent to gratify sexual desire. Given the context, the charge error appeared less detrimental, particularly since C.Y.'s credibility was the focal issue rather than York's intent, and the State did not emphasize his intent in arguments. York failed to articulate how he suffered egregious harm from the charge, leading to the conclusion that he did not experience such harm, resulting in the overruling of his second issue.

In his third issue, York contended that the ex post facto doctrine and the rule of lenity barred the trial court from ordering consecutive sentences for Counts V through XII. His fourth issue claimed that cumulative sentences violated Apprendi v. New Jersey principles. Texas trial courts generally have discretion to impose cumulative sentences, but there are restrictions when offenses from a single episode are consolidated for trial under Texas Penal Code Section 3.03(a). Section 3.03(b)(2)(A) exempts specific offenses, including indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault of a child, from the concurrent sentencing requirement. Historically, Section 3.03 mandated concurrent sentences for multiple offenses until 1995 when amendments allowed consecutive sentences for certain convictions, and in 1997, further amendments included specific sexual offenses against minors in the list of offenses eligible for consecutive sentencing.

The amendments to the relevant legal statutes became effective on September 1, 1997, and apply only to offenses committed on or after that date. C.Y. testified that she was abused from the age of six until thirteen, indicating the offenses took place between 1994 and 2001. The indictment specified that Counts I through IV related to offenses around 1996, while Counts V through XII pertained to offenses around 1998 and 1999. York was found guilty of multiple counts of indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences for the offenses committed before the 1997 amendment and consecutive sentences for those committed afterward. York contended that the jury could have concluded all offenses occurred prior to the amendment, arguing for concurrent sentencing for all counts. 

The case referenced, DeLeon v. State, involved similar issues of sentencing for offenses spanning multiple years, where the court upheld the trial court's authority to impose consecutive sentences for offenses committed after the effective date of the 1997 amendment. The key distinction between the 1995 and 1997 amendments was highlighted, as the latter did not require that all offenses tried together had to occur after the effective date to be subject to consecutive sentencing. The court affirmed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the consecutive sentences for Counts V through XII, aligning with prior rulings. Additionally, the Supreme Court's ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey established that facts increasing a penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, emphasizing the importance of jury findings in determining sentence enhancements.

The trial court's authority to cumulate sentences is recognized when it is granted by statute and is discretionary, without the need for specific fact-finding. The sentences imposed on York were valid and within the statutory range for his convictions, and did not conflict with the Apprendi ruling. The fourth issue raised by York was overruled. In the fifth issue, York contended that the trial court improperly assessed fees for court-appointed attorneys and investigators against him due to his indigent status. The State acknowledged a lack of evidence supporting the fee assessment. Consequently, this fifth issue was sustained, leading to a modification of the judgment to remove the requirement for York to pay these fees. The modified judgment was affirmed by the court.