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Robert Steven Dudley v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 11-12-00110-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 20, 2014; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Robert Steven Dudley was found guilty of aggravated robbery by a jury, which assessed a ninety-nine year sentence after affirming an enhancement paragraph. Dudley challenged the trial court’s admission of evidence regarding a prior robbery, asserting that identity was not at issue and that the previous offense was insufficiently similar to establish a signature. The robbery in question involved Michelle Perkins, a clerk at a Chevron store, who was threatened with a handgun by Dudley and two accomplices on December 2, 2008. 

Evidence presented included security footage from the Chevron store and subsequent identifications of Dudley by law enforcement officers. Perkins identified Dudley in a photo array as her assailant. The State introduced evidence of a separate robbery at the Smoker’s Outlet, involving a similar modus operandi where Dudley also used a firearm. Despite Dudley's claims regarding the extraneous evidence's admissibility under TEX. R. EVID. 404(b), the court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the evidence, ruling that it was relevant for proving identity.

The State contends that the Appellant introduced the issue of identity during cross-examination of Sergeant Matt Davidson, prior to the admission of evidence regarding an extraneous robbery. The admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, with reversals occurring only if the trial court's decision falls outside a reasonable disagreement zone. Generally, a defendant should be tried solely for the charged offense, not for other crimes. However, evidence of uncharged misconduct may be admissible if it is relevant to a material issue and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Exceptions include showing motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. Extraneous offenses are admissible to establish identity only when that issue is contested in the case. The defense may raise identity during cross-examination by impeaching the identifying witness regarding critical details of the identification.

In this case, the Appellant's cross-examination challenged eyewitness Perkins' description of the suspects, focusing on discrepancies in race, hair color, facial hair, and weapon identification. Perkins initially described the suspects as a black male and two Hispanic males but later identified the Appellant, who is white but was perceived as Hispanic due to his dark facial hair. The defense highlighted inconsistencies in Perkins' descriptions and her ability to identify the weapon, arguing that her identification of the Appellant was unreliable. During closing arguments, defense counsel pointed out that Perkins changed her description after identifying the Appellant and emphasized that the weapon found at the Appellant's home was not the one used in the robbery. The defense also contested the identification of the Appellant in surveillance photos, noting the suspect’s blond hair and lack of facial hair. Additionally, the defense sought to demonstrate that Detective Liverett had shown Perkins a large image of the Appellant before the photo array, although Perkins clarified otherwise during redirect examination.

Defense counsel argued during closing that Detective Liverett misled the jury regarding his efforts to secure Ms. Perkins's identification of Mr. Dudley, thereby raising the issue of identity. The court addressed the second contention from the Appellant regarding the admissibility of an extraneous offense based on insufficient similarities to the charged offense. Evidence of extraneous offenses intended to prove identity must showcase distinct characteristics that are common to both offenses, such that they form a defendant's "signature." This signature must be evident through a comparative analysis of the circumstances involved in both offenses. No strict rules determine what constitutes sufficient similarities; factors may include proximity in time and place, method of commission, or other distinguishing elements.

The Appellant contested the relevance of the mere use of firearms, citing that such usage is too broad to establish a connection between the offenses. They referenced case law, arguing that distinctiveness is required to justify the admission of extraneous crime evidence. Although Perkins identified a BB gun from Appellant’s vehicle as similar to the one used in the charged offense, no evidence confirmed that it was the same gun used in either robbery. The court concurred, noting that the mere fact that firearms were involved does not suffice to demonstrate admissibility due to lack of evidence linking the firearms to both crimes.

The State argued for admissibility based on the geographical proximity of the two robberies, stating they occurred 1.43 miles apart. However, this distance lacked supporting evidence in the record. The court acknowledged that they could take judicial notice of this fact on appeal and determined that the proximity of the stores could be a relevant factor in assessing the connection between the offenses, drawing parallels to prior case law where location supported the admission of extraneous offenses.

The State contended that both robberies involved similar convenience store businesses. The Appellant presented evidence that convenience stores in Odessa frequently experience robberies, arguing that this commonality does not establish a unique 'signature.' While this alone does not define a signature, the fact that both incidents involved convenience stores—as opposed to different types of establishments—can indicate a common mode of operation. The court referenced *Ransom v. State* to illustrate the importance of modus operandi in distinguishing between different robbery types. 

In both robberies, Appellant and his accomplices executed similar tactics: at the Chevron station, Appellant feigned a purchase before brandishing a weapon and demanding money, while at Smoker’s Outlet, he made a small purchase before threatening the clerk. Differences included Appellant acting alone in the extraneous robbery versus having accomplices in the charged offense. 

Key similarities noted between the incidents were that they occurred six days apart, shortly after 10 p.m., in the same area, involved convenience stores, featured suspects in similar zip-up hoodies, and occurred when only one clerk was present. Given these similarities and the Appellant’s challenge to identity, the trial court's admission of the extraneous offense evidence was deemed appropriate, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's judgment.