Stratman v. Leisnoi Inc

Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-35934

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 6, 2008; Federal Appellate Court

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Omar Stratman initiated a challenge in 1976 against the Secretary of the Interior's certification of Woody Island as a native village under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether Congress ratified the Secretary’s 1974 eligibility determination when it passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) in 1980, which recognized Leisnoi, Inc., Woody Island’s village corporation, as a "deficiency village corporation" entitled to lands under ANCSA. The court concluded that Congress did ratify the Secretary's determination, leading to the dismissal of Stratman’s appeal as moot.

The background highlights that ANCSA was enacted in 1971 to resolve land disputes involving the federal government, the state of Alaska, Alaskan Natives, and non-native settlers, providing approximately 44 million acres of land and nearly $1 billion to Alaskan Natives in exchange for resolving aboriginal land claims. The legislation established thirteen Regional Corporations and various Village Corporations for Native groups. A native village is defined under ANCSA to include any recognized tribe or community in Alaska, requiring that at least 25 Natives resided in the village during the 1970 census and that the village not be modern or urban in character. The Department of the Interior set procedural guidelines for determining village eligibility, mandating that initial decisions be made by the Bureau of Indian Affairs by December 19, 1973, with specific timelines for protests and appeals.

The total land allocation from the Federal government to village corporations under ANCSA is fixed at twenty-two million acres, but the actual distribution to each corporation is based on the Native Alaskan population in eligible villages. For example, a village with 25 Native residents can patent 69,120 acres, while one with over 600 can patent 161,280 acres (43 U.S.C. 1613(a)). Any unclaimed land from the total allocation must be redistributed equitably, considering factors such as historical use, subsistence needs, and population (43 U.S.C. 1611(b)). Final land allocations depend on the eligibility of all potential villages within a regional corporation, impacting the regional corporations' land grants if village patents exceed the percentage of acreage allotted based on the corporation's size (43 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1)). Eligible village corporations can select lands per 43 U.S.C. 1611, and if land selection criteria cannot be met due to a lack of available land, the Secretary is required to withdraw three times the deficiency from nearby unreserved public lands (43 U.S.C. 1610(a)(3)(A)). 

Koniag, Inc. faced challenges due to land shortages on Kodiak Island and uncertainty regarding the status of several potential villages. In the 1970s, eleven villages sued over eligibility decisions made by the Secretary (Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Congress addressed these issues through ANILCA, which focuses on land management for environmental preservation and includes amendments to ANCSA. Specifically, Section 1427 of ANILCA, known as the "Koniag Amendment," provides definitions relevant to these disputes, including the designation of "Deficiency village acreage on the Alaska Peninsula," which pertains to lands assigned to Koniag villages due to the lack of available land on Kodiak Island (43 U.S.C. 1613, 1427(a)(2)). Leisnoi is explicitly defined as a "Koniag deficiency village corporation" (1427(a)(4)).

Leisnoi was designated as a "village corporation" by Koniag, making it eligible to receive land under section 12(b) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C. 1611(b). This subsection outlines that the Secretary of the Interior will convey lands on Afognak Island to satisfy Koniag Deficiency Village Corporations' claims to land on the Alaska Peninsula, extinguishing all related claims and including the land within the Alaska Peninsula Wildlife Refuge. Subsection (e) addresses eligibility disputes from eleven villages, stating that releasing the U.S. from prior claims under ANCSA allows them to be deemed eligible under the Act. Subsection (f) clarifies that all conveyances made under this section will adhere to ANCSA's terms as if issued under that Act. Additionally, Section 1412 in Title XIV specifies that ANCSA's provisions remain fully applicable unless explicitly altered by this Act.

In 1976, Stratman and others sued in the District of Alaska to prevent land issuance to three villages, claiming they did not meet ANCSA’s certification requirements. Initially, the court dismissed claims related to recreational use of Woody Island due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. However, Stratman and plaintiff Toni Burton maintained their claims due to their ownership of grazing leases tied to Leisnoi’s land selections, necessitating actual notice of Woody Island’s certification. Stratman's action was later mooted when Leisnoi relinquished its claims to the grazing lease lands, leading to the district court's dismissal. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Stratman’s claim was not barred by administrative exhaustion due to lack of notice, remanding the case for administrative remedy pursuit. In 1982, a settlement was reached, but noncompliance with its terms allowed Stratman to reopen the decertification action in federal court.

The district court found that Stratman’s claims were not ready for judicial review without a formal agency determination, remanding the case to the IBLA and dismissing Stratman’s action. Following the remand, a hearing determined that Woody Island was not eligible as a Native village based on findings regarding resident numbers and occupancy as of April 1, 1970. The IBLA later affirmed Stratman’s claims in 2002. Meanwhile, Leisnoi sought a review of the IBLA’s decision, which led to a 2006 DOI Solicitor memorandum stating that section 1427 of ANILCA recognized Leisnoi as an eligible village, effectively nullifying Stratman’s challenge. The Secretary adopted this memorandum, disapproving the IBLA’s earlier decision. Stratman then filed a third amended complaint seeking to enforce the IBLA’s 2002 ruling. However, on September 26, 2007, the district court dismissed this complaint, ruling that section 1427 rendered Stratman’s claim moot. Stratman appealed the dismissal. The court noted that the review of the district court's dismissal is conducted de novo, particularly concerning the interpretation of ANILCA section 1427 and its impact on the case's mootness. The dismissal will stand if an event occurs during the appeal that prevents any effective relief for the prevailing party, as established in precedent.

Defendants argue that section 1427 of ANILCA designates Leisnoi as an eligible village corporation and conveys land to it, thus affirming the Secretary’s eligibility determination and rendering Stratman’s challenge irrelevant. Conversely, Stratman maintains that section 1427 serves merely as a land withdrawal and selection provision, indicating that Leisnoi’s land selection could change upon meeting ANCSA eligibility requirements. The court aligns with the defendants, asserting that the statutory language and structure indicate Congress intended to recognize Leisnoi as an eligible village. Section 1427(a) defines "deficiency village acreage" and identifies Leisnoi as a "Koniag deficiency village corporation," which ties to the rights granted under ANCSA. The provisions require that a village must be deemed eligible before addressing land deficiency issues, suggesting that Congress intended for Leisnoi to be recognized as eligible and entitled to land under ANCSA. Section 1427(b) further solidifies this by stating that the Secretary shall convey public land on Afognak Island to Leisnoi, satisfying its entitlement to land on the Alaska Peninsula. The court concludes that it is illogical for Congress to convey land to an ineligible village corporation, and since no additional requirements were imposed for Leisnoi to acquire land, it reinforces the intent of Congress to treat Leisnoi as an eligible village corporation.

Stratman asserts that section 1427 incorporates the eligibility criteria of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), arguing there is no conflict between section 1427's provisions and ANCSA's village eligibility criteria, thus suggesting Congress intended for them to be read together. However, this interpretation contradicts the explicit designation of Leisnoi as a deficiency village corporation and the absence of any direct incorporation of ANCSA’s requirements in section 1427. 

Stratman highlights section 1427(f), which states that conveyances under this section are subject to ANCSA’s terms, suggesting a prerequisite finding of eligibility. However, this interpretation misreads section 1427(f), which pertains only to conveyances and not to eligibility determinations. He also argues that if Congress intended to exempt Leisnoi from ANCSA’s requirements, it would have done so explicitly, citing the clear exceptions made for certain other villages under section 1427(e). This absence of an explicit exemption for Leisnoi implies, according to Stratman, that Congress recognized it as an eligible village.

Finally, Stratman points to section 1412, which states that ANCSA's provisions apply unless specified otherwise. He contends that deviations in section 1427 provide the necessary specificity to exempt Leisnoi from ANCSA’s eligibility requirements. This section deals with various regional corporations and addressing each transaction’s requirements individually would be impractical, as evidenced by other provisions in Title XIV that do not mention ANCSA.

Section 1412 of ANCSA is identified as a "savings clause" by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, which preserves the validity of ANCSA’s requirements. This clause does not displace provisions specifically naming Leisnoi as a deficiency village. The Supreme Court, in Amoco Products Co. v. Gambell, highlighted that ANILCA aimed to finalize the allocation of federal lands in Alaska, following earlier legislation. It noted that Title XIV, including section 1427, facilitates the conveyance of federal lands to Alaska Natives under ANCSA. Section 1427 requires the exchange of deficiency lands for lands on Afognak Island to occur "as soon as practicable" and mandates that Koniag designate village corporations entitled to the surface estate within 60 days.

The intent of Congress was to include Leisnoi as an eligible native village corporation, thereby avoiding ambiguity regarding its status. The analysis indicates that Congress designated Leisnoi as eligible without needing to meet ANCSA's eligibility requirements. The interpretation of the statute is deemed clear, negating the need to delve into legislative history unless it contradicts the statute's plain meaning. 

Congress viewed section 1427 as a cleanup measure to fulfill ANCSA's purposes, independent of the Secretary’s determinations. The authority of Congress to designate Leisnoi as an eligible village and convey land to it is upheld, supported by the Property Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress comprehensive power over federal lands. The court acknowledges that Congress retains the same rights over public lands as an individual would over private property, and there are no challenges to Congress's authority to patent lands to Leisnoi or designate it as an eligible village.

Congress’ intent to classify Leisnoi as an eligible village corporation renders Stratman’s challenge to its certification moot. In *United States v. Alaska*, the Supreme Court addressed ownership disputes over submerged lands off Alaska’s coast, emphasizing Congress’ ratification of a 1923 Executive Order that reserved these lands for federal control. The Court concluded that even if the President lacked authority under the Pickett Act to reserve these lands, Congress had effectively confirmed this reservation through the Statehood Act, thus affirming federal ownership of submerged lands.

In the case concerning Leisnoi, Congress had the authority to designate it as an eligible village and allocate public lands to it. This was evident from Leisnoi's inclusion in section 1427, which recognized its eligibility under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). The designation of Leisnoi as a "deficiency village corporation" entitled it to land conveyance rights under ANCSA, regardless of the correctness of the Secretary's prior eligibility determination. Similar to the precedent set in *Alaska*, Congress’ actions rendered any underlying eligibility decisions irrelevant, even if they diverged from Congress’ original intent.

Additionally, prior land conveyances to regional and village corporations under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) were treated as final, underscoring the principle that Congress does not impose land-use restrictions without explicit intent. Whether Congress acted under a misunderstanding regarding Leisnoi’s eligibility does not affect the validity of the legislation enacted. Compliance with the law by government agencies is necessary, but Congress’ legislative actions remain binding regardless of any misconceptions that may have influenced them.

Legislation, once valid, does not require judicial revision; Congress must amend any discrepancies between intent and law. The judiciary's role is not to rectify legislative drafting errors. In this case, Congress recognized Leisnoi as an eligible village and confirmed land rights, which ratified the Secretary's eligibility decision. The legal system has struggled to resolve claims swiftly, and after nearly thirty years since the enactment of ANILCA, it is imperative to conclude this litigation. Section 1427 ratified the eligibility determination challenged by Stratman, preventing any relief under ANCSA, as the court lacks jurisdiction over moot claims. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed, with each party bearing its own costs. The court also rejects Stratman's argument that a finding is necessary to conclude that ANCSA's eligibility requirements do not apply to Leisnoi.