United States v. MacIas-valencia

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-10711

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 4, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) applies to a conviction for conspiracy and attempted possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine when no actual contraband was present during the offense. The case involved Salvador Macias-Valencia, who was arrested during a DEA reverse sting operation while attempting to purchase methamphetamine. Although he had over $4,600 in cash for the transaction, no methamphetamine was involved at the time of his arrest.

Macias-Valencia was indicted on two counts related to conspiracