Shantaniqua Nykole Scott v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-11-00186-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; July 17, 2014; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Shantaniqua Nykole Scott appeals her conviction for serious bodily injury to a child, stemming from a incident involving her four-month-old son, R.S. Following surgery for a gastro-esophageal-reflux disorder, R.S. was placed in a monitored recovery room due to suspected abuse. Security footage captured Scott holding a blanket over R.S.'s face and obstructing his breathing until he became unresponsive. Afterward, she informed hospital staff that he had stopped breathing and admitted to law enforcement that she had intentionally smothered him due to stress.

Scott was indicted and convicted by a petit jury, which sentenced her to twenty-five years in prison. In her appeal, she raises three issues, the first concerning the trial court's decision to allow Physician’s Assistant Kevin Scully to testify as an expert regarding R.S.'s injuries and the associated risk of death without medical intervention. The court affirms that the trial court has broad discretion in qualifying expert witnesses and notes that Texas Rule of Evidence 702 permits testimony from individuals with specialized knowledge based on experience, skill, or training, without requiring a specific medical degree. The ruling emphasizes that prior case law supports the qualification of medical professionals, including physician assistants, as expert witnesses in assessing serious injuries.

The court addressed an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, referencing prior cases where the qualifications of medical professionals to testify as experts were upheld. In Frohne, the court determined that a pediatric nurse's testimony regarding abuse was admissible due to her qualifications. Similarly, in Butler v. State, the court permitted a nurse and a clinical supervisor with significant experience in child abuse to testify as experts. In the current case, Scully, a licensed physician’s assistant with relevant education and four years of experience at Cook Children's Hospital, provided expert testimony that R.S. faced a “substantial risk of death” without medical intervention. The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing Scully's testimony, which was deemed harmless given the substantial other evidence of R.S.'s serious injuries, including testimony from Nurse Gammons and Dr. Hadeed regarding R.S.'s lack of breathing and risk of death.

Regarding the second issue, the appellant contended that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of injury to a child. The court applied a two-step analysis to determine if such an instruction was warranted, emphasizing that a lesser offense must be defined under Texas law as differing only in the degree of injury or risk involved. The definitions of bodily injury and serious bodily injury were outlined, with the former involving physical pain or impairment and the latter involving substantial risk of death or serious disfigurement. The court ultimately overruled the appellant's first issue and examined the criteria for the lesser-included offense instruction.

Bodily injury to a child is distinguished from serious bodily injury primarily by the severity of the injury required for conviction. For the appellant to be entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser charge of bodily injury, evidence must exist that a rational jury could find her guilty only of that lesser offense. The evidence must be evaluated within the context of the entire record, and more than a scintilla of evidence may suffice for this entitlement. The appellant cites a conversation with Dr. Hadeed regarding the risk of death from oxygen deprivation, suggesting that a rational jury could conclude she was only guilty of bodily injury. However, the court finds no basis for a rational juror to conclude that the appellant’s actions did not place the child, R.S., at a substantial risk of death. As a result, the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of injury to a child is upheld.

In the jury argument phase, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by overruling her objection to the State’s closing argument. The jury was informed of the appellant’s admissions regarding suffocating R.S. and the medical records indicating prior incidents of the child stopping breathing. The appellant's mother testified in support of her, asserting that she deserved a chance to regain custody after receiving necessary help. During closing arguments, the appellant’s counsel emphasized that the jury's decision should not affect custody but rather focus on her trustworthiness. He argued that future custody would depend on demonstrating her reliability, contrasting it with the current perception of her as untrustworthy.

The State's closing argument included a narrative about R.S., a child in foster care, emphasizing the need for severe punishment of the appellant to prevent her from having future children. The State argued that the appellant had proven herself untrustworthy through her past actions, which jeopardized the child's safety. Defense counsel objected, claiming the argument improperly called for law enforcement intervention, but the court overruled the objection, stating the jury's duty was to focus on the facts of the case. The State maintained that the appellant had forfeited her right to procreate and urged the jury to ensure she received a lengthy prison sentence to protect future children. 

The excerpt also outlines the legal standards for permissible jury arguments, which include summarizing evidence, making reasonable deductions, responding to opposing counsel, and pleas for law enforcement. The appellant contended that the State's comments infringed upon her fundamental rights but failed to preserve her objection for review because she did not object to similar remarks made earlier in the argument. Her lack of a timely and specific objection when the issue first arose meant the complaint could not be considered on appeal.

A complaint raised on appeal must align with the complaint presented in the trial court; failure to do so results in forfeiture of the claim. The legal basis for the appeal cannot differ from that at trial. Appellant’s current assertion regarding the trial court's error in allowing the State to discuss her fundamental right to procreate diverges from her initial trial objection, which lacked detail and merely stated that the State's remarks were improper. The appellate argument introduces new legal concepts not addressed during the trial and thus cannot be considered. Additionally, the State's remarks were a legitimate response to Appellant's closing argument, which implied the jury should disregard potential future dangers to children in sentencing. This invites the State’s counter-argument concerning Appellant's future dangerousness. Any alleged error in the State's argument is deemed harmless under Texas appellate rules, as it did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights; a substantial right is only impacted if the error significantly influenced the jury’s verdict. The review suggests there is fair assurance that any error had minimal effect on the jury's decision.

In evaluating the impact on the appellant's substantial rights, three factors were considered: (1) the severity of the prosecutor's remarks, (2) the absence of curative measures, and (3) the certainty of the punishment without the misconduct. The court assessed that the prosecutor's statement, which suggested the jury consider the appellant's future dangerousness to any potential children, was minimally prejudicial since it aligned with the jurors' existing concerns about the seriousness of the crime. The trial court did not provide any curative instruction as it overruled the appellant's objection. However, the third factor favored the State significantly, noting that the appellant was recorded committing the crime, expressed a desire to avoid the stress of parenthood, and received a 25-year sentence out of a possible 99 years. Consequently, even if there was an error in overruling the objection, it did not substantially influence the jury's verdict or affect the appellant's rights. The appellant's issues were overruled, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed.