Trevor Scott Copeland v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-13-00044-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 4, 2013; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Trevor Scott Copeland was convicted and sentenced to fifty years in prison for intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a two-year-old child, L.H. On appeal, Copeland raised three main arguments: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to hire an expert witness to challenge medical testimony regarding the cause of L.H.'s injuries, and (3) the trial court erred in allowing two of his Facebook posts from months prior to the incident into evidence. 

The court found the evidence legally sufficient to uphold the conviction, determined that ineffective assistance could not be proven based on the existing record, and acknowledged that while the admission of the Facebook posts was an error, it was harmless in the context of the case. 

The factual background revealed that Copeland began living with L.H. and her mother, Erin Saari, in late 2011. Following an evening of drinking on December 6, Saari noted some unusual behavior and injuries on L.H. the next morning. Copeland provided an unconvincing explanation for these injuries, claiming L.H. might have fallen from a window. Saari, however, observed that L.H. was unwell and had noticeable bruising, and she expressed concerns over L.H.'s condition, which led her to seek medical assistance.

Saari took L.H. to the hospital, claiming the child had fallen from a window. Dr. Mauricio Trujillo, the emergency physician, observed extensive bruising and abrasions on L.H.'s body, including petechiae around her eyes, indicating potential trauma rather than a fall. He concluded the injuries did not match those expected from a fall and transferred L.H. to Dallas Children’s Medical Center. There, Dr. Matthew Cox found L.H. unresponsive with significant bruising and respiratory distress, leading to her immediate placement on life support. He noted neck bruising and facial petechiae raised concerns of strangulation and determined the injuries were consistent with high-force blunt trauma, not a fall. After three weeks in intensive care, L.H. remained critically injured. 

Following L.H.'s transfer, Saari and Copeland researched potential sentencing for child abuse cases, with Copeland expressing concern about being implicated regardless of his involvement. Saari testified that she did not believe in using excessive force for discipline, asserting she did not cause L.H.'s injuries. She maintained that the bedroom windows were closed, as it was cold, and stated that it would have required significant strength to open them, suggesting L.H. could not have done so independently. Child Protective Services and local law enforcement investigated the incident. CPS investigator Kenny Stillwagoner found no footprints or disturbances around the window, which was 4 feet 4 inches off the ground. Hunt County Sheriff’s Office investigator Roger Seals confirmed that the window required tabs to be held to open, with a 20-inch height from the bottom to the floor, indicating difficulty for a child to access.

Detective Joel Gibson's interview of Saari and Copeland revealed inconsistencies in Copeland's statements regarding the discipline Saari used on L.H. Initially, Copeland denied witnessing any spanking but later shifted blame onto Saari. The jury convicted Copeland of injury to L.H., a child under fourteen, which he claims was based on insufficient evidence. The legal sufficiency of evidence is evaluated by considering it in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, assessing whether a rational jury could find that Copeland intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to L.H. The required elements for conviction include that Copeland (1) intentionally or knowingly (2) caused serious bodily injury (3) to a child under fourteen. Copeland contests the first two elements. The jury charge included a law of the parties instruction, establishing that a person can be responsible for an offense committed by another if they acted with intent to promote or assist the commission of that offense. Evidence indicated both Saari and Copeland were present when L.H. was injured, with Copeland being the only one awake during the incident. Copeland reported finding L.H. with injuries and that Saari noticed them but returned to sleep. Saari observed Copeland spanking L.H., who later exhibited signs of severe injury, including vomiting and bruising, suggesting prior strangulation.

Copeland initially expressed the belief that L.H. had climbed outside through an open window, but later conceded to Gibson that such a fall could not have caused L.H.'s serious injuries, which included signs of strangulation. Testimony indicated that the window was difficult for a child to open and there was no evidence of disturbance below it. Despite maintaining that the window was open, Copeland did not visit L.H. frequently during her hospitalization and indicated to Saari that he would face consequences regardless of his actions. He conducted an internet search regarding sentencing for child abuse. The evidence presented was deemed sufficient for the jury to conclude that Copeland was responsible for the crime. 

The mens rea for injury to a child involves awareness that one’s conduct is likely to cause serious harm. Inconsistencies in Copeland's statements were seen as indicative of wrongful conduct. L.H.'s severe injuries, described by doctors as near-fatal and resulting from blunt-force trauma, supported the conclusion that Copeland acted with knowledge that his actions could cause serious bodily injury. Furthermore, even if the jury believed Saari inflicted the injuries, Copeland's actions, including spanking L.H. and initially misinforming authorities about the circumstances of her injuries, were considered sufficient to establish his guilt as a participant in the crime.

Copeland also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his lawyer failed to hire an expert to counter testimony about L.H.'s injuries. To prove ineffective assistance under the Strickland test, a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing norms. This determination requires a careful examination of the specific case facts, and allegations of ineffectiveness must be substantiated by the record.

In the case of Copeland, the court addressed claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the failure to seek an expert witness to counter the testimony of L.H.’s treating physicians. Copeland must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance was ineffective. The court noted that it is uncommon for a reviewing court to evaluate ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal due to often undeveloped records. Copeland's brief did not specify how expert testimony would have benefited his case, and it acknowledged that counsel might have reasonably deemed such an expert unnecessary or ineffectual against the treating physicians' testimony. The court emphasized a strong presumption in favor of counsel's strategic decisions, stating that hindsight should not dictate evaluations of trial strategy. To prove ineffective assistance, Copeland needed to satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test: the performance prong and the prejudice prong. The latter requires demonstrating that counsel's errors undermined the trial's outcome. The court found no evidence that an expert could have challenged the physical evidence of L.H.'s injuries, which were well-documented and consistent with the treating physicians' accounts. Additionally, Copeland himself questioned the plausibility of an explanation for L.H.’s injuries. Consequently, the court overruled Copeland’s ineffective assistance claim, concluding that he failed to meet the necessary criteria under Strickland.

The admission of Facebook posts by Copeland, which included statements expressing violent thoughts towards children, was deemed a harmless error by the court. Copeland's counsel objected to the relevance of these posts, arguing they were prejudicial and unrelated to the case of alleged child abuse. The State countered, asserting the posts were relevant to Copeland’s state of mind and intent. The trial court ultimately admitted the posts, reasoning they provided insight into Copeland's outlook regarding children and his motives. The appellate review for abuse of discretion established that a trial court's decision on evidence admission is upheld unless it is outside a reasonable disagreement zone. A trial court's decision is not reversible if supported by the record and is valid under any applicable legal theory. Additionally, while character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove conduct on a specific occasion, comments expressing intent do not constitute misconduct under Rule 404(b) unless they are tied to actual conduct. In this instance, the posts were viewed as mere expressions of harmful intent rather than evidence of past misconduct.

Copeland's Facebook posts were evaluated for admissibility under Texas Rules of Evidence, specifically Rules 401, 402, 403, and 404. The posts were deemed relevant to demonstrate Copeland's state of mind regarding children, made both before and after he moved in with Saari. However, the court found their probative value minimal since they did not refer specifically to the victim and were made months prior to the incident in question. The State presented ample evidence of Copeland’s behavior during the incident, making the Facebook posts unnecessary to establish his state of mind. The posts were also seen as potentially unfairly prejudicial, as their introduction could incite jury hostility towards Copeland rather than providing a logical connection to the case. Consequently, the court determined that the probative value of the posts was significantly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, warranting a sustained objection under Rule 403. Although the admission of these posts was deemed erroneous, the court classified the error as harmless.

Error in the admission of evidence is classified as nonconstitutional and requires a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Nonconstitutional errors that do not impact substantial rights must be disregarded. A substantial right is deemed affected if the error has a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. A conviction should not be overturned if there is assurance that the error did not influence the jury or only had a minimal effect. In this case, the evidence in question, consisting of Facebook posts read aloud by Saari, was limited and did not dominate the trial. During closing arguments, defense counsel downplayed the significance of the posts. The assessment of any potential negative impact on the jury's decision considers the entire trial record, including all evidence and testimony. Given the strength of the evidence against Copeland, which indicated guilt as either the perpetrator or an accomplice, the court concluded that the admission of the Facebook posts did not have a substantial effect on the verdict. Therefore, the error was deemed harmless, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed.