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United States v. Mask

Citations: 330 F.3d 330; 2003 WL 2004510Docket: 02-40677

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; May 1, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed an appeal from the United States regarding a district court's order that granted Bryan Chadwick Mask's motion to suppress evidence, which was claimed to be obtained through an illegal seizure violating the Fourth Amendment. The incident began on August 2, 2001, when Janie Marsh contacted the Gladewater Police Department to report suspicious vehicles at her home. Officer Vance Callahan arrived and found Christopher Tubbs next to a sport utility vehicle (SUV) with a trailer, who claimed he was retrieving his belongings from a storage building. After confirming Tubbs's identity, Callahan permitted him to collect his items.

As the situation unfolded, Bryan Chadwick Mask arrived to assist Tubbs and engaged with Animal Control Officer Les Dolbow, providing his identification and chatting while waiting for the results of a license check. Mask entered Tubbs's vehicle multiple times for items, and no suspicion of illegal activity was apparent to Dolbow at that time. After the checks cleared, Callahan informed both men they were free to leave, indicating that any reasonable suspicion to detain them had dissipated. However, despite being free to leave, both men remained on the scene while additional officers arrived.

The district court later determined that Sergeant Bill Clampitt had been instructed to detain the men based on intelligence regarding Tubbs's potential involvement in narcotics, although Mask was not suspected of any wrongdoing. The appellate court concluded that the district court erred in its finding of illegal seizure and decided to reverse the suppression order and remand the case.

Callahan requested the dispatcher to repeat license check information, but the specifics of the instructions from Clampitt and whether Mask overheard this request remain unclear, as the district court did not address these points, leaving the record ambiguous. After receiving the reports, Callahan and Clampitt approached Tubbs, who was in front of a storage building. Clampitt observed a sawed-off shotgun in plain view inside the building and asked Tubbs about it. Tubbs claimed the gun was given to him and offered it to Clampitt, who took it and secured it in Callahan's patrol car. Tubbs signed a consent to search form. Shortly after the gun was found, Officer Gage suggested arresting Tubbs for possession of a prohibited weapon, leading to his arrest. A search revealed a narcotics pipe on Tubbs, over $5,000 in cash, and 122 grams of methamphetamine in his vehicle.

Meanwhile, Mask, who was sitting nearby, had not been patted down for safety. Gage asked Mask for consent to a pat-down, during which a marijuana pipe was discovered, resulting in Mask's arrest. An inventory search of his vehicle yielded methamphetamine, marijuana, a pistol, and items indicating drug trafficking. Mask was indicted on multiple drug-related charges and filed a motion to suppress evidence. The district court granted the motion, ruling that Mask was unlawfully seized because he was free to leave when the license check returned clear, and his continued presence was no longer voluntary when Clampitt arrived or when the shotgun was discovered. The court determined that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain Mask, rendering the evidence obtained from the subsequent searches inadmissible. The Government's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

The discussion included the standard of review for factual findings (clear error) and legal conclusions (de novo), with a dispute over the appropriate standard for seizure determinations. The Government argued for de novo review based on the Supreme Court's decision in Ornelas v. United States, while Mask contended that established precedent supports clear error review. The court agreed with Mask’s position.

Intra-circuit stare decisis mandates adherence to prior panel decisions unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc. The precedent set in United States v. Valdiosera-Godinez establishes that a district court's determination regarding whether a seizure has occurred is a factual finding subject to clear error review. The court asserts that the Fifth Circuit is unified in this standard and that no Supreme Court ruling has contradicted it. The decision in Ornelas does not pertain to the standard for reviewing seizure determinations but instead addresses the review of Fourth Amendment compliance regarding acknowledged seizures. Other circuits, including the Fourth and Seventh, align with the Fifth Circuit's stance on treating seizure determinations as factual issues subject to clear error review, while several other circuits have adopted a differing approach.

When a district court's seizure determination is influenced by an incorrect legal interpretation, it is not entitled to deference and should be reviewed de novo. In this case, the district court's finding that Mask was illegally seized was influenced by such an incorrect view, prompting a de novo review of the evidence, favoring the party prevailing below, in this instance, appellee Mask. The appeal concerns whether Mask was illegally seized after being told he was free to leave when Officer Clampitt arrived or upon discovering an illegal shotgun in a storage building. It is undisputed that Mask was legally detained while his driver’s license was held.

The Government agrees with the district court’s finding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the second detention but argues that Mask’s presence at Ms. Marsh’s residence was voluntary and did not constitute a seizure until Sergeant Gage conducted a pat-down, which did involve reasonable suspicion. The legal standard for a seizure under the Fourth Amendment requires that an encounter becomes a seizure only when an officer, through physical force or a show of authority, restrains an individual's liberty. This principle is encapsulated in the "reasonable person" standard established in United States v. Mendenhall and INS v. Delgado, which assesses whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave under the circumstances.

The district court’s ruling that Mask was seized upon the arrival of Sergeant Clampitt is scrutinized as it may have misinterpreted the law by considering the officers' intent rather than their observable conduct. The determination of a seizure must focus on the officers’ actions and words that were perceptible to the individual. The review of the district court's conclusion is conducted de novo. Mask argues that the presence of multiple officers in a quiet neighborhood created a coercive atmosphere, making a reasonable person feel they could not leave, supported by his request for permission to retrieve items from Tubbs's vehicle and Officer Dolbow's testimony.

While recognizing that assessing whether a seizure occurred can be imprecise and should consider the totality of police conduct, past cases such as United States v. Knotts and Michigan v. Chesternut illustrate that mere observation or follow-up by police, without coercive elements, does not necessarily amount to a seizure.

The police officer's monitoring of Mask during events at Ms. Marsh’s residence did not indicate to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave, especially since Officer Callahan had explicitly told Mask he could depart. The presence of three other officers did not alter this conclusion, similar to the INS v. Delgado case, where no seizure occurred despite multiple officers being present. None of the officers prevented Mask from leaving or showed intimidating behavior, such as brandishing weapons or speaking threateningly. Only Officer Dolbow paid significant attention to Mask until contraband was found in Tubbs's vehicle, which Mask had accessed multiple times, providing no initial reason to suspect him of wrongdoing.

Appellees argued that Mask's request to retrieve items from Tubbs's vehicle indicated he felt he could not leave, but most individuals would hesitate to do so in the presence of police. Dolbow’s testimony was misinterpreted by the district court; he affirmed that both Mask and Tubbs were free to leave even after Officer Clampitt’s arrival. Dolbow's observations remained unchanged in terms of the situation's coerciveness, and despite possible implications from overheard conversations, these did not suffice to demonstrate that Mask was no longer free to leave. Officer Clampitt did not engage with Mask directly, focusing instead on other matters related to Tubbs. Overall, the police conduct lacked the coerciveness typically associated with a seizure.

A reasonable person in Mask’s position would have felt free to leave after his license was returned, and Clampitt's arrival did not change this assessment. Mask's choice to remain on the property post-arrival was voluntary. The district court incorrectly determined that Mask was seized when Clampitt arrived, as well as when the shotgun was found in Tubbs’s storage building. The court's analysis lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a seizure at that moment, and there was no evidence indicating a change in the officers' conduct towards Mask upon discovering the shotgun. Consequently, the situation did not become coercive enough to constitute a seizure. The district court's finding of an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment was erroneous. Therefore, the evidence obtained from Mask should not be considered tainted, and his motion to dismiss should have been denied. The appellate court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings.