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Elroy Chester v. Rick Thaler, Director
Citation: 666 F.3d 340Docket: 08-70023
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; January 3, 2012; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Elroy Chester, having confessed to and pled guilty for capital murder, was sentenced to death by a Texas jury, and his conviction was upheld on direct appeal. He later sought post-conviction relief, arguing he was mentally retarded, which would render his execution unconstitutional. Both the Texas trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals found him not to be mentally retarded. Chester subsequently filed for a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was denied by the federal district court. The court's decision noted that the state's legal conclusions did not contradict or unreasonably apply federal law and that the factual determinations were reasonable given the evidence. Consequently, the appeal was affirmed. Chester's criminal history includes multiple burglaries, assaults, and the murders of at least five victims, culminating in a violent incident on February 6, 1998, where he raped and threatened multiple individuals before murdering Willie Ryman III. He was apprehended shortly after the crime, confessed to Ryman’s murder, and led authorities to the weapon used. Chester sought post-conviction relief, arguing that he could not be executed due to mental retardation, referencing the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins v. Virginia, which prohibits executing mentally retarded individuals under the Eighth Amendment. The Texas trial court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) concluded that Chester did not qualify as mentally retarded. Although Chester met two of the three criteria for mental retardation—significant limitations in intellectual functioning and early-life deficiencies—he failed to demonstrate 'significant deficits in adaptive behavior.' The TCCA cited Ex Parte Briseno, which outlines guidelines for determining adaptive behavior deficits and states that the American Association of Mental Retardation's definitions should be used. The TCCA found the trial court's conclusion supported by evidence, including Chester's 1987 Vineland test, which indicated mild mental retardation, contrasted with his school classification as 'learning disabled.' The trial court found credible testimony that a 'learning disability' does not equate to mental retardation. Additionally, the court considered Chester's calculated criminal behavior and his ability to engage in coherent conversations, further supporting its conclusion. Ultimately, the TCCA affirmed that Chester did not show significant deficits in adaptive behavior. Chester subsequently filed a habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that the TCCA's findings were unreasonable and contrary to Atkins. The federal district court denied his request for relief, leading Chester to appeal the decision. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) prohibits the relitigation of claims that have been adjudicated on the merits in state court, with exceptions outlined in subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2). Section 2254(d)(1) includes two distinct exceptions: an "unreasonable application" prong and a "contrary to" prong. Federal courts can grant habeas relief under this section only if the state court's decision was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as defined by the Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision. Clearly established federal law is interpreted as the holdings of the Supreme Court, not its dicta. Section 2254(d)(2) allows relief if the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable factual determination in light of the evidence presented. Federal courts presume the state court’s factual findings are correct unless the petitioner provides clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption. Although the standard for obtaining relief is stringent, it does not preclude the possibility of relief if the state court’s decision is in clear conflict with Supreme Court precedent. The petitioner claims entitlement to relief under both subsections, arguing that the state court's decision was contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of federal law, while also being based on an unreasonable factual determination. The document outlines that a state court's judgment qualifies as an "unreasonable application" if it correctly identifies governing legal principles but unreasonably applies them to the facts of the case or misapplies or refuses to extend legal principles from Supreme Court precedent to new contexts. A federal court must find that the state court's application of law was unreasonable to reverse the denial of habeas relief, requiring a showing that the state court's ruling lacked justification to the extent that it was beyond fair-minded disagreement. Determining whether a state court unreasonably applied federal law begins with identifying the relevant Supreme Court holding, which in this case is Atkins v. Virginia. The Supreme Court established that the death penalty is not appropriate for mentally retarded individuals, basing this on the Eighth Amendment's evolving standards of decency. The Court noted a national consensus against executing the mentally retarded, although it recognized disagreements regarding the definition of mental retardation itself. The Court did not provide specific criteria for identifying mentally retarded offenders but left it to states to develop their own standards. The petitioner argues that Atkins mandates state courts to use clinical definitions of mental retardation from the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and American Psychological Association (APA), citing a footnote in Atkins that suggests state definitions generally align with these clinical standards. The petitioner contends that the Texas court's analysis failed to conform to these definitions, thus constituting an unreasonable application of Atkins. However, the analysis of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA), which relied on factors from Ex parte Briseno to assess mental retardation, is deemed not unreasonable when compared to Atkins. Texas law requires proving three criteria for classification as mentally retarded: significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (IQ below 70), deficits in adaptive behavior, and evidence that these conditions originated before age 18. The conclusion is that the TCCA's reliance on Briseno did not unreasonably apply the principles established in Atkins. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the AAMR definition of mental retardation in death penalty cases, as established in Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8. The court acknowledged that the AAMR definition was intended for social services, not for assessing mental impairment in the context of capital punishment. It highlighted the subjectivity involved in measuring adaptive behavior, which is a critical component of determining mental retardation. To address these issues, the Briseno court identified seven evidentiary factors for evaluating whether a convict qualifies for protection against the death penalty under Atkins. These factors include: 1. Opinions of those who knew the individual during developmental years regarding their mental capacity. 2. Assessment of the individual’s impulsiveness versus planning in behavior. 3. Evaluation of leadership qualities or tendencies to follow others. 4. Analysis of the appropriateness and rationality of responses to external stimuli. 5. Clarity and focus of responses to questions. 6. Ability to conceal information or lie effectively. 7. Consideration of whether the offense required forethought and complex execution. These factors are designed to align with the constitutional restrictions set forth in Atkins and do not contradict its principles. The Briseno factors correlate closely with the discussions in Atkins regarding the nature of mental retardation, including developmental onset, impulsive behavior, social interactions, and cognitive processing abilities. Thus, the Texas judiciary’s approach in Briseno is a deliberate and structured interpretation that reinforces the standards established in Atkins. This analysis also counters claims that the state court's decision was contrary to established federal law. A state court's decision is considered 'contrary to' established federal law if it conflicts with Supreme Court holdings or reaches a different conclusion on materially similar facts. The use of the Briseno factors to assess adaptive functioning does not contradict the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins. The court has previously ruled that Briseno is not contrary to Atkins. The petitioner contends that the state habeas court's reliance on Ex parte Briseno is inconsistent with Atkins regarding the evaluation of adaptive behavior limitations, but the court finds no such inconsistency. The petitioner must rely on Section 2254(d)(2) for federal habeas relief, as Section 2254(d)(1) is not applicable. Under Section 2254(d)(2), a state court's decision may be challenged if it is based on an unreasonable factual determination given the evidence presented. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) found that the petitioner lacked the necessary deficits in adaptive behavior to be classified as mentally retarded, which would absolve him of moral culpability for a capital crime. The petitioner argues that his VABS score and IQ indicate mild mental retardation and that the Briseno factors are inadequate for such determinations, claiming the TCCA's conclusion was unreasonable. According to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a state court's factual determinations are presumed correct unless clearly rebutted by convincing evidence. The trial court's factual findings, particularly regarding the petitioner's mental retardation, are subject to deference, and the court found that the petitioner demonstrated significant adaptive behavior through credible testimony and actions, such as effective communication, understanding legal matters, and planning during criminal activities. Thus, the state court's factual determinations stand unless convincingly rebutted by the petitioner. Petitioner argues that the Briseno factors and state evidence focus narrowly on recent actions rather than his complete history. He presented several pieces of evidence, including a Vineland Adaptive Behavior Survey score of 57, expert testimony from Dr. Orloff, and statements from family and school personnel suggesting he was 'stupid' or 'retarded.' Petitioner also noted his participation in the Mentally Retarded Offenders Program. However, the state trial court dismissed this evidence as unpersuasive, viewing the family and school testimony as indicative of a learning disability rather than mental retardation, and suggested potential bias from the family. The court found Dr. Orloff's testimony lacked credibility due to limited exposure to Petitioner and his lesser qualifications. Furthermore, participation in the Mentally Retarded Offenders Program was deemed non-determinative since non-retarded individuals could also enroll. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that while test scores might suggest mental retardation, it ultimately upheld the trial court's findings, concluding Petitioner did not provide 'clear and convincing evidence' to counter the court's determinations. The court emphasized that the review process does not involve second-guessing credibility determinations made by the state trial court. Notably, evidence presented demonstrated Petitioner’s calculated actions during the crimes, such as casing victims' homes and employing tactics to avoid detection, which contradicts claims of diminished mental capacity. The court highlighted that definitions of mental retardation include significant limitations in adaptive skills, which Petitioner failed to substantiate based on his conduct. Overall, the court found no unreasonable factual findings regarding adaptive behavior deficiencies in the state courts' rulings. Petitioner demonstrated premeditated planning rather than impulsive behavior in executing a sophisticated break-in and managing associated crises. The evidence suggests that Petitioner was capable of processing information and engaging in logical reasoning, contradicting arguments regarding mental incapacity. The burden on Petitioner was to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's decision was unreasonable, which he failed to do. The district court's denial of habeas relief was affirmed as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) did not act contrary to established federal law or make unreasonable factual determinations. In dissent, Judge Dennis argues that the majority's affirmation of the TCCA's death penalty judgment contradicts federal law as established in Atkins v. Virginia, which prohibits the execution of mentally retarded offenders. The dissent contends that the TCCA incorrectly applied its own 'Briseno factors' instead of adhering to the clinical definitions of mental retardation set by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and the American Psychiatric Association (APA). The dissent asserts that the TCCA's failure to properly apply these definitions warrants vacating the federal district court's judgment and remanding for further proceedings based on the correct clinical criteria. Atkins established that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of mentally retarded offenders, underpinned by a national consensus against such punishment and the standard clinical definitions of mental retardation, which include subaverage intellectual functioning, significant limitations in adaptive skills, and manifestations prior to age 18. For a state court to determine mental retardation in the context of execution exemption, it must apply all three prongs of the definition aligned with AAMR and APA standards. The Court in Atkins established that not all individuals claiming mental retardation meet the criteria for exemption from execution, as defined by federal constitutional law. States are responsible for creating procedures to enforce this constitutional restriction, similar to the approach taken in Ford v. Wainwright regarding insanity defenses. While Atkins affirms that the federal government determines the boundaries for defining mentally retarded offenders exempt from execution, it allows states to develop their procedures within due process limits. However, states cannot redefine mental retardation in a way that permits the execution of individuals who are nationally recognized as mentally retarded. Atkins referenced the AAMR definition of mental retardation, which includes significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, concurrent limitations in two or more adaptive skill areas, and manifestation before age 18. In Chester’s habeas petition, the Texas habeas trial court failed to apply the second element of this definition and instead used the Briseno factors, which are considered non-diagnostic criteria, as established by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. This indicates a misapplication of the established standards in assessing mental retardation for execution exemption. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) utilized the Briseno factors, developed as evidentiary indicators for mental retardation, as substantive criteria to assess Elroy Chester’s mental capacity rather than the adaptive skills criteria of the AAMR definition. Chester presented evidence, including low IQ scores and a 57 on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Survey, indicating significant adaptive functioning deficits. However, the state habeas trial court applied the Briseno factors without justification, concluding that Chester did not meet the criteria for mental retardation, a decision affirmed by the TCCA. The U.S. District Court subsequently denied Chester federal habeas relief, citing failure under the seventh Briseno factor. The TCCA's reliance on these non-diagnostic factors is argued to conflict with federal law established in Atkins, which mandates adherence to comprehensive clinical definitions of mental retardation, including all three components of the AAMR or APA definitions. This approach risks the wrongful execution of individuals who should be protected under the Eighth Amendment due to mental retardation. As both the TCCA and the federal court's rulings stem from the same constitutional error, it is recommended that the federal district court’s judgment be overturned, and the case remanded to ensure compliance with the clinical definitions mandated by Atkins. Chester, previously convicted for robbery and murder, remains central to this legal contention. Chester was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by a Texas jury in 1998, with his conviction affirmed on direct appeal. He later sought post-conviction relief, arguing that he could not be executed due to mental retardation. His federal habeas petition was pending when the Supreme Court ruled in Atkins that executing mentally retarded offenders violates the Eighth Amendment. Subsequently, Chester's petition was dismissed without prejudice to allow him to pursue state post-conviction relief based on Atkins. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) permitted Chester to file a successive state habeas petition and remanded the case for further proceedings, which included an evidentiary hearing on his Atkins claim. To prove mental retardation under Atkins and the TCCA's Briseno decision, Chester needed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, related limitations in adaptive functioning, and that these limitations manifested before age 18. The Briseno decision specified that judges, not juries, would decide Atkins claims and outlined various evidentiary factors for assessing mental retardation, such as personal development, impulsivity, leadership, rationality of conduct, coherence in responses, ability to deceive, and the complexity of the crime committed. These factors serve as additional considerations rather than an alternative definition of mental retardation, differing from clinical definitions provided by the AAMR and APA. Chester's case involves multiple IQ tests and the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (VABS) indicating significant limitations in intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior. At various ages, Chester scored an IQ of 69, and the State's expert acknowledged that such a score indicates mental retardation. Chester's evidence included his early placement in special education, admission to the Mentally Retarded Offenders Program (MROP) at age eighteen, and achievement test results reflecting third-grade level performance or below. Testimonies from relatives and a special education teacher highlighted Chester's adaptive behavior deficits, including his inability to live or work independently. Despite this evidence, the trial court concluded that Chester failed to prove significant adaptive skill deficits, applying the Briseno evidentiary factors rather than the clinical criteria from the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR). The court found that Chester did not meet the adaptive functioning requirement to be classified as mentally retarded. However, on appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) partially overturned the trial court's findings, affirming that Chester met the criteria for significant limitations in intellectual functioning and the evidence supporting mental retardation was documented before his eighteenth birthday. Nevertheless, the TCCA denied habeas relief, stating that Chester had not sufficiently demonstrated limitations in adaptive functioning. Chester failed to demonstrate significant deficits in adaptive behavior necessary to prove mental retardation under the second prong of the relevant legal standard, as determined by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA). The TCCA's conclusion did not incorporate clinical definitions from the AAMR or APA, relying instead on factors from the Briseno decision, which are deemed indicative of mental retardation or personality disorder. Chester subsequently filed a federal habeas petition, where the state acknowledged evidence of his mental deficits prior to age eighteen and his significantly sub-average intellectual functioning. However, the district court diverged from the clinical definitions of mental retardation established in Atkins v. Virginia, asserting that a finding on just one of the seven Briseno factors could suffice for denying an Atkins claim. The court upheld the TCCA's rejection of Chester's mental retardation claim, concluding it was consistent with federal law and denied him habeas relief. Chester is now appealing this decision, focusing on whether the state courts' determination of his mental capacity was unreasonable and violated the Eighth Amendment by allowing the execution of a mentally retarded individual. The district court granted Chester a certificate of appealability on three issues, including concerns about the validity of the Briseno factors and their alignment with scientific definitions of mental retardation. The review of the TCCA's decision will assess whether it was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, as per the standards set by the AEDPA. A federal court cannot grant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas relief if a state court has previously decided the issue on its merits unless the state decision was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. A state court's decision is contrary to federal law if it applies a rule that contradicts Supreme Court precedent or reaches a different conclusion on materially indistinguishable facts. An unreasonable application occurs when the court identifies the correct legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of the case. The AEDPA standard applies to the last reasoned decision made by the state courts regarding the petitioner’s arguments. In cases where multiple state courts have adjudicated a claim, the last reasoned decision is analyzed. Additionally, the Supreme Court's definition of mental retardation includes significant limitations in intellectual functioning alongside limitations in adaptive skills before the age of 18, as outlined by both the American Association on Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association. Onset of mental retardation must occur before age 18. It encompasses various pathological processes affecting the central nervous system, with “mild” mental retardation defined by an IQ range of 50-55 to approximately 70. The Supreme Court, in Atkins v. Virginia, recognized a growing consensus against executing mentally retarded defendants, noting that 18 states and the federal government have laws prohibiting such executions. Notably, only five states have executed individuals with an IQ below 70 since 1989. The Court highlighted that while definitions of mental retardation vary among states, they generally align with clinical definitions from the AAMR and APA. In its analysis, the Court identified characteristics of mentally retarded individuals that render their execution cruel and unusual, including diminished capacities in understanding, communication, logical reasoning, impulse control, and comprehension of others' reactions. The Court concluded that executing mentally retarded individuals does not achieve deterrence and that their lesser culpability does not justify retribution. Additionally, these individuals are at a heightened risk of wrongful execution due to potential false confessions and challenges in presenting mitigating evidence. Ultimately, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of individuals who qualify as mentally retarded according to national consensus. The Court established that the definition of mental retardation for Eighth Amendment purposes aligns with clinical definitions used by the AAMR and APA, emphasizing a "national consensus" on this matter. While the Court did not specify procedures for determining mental retardation, it assigned states the responsibility to develop methods to enforce constitutional restrictions on capital punishment. This mirrors the approach taken in Ford v. Wainwright concerning insanity, where both cases limit the class of death penalty-eligible offenders. The Court affirmed that federal constitutional law governs the definition of incompetency for execution, citing that both Atkins and Ford impose substantive restrictions on the state's power to execute specific offenders. Atkins highlighted that states must adhere to definitions of mental retardation that conform to established clinical standards, as part of the enforcement of these constitutional limits. Thus, the substantive criteria for determining mental retardation and incompetency in execution cases are rooted in federal law, requiring states to align their definitions accordingly. In 2004, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals clarified the enforcement of the constitutional restriction against executing individuals with mental retardation, as established in Atkins v. Virginia. The court referenced the definitions of "mental retardation" from the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and the Texas Health and Safety Code, which both require significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, related limitations in adaptive functioning, and an onset before age 18. The court decided to adhere to these definitions until the Texas Legislature provides an alternative statutory definition. Concerns were raised about the subjective nature of the adaptive behavior criteria in the AAMR definition. The court emphasized the need for states to maintain a definition that generally conforms to accepted standards in the field of mental health, indicating that a definition completely at odds with expert consensus would violate the prohibition against executing mentally retarded individuals. The court also suggested additional factors for consideration in assessing mental retardation, such as opinions from those who knew the individual during their developmental years, the ability to formulate and execute plans, the nature of the individual's conduct, and the rationality of their responses to external stimuli. These factors aim to provide a more comprehensive evaluation beyond the established definitions. Coherent responses to questions and the ability to conceal facts or lie effectively are key considerations in evaluating a person's mental state. The differences between the AAMR’s 1992 and 2002 criteria for adaptive functioning are irrelevant to the appeal in question. The Briseno court may have incorrectly assumed that a defendant cannot simultaneously have mental retardation and a personality disorder, despite evidence indicating that individuals can experience both conditions. Scientific definitions affirm that mental disorders can co-occur with mental retardation, and no credible clinician would dismiss a diagnosis of mental retardation solely based on the presence of an antisocial personality disorder. The AAMR clarifies that types of mental health disorders exist in both populations with and without mental retardation, and prevalence rates of mental health disorders are notably higher among those with mental retardation. The Briseno factors, labeled as "adaptive functioning" criteria by the TCCA, do not align with established AAMR or APA definitions and lack authoritative support. They appear to be subjective and based on judges’ assumptions rather than objective criteria. The TCCA ruled that a jury determination of mental retardation is not mandated in post-conviction proceedings and that the defendant must prove mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the petitioner, Jose Garcia Briseño, failed to meet this burden. The Briseno factors do not offer a clear, independent method for assessing significant limitations in adaptive functioning, as they lack guidance on how many factors must be negated to establish mental retardation, contrasting with precise criteria set forth by the AAMR. The Briseno court established that Texas courts would apply either the AAMR criteria or section 591.003(13) in evaluating claims of mental retardation related to Atkins. It identified seven additional evidentiary factors for consideration in assessing a defendant's limitations in adaptive behavior. In the current case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) found that Chester satisfied two of the three criteria for mental retardation: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and onset before age 18, which are undisputed in this appeal. The remaining criterion—significant limitations in adaptive functioning—remains contested. Chester presented substantial evidence, including factual data and expert testimony, to support his claim of significant limitations in adaptive functioning, consistent with clinical definitions of mental retardation. However, the TCCA concluded otherwise, relying solely on the Briseno evidentiary factors. The state trial court initially adopted the prosecution's findings, conflicting with the record, but the TCCA later acknowledged Chester's demonstrated significant limitations in intellectual functioning. Chester's Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (VABS) score of 57 and IQ score of 69 were cited as indicative of mild mental retardation, both measured in 1987 when he was 18 and admitted to the Mentally Retarded Offender Program. Chester contends that he meets the criteria under the revised AAMR definition from 2002, but the appeal does not hinge on the differences between the 2002 and earlier definitions of mental retardation. Mental retardation is defined by three criteria: significant limitations in intellectual functioning, significant limitations in adaptive behavior, and the onset of these limitations before age 18. The court does not need to resolve definitional differences between the American Psychological Association (APA) and the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), as both reference standardized measures for assessing adaptive behavior, notably the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales-II (VABS), which courts have accepted as valid. The AAMR advocates for standardized testing to identify adaptive behavior limitations, defining significant limitations as performance at least two standard deviations below the mean. In the case of Chester, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) did not provide reasons to dismiss his VABS score of 57, nor has the State of Texas challenged its reliability. Chester presented evidence of deficits across multiple adaptive skill areas, including communication, home living, functional academics, and work. His history reveals severe communication difficulties, special education attendance, and a lack of independent living skills. Despite an IQ of 69 and a VABS score of 57, a state expert conceded that Chester meets the criteria for mental retardation but personally disagreed with that diagnosis. The evidence suggests Chester was unable to perform basic tasks independently and had significant communication challenges throughout his life. Chester was classified as having "borderline intellectual functioning" while in the MROP, despite Dr. Henry Orloff, the MROP's director, testifying that this diagnosis lacked foundation. The classification persisted due to practical considerations at the time. Chester's VABS test score of 57 indicated a level low enough to warrant a diagnosis of mental retardation, supported by substantial evidence of adaptive functioning limitations in at least four AAMR skill areas. However, the state courts relied exclusively on the Briseno factors to determine Chester did not meet the mental retardation requirement, failing to use these factors as supplementary to the AAMR's clinical definition, which emphasizes adaptive functioning criteria. The AAMR's 1992 definition requires limitations in two or more adaptive skill areas, a standard echoed by the APA. The state argued Chester was classified as learning disabled in school, but Chester contended this was inappropriate given his low IQ scores, which contradicted the definition of learning disabilities that necessitates a discrepancy between IQ and academic achievement. The TCCA did not evaluate whether Chester exhibited significant limitations in two or more adaptive functioning areas, nor did the state trial court, both mistakenly treating the Briseno factors as adequate for assessing adaptive functioning limitations without referencing clinical definitions or criteria. The Court's review of evidentiary factors concerning adaptive behavior, as referenced in Ex parte Briseno, undermines the Applicant's claim of mental retardation. The trial court addressed all seven Briseno factors, demonstrating that the Applicant did not convince the court on any of them. