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Nathaniel Stephens v. Ashleigh Petry
Citation: Not availableDocket: 09-09-00078-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 10, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Appellant Nathaniel Stephens sued appellee Ashleigh Petry for injuries from an automobile accident. The jury found Petry negligent, establishing her actions as a proximate cause of the accident, yet awarded no damages to Stephens. He appealed, arguing that uncontroverted expert evidence of an objective injury warranted damages. The court affirmed the jury's decision. Officer Owens, who investigated the accident, testified via video deposition that Petry’s vehicle rear-ended Stephens’s vehicle during daylight on a dry road. His report indicated damage to both vehicles and cited Petry for failure to control her speed. Petry, also testifying via video, claimed she was blinded by the sun and did not see Stephens's brake lights. She suggested that the accident could have been avoided had Stephens not slowed down excessively. Petry asserted that her vehicle sustained no damage, while Stephens's vehicle needed a rear bumper replacement. Additionally, Petry mentioned that neither party sought medical assistance at the scene, and she noticed no signs of injury on Stephens after the accident. Stephens described the impact as severe but did not specify any injuries at the time of the incident. The court's affirmation of the jury's decision was based on the lack of awarded damages despite establishing negligence. Stephens experienced neck stiffness after a work-related accident on September 5, 2006, and requested to be taken to the emergency room, where he was diagnosed with a neck injury and prescribed medication. He later sought further treatment from Dr. McNeill at Beaumont Bone Joint Institute, who conducted a thorough examination, an MRI, and six weeks of physical therapy. Dr. McNeill determined that the accident exacerbated a preexisting neck condition. Stephens was subsequently referred to Dr. Redko for pain management injections. Stephens was involved in another accident on December 23, 2007, but reported that his pain levels remained unchanged. He described ongoing pain that has affected his quality of life, particularly as an electrician, limiting his ability to work and enjoy hobbies. He noted that certain sleeping positions and physical activities have become uncomfortable, resulting in disrupted sleep and constant pain. Despite financial obligations preventing him from taking significant time off work, he acknowledged that the pain interferes with his job performance and tasks around the house. During cross-examination, Stephens disclosed a history of back problems, including incidents in 1993 and 2001 that led to earlier injuries and diagnoses related to degenerative disc disease. Prior MRIs from 2004 and 2005 indicated degenerative issues in his cervical spine. He did not photograph damage to his BISD van and testified regarding the absence of records for a bumper replacement, asserting that relevant personnel could confirm his account. He admitted he did not observe damage to Petry's vehicle but reported multiple symptoms, including shoulder and back pain, during his emergency room visit. Stephens sought medical care 16 days post-accident and testified that his work duties remained unchanged since the incident. Dr. Vladimir Redko, a pain management specialist, first examined Stephens on December 11, 2006, reporting that Stephens suffered from intractable neck pain following a motor vehicle accident and had a preexisting condition of small disc bulging for which he was not receiving treatment. Redko noted that prior to the accident, Stephens had been functioning well but became "in disabling pain" afterward. He asserted that the accident aggravated Stephens's preexisting condition and treated him with epidural injections to reduce inflammation. Redko opined that Stephens would likely experience ongoing pain, yet he had not reviewed MRIs from before the accident to assess any structural changes. Dr. Walter R. Sassard, an orthopedic surgeon, also provided testimony without examining Stephens or reviewing the actual MRI films, relying instead on available MRI reports. Sassard concurred with Dr. McNeill's assessment that the accident exacerbated Stephens's neck issues and classified the injury as a soft tissue injury. He reviewed MRI reports from 2005 and 2006, noting degenerative changes but concluded that the two reports described the same condition, indicating no structural alteration due to the accident. Sassard claimed the epidural injections were unnecessary, suggesting that soft tissue injuries typically do not lead to prolonged symptoms and attributing Stephens's complaints more to degenerative changes than to the accident. In his appeal, Stephens contends that the jury's failure to award damages contradicts the uncontroverted expert testimony indicating an objective injury. Evidence must be weighed comprehensively, not selectively in favor of the verdict, as established in *Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis*. The review assesses whether the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of evidence, potentially manifestly unjust, referencing *Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson* and *Cain v. Bain*. The jury has the exclusive authority to determine witness credibility and the significance of testimony. In this case, despite evidence of Stephens's injuries from an accident, the jury could reasonably conclude that his suffering and any required future medical care stemmed from preexisting conditions rather than the incident with Petry. The jury's discretion allows for the rejection of all or part of witness testimony, including uncontroverted expert opinions. Consequently, the decision not to award damages for Stephens's claimed future medical care, past and future physical pain, mental anguish, and physical impairment was not deemed manifestly unjust. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.