Humphrey Brock, Jr. v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 11-11-00252-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 22, 2013; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Humphrey Brock, Jr. was convicted by a jury for possessing four or more grams but less than 200 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, with the offense occurring in a drug-free zone. The trial court sentenced him to life confinement. Brock raised three issues on appeal: 

1. He challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from two search warrants, arguing the affidavits lacked sufficient probable cause. He contended that the description of a suspect in the first affidavit was too vague, which he believed invalidated the issuance of the warrant.
   
2. He argued that the trial court erred in denying his request to reveal the identity of a confidential informant.

3. He questioned the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

The court noted that a magistrate must find probable cause for issuing a search warrant, defined as a "fair probability" that evidence of a crime will be found. The appellate review favors the magistrate's decision if there is a substantial basis for concluding that evidence would be uncovered. The search warrant for Brock's residence was based on an affidavit from Agent Gary Castillo, which was deemed adequate. At the pretrial hearing, both Brock and Agent Castillo testified, with Brock claiming that the suspect description could apply to another individual. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions and the conviction.

Agent Castillo provided testimony indicating that his affidavit for the search warrant contained a description solely based on the warrant itself. The warrant, derived from Castillo's affidavit, stated that on the day of issuance, the suspected individual was in possession of marijuana at 649 Cockerell, a residence he owned or controlled. The individual was described as a black male, approximately 6 feet tall, weighing 280 pounds, with black hair and brown eyes. The warrant included a detailed description of the residence, noting it was a multi-family duplex with specific characteristics. Castillo testified that information in his affidavit was obtained within the last 48 hours from a reliable confidential informant, who had a history of providing accurate information. Although the informant had provided additional details, Castillo did not include them in the affidavit. During a pretrial hearing, defense counsel questioned Castillo about the informant's prior reliability, to which Castillo confirmed he had used the informant several times. Although defense counsel had a copy of the affidavit, it was not entered into evidence for appellate review. It is established that once the warrant and supporting affidavit are provided by the State, the defendant must ensure they are part of the record if challenging probable cause. However, testimony from the officer presenting the affidavit is sufficient if the defendant can cross-examine the officer, and the trial court can assess probable cause. In this case, the combined evidence of Castillo's testimony and the warrant was adequate, allowing a magistrate to reasonably conclude that probable cause existed for the warrant's issuance. The court overruled the appellant's first issue regarding probable cause. The appellant's second issue, concerning the trial court's denial of his request to reveal the informant's identity, was also dismissed. The State claimed privilege under the Rules of Evidence, and after an in-camera hearing, the trial court decided that disclosure was not necessary.

The trial court's denial of Appellant’s request to disclose the identity of a confidential informant was reviewed for abuse of discretion. Under Texas Rule of Evidence 508, the State can refuse disclosure unless certain conditions are met, such as voluntary disclosure or a demonstration that the informant's testimony is essential for a fair determination of guilt. The trial court found the informant credible and reliable, determining that the informant was not present during the execution of the search warrant and that their testimony would not aid the case. Consequently, the court upheld the denial of disclosure.

Regarding Appellant's claim of insufficient evidence concerning his "actual control" of the searched property and contraband, the court applied the Jackson v. Virginia standard, which requires viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight of testimony. In drug possession cases, the State must prove the accused had care, custody, control, or management over the substance and that they knew it was contraband. Since Appellant was not shown to have exclusive possession of the residence, evidence must establish a significant link to the contraband. The search warrant execution revealed Appellant was present at the residence, where officers seized 4.7 grams of marijuana, cash, crack cocaine, and keys belonging to him, supporting the jury’s finding of his connection to the contraband. Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence was upheld.

The keys obtained included those for Appellant's car and the front door of the residence at 649 Cockerell. Following a search warrant for the car, officers discovered marihuana and crack cocaine inside. During the search of the residence, Agent Ferrell found cocaine in Appellant's front pocket, totaling 2.09 grams, along with 4.7 grams of marihuana. Appellant had $400 in cash and additional money in his wallet. Further evidence included 0.38 grams of crack cocaine found on a coffee table and 0.31 grams of cocaine under a mattress, with the total weight of cocaine in the house and car amounting to 5.53 grams. Agent Smith discovered more cocaine packaged for sale in the car, weighing 2.75 grams. The evidence established that the residence was within 1,000 feet of a school, classifying it as a drug-free zone. The court concluded that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant possessed over four grams of cocaine with intent to deliver within a drug-free zone, linking him to the drugs in both the car and residence. Appellant's appeal was overruled, affirming the trial court's judgment.