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) effectively disregarded the conventional clinical definitions of adaptive functioning, as well as the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) 2002 criteria, which require performance to be significantly below the mean in conceptual, social, or practical skills. The federal district court, in denying habeas relief, also neglected to evaluate the Applicant's adaptive functioning against established clinical definitions, relying solely on one of the Briseno factors. The TCCA's decision, which suggests that a positive finding on the seventh Briseno factor alone is sufficient to deny relief, contradicts the Supreme Court ruling in Atkins, which mandates that states must use definitions of mental retardation that align with national consensus and clinical standards. The TCCA's approach, therefore, represents a significant deviation from these established definitions, failing to uphold the protections intended by Atkins against executing individuals deemed mentally retarded. The Briseno evidentiary factors cannot be solely relied upon to determine whether an individual lacks significant limitations in adaptive functioning, as they differ substantially from the criteria established by the AAMR and APA regarding mental retardation. Specifically, the Briseno factors do not assess crucial adaptive skill areas, such as self-care, community use, or health and safety, which the AAMR and APA criteria require to show significant limitations in at least two of ten or eleven areas. The AAMR and APA recognize that individuals with mental retardation possess both strengths and limitations, emphasizing the need to focus on limitations when assessing adaptive functioning. Evidence of a defendant's capabilities in certain areas does not negate their limitations unless explicitly contradicted. The Briseno factors, if applied without the clinical definitions, could lead to erroneous conclusions about an individual's mental retardation status. Additionally, evidence of criminal behavior is relevant only to the extent it demonstrates limitations in the specified areas of adaptive functioning, which was not the case in Lambert's claims. Therefore, evidence pertaining to criminal activity does not effectively disprove claims of adaptive functioning limitations. The Briseno evidentiary factors, which assess an individual's behavior, do not align with clinical standards for determining mental retardation, as these standards evaluate limitations in adaptive functioning based on typical behavior rather than isolated incidents. Courts may find individuals with significant limitations in two or more adaptive areas not mentally retarded if they rely solely on Briseno factors, rendering such evidence irrelevant and contrary to clinical definitions. Certain Briseno factors mischaracterize impulsivity and rational communication as indicators of mental retardation, which contradicts the DSM-IV-TR that acknowledges individuals with mild mental retardation can develop social skills and communicate effectively. The Briseno factors also emphasize exceptional behaviors related to capital crimes rather than an individual's consistent day-to-day functioning, neglecting the strengths and weaknesses that individuals with mental retardation may exhibit in various circumstances. This focus on isolated instances, especially concerning serious offenses, diverges from the clinical emphasis on typical adaptive behavior, as underscored by Supreme Court precedent in Williams v. Taylor. A state-court decision is deemed contrary to Supreme Court precedent if it reaches an opposite conclusion on a legal question or confronts materially indistinguishable facts while arriving at a conflicting result. The term "contrary" is defined as being "diametrically different" or "mutually opposed." For a state decision to be considered contrary under 2254(d)(1), it must significantly deviate from established Supreme Court rulings. A clear example is provided where a state court's rejection of a prisoner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on a preponderance of evidence, contradicts the standard set in Strickland, which requires only a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Conversely, a state-court decision that accurately applies the correct legal framework but reaches a different conclusion does not fit the “contrary to” clause. For instance, if a state court correctly identifies Strickland as authoritative and applies it to reject an ineffective assistance claim, that decision would not be considered contrary, even if a federal court might arrive at a different outcome. In applying these principles, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) has made a decision that is contrary to Atkins by employing a rule that contradicts Atkins's governing law. Specifically, the TCCA rejected Chester’s Atkins claim on the basis that he did not prove his limitations in adaptive functioning according to state-law Briseno factors, which is fundamentally opposed to the Atkins precedent that requires demonstrating adaptive functioning deficits based on the AAMR or APA definitions. The Briseno factors do not align with these accepted definitions, marking the TCCA's decision as substantially different and contrary to established law. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) failed to adhere to the clinical standard for defining mental retardation as established in Atkins v. Virginia, instead applying the Briseno factors, which fundamentally differ from the clinical criteria recognized by the Supreme Court. The TCCA's reliance on Briseno disregards the adaptive functioning framework mandated by Atkins, which allows defendants to demonstrate deficits through specific skill limitations aligned with American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) or American Psychological Association (APA) definitions. The use of Briseno's factors as the exclusive measure for adaptive functioning lacks clinical validity and does not align with the national consensus on mental retardation. Furthermore, the TCCA did not follow its prior ruling in Briseno that endorsed using the AAMR definition, instead opting to solely utilize additional evidentiary factors without clinical substantiation. This approach was criticized in a dissenting opinion in Lizcano v. State, which argued that the TCCA's methodology contradicts both Atkins and its own prior decisions, reinforcing that the use of Briseno factors alone to adjudicate mental retardation claims is inconsistent with established federal law prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded individuals. Legislative judgment regarding mental retardation aligns with the diagnostic criteria set by the AAMR and APA. The dissent in Lizcano contends that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) improperly allowed fact-finders to modify clinical criteria for adaptive deficits based on personal judgments about which mentally retarded offenders deserve the death penalty. This deviation from established diagnostic standards was deemed unconstitutional. Although the Supreme Court in Atkins did not prescribe a specific mental health standard, it emphasized the importance of adhering to professional standards in framing the constitutional prohibition against executing mentally retarded individuals. The courts must not permit subjective judgments to undermine the diagnostic nature of the inquiry. To determine if Chester qualifies as mentally retarded and is thus protected from execution under Atkins, state courts were required to apply a definition that accurately identifies offenders within Atkins’s protected class. However, the state courts improperly modified the Briseno evidentiary factors, creating a standalone test for adaptive functioning that diverged from clinical definitions, which undermined the accurate assessment of Chester's eligibility for protection under Atkins. Chester provided standardized test scores and evidence supporting his claim of meeting clinical criteria for adaptive functioning and other prongs of mental retardation, which the state courts failed to recognize. Consequently, the decision that Chester is not mentally retarded contradicts Atkins and is deemed contrary to the governing law. The key legal issue is whether state courts must apply a definition that generally conforms to clinical standards or whether they can adopt unscientific definitions that conflict with the national consensus on mental retardation as articulated in Atkins. The TCCA's definition of the adaptive functioning prong of mental retardation deviates significantly from the national consensus, which undermines the criteria for assessing adaptive functioning deficits. The majority incorrectly asserts that the Briseno factors are a constitutionally valid method for determining death eligibility, disregarding the requirement that any definition must generally conform to clinical standards established by national consensus, as mandated by the Atkins decision. Atkins clearly prohibits executing mentally retarded defendants and necessitates that states adhere to a widely accepted definition of mental retardation to enforce this ban effectively. The TCCA's reliance on the Briseno factors replaces the established clinical definition previously used in Texas, leading to an assessment of adaptive functioning that lacks scientific validity and contravenes Atkins. The majority's stance implies that states can disregard national consensus, which is contrary to the Eighth Amendment's evolving standards of decency. The TCCA should not be allowed to bypass the constitutional prohibition established by Atkins by adopting its own definitions that do not align with the national consensus for determining mental retardation. The AAMR and APA evaluate adaptive functioning by examining the petitioner's limitations, defining significant limitations as a deficiency in two of ten adaptive skill areas. In contrast, the Briseno factors, endorsed by the district court and affirmed by the majority, may allow a petitioner to be deemed non-mentally retarded based on meeting just one of seven factors. These Briseno factors diverge from clinical definitions and often reflect a person's actions at a specific moment rather than their overall functioning throughout life. If relied upon exclusively, these factors could undermine evidence of significant limitations in adaptive functioning. Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) did not base the Briseno factors on national consensus or established clinical definitions of mental retardation, leading to potential misapplication of the law regarding death eligibility under Atkins. Chester's claim of mental retardation must be evaluated consistently with Atkins, as the TCCA’s approach conflicts with established federal law. The recommendation is to vacate the district court's judgment and remand the case for a reevaluation of Chester's mental retardation claim based on definitions aligning with clinical standards and national consensus, thus ensuring protection under the Eighth Amendment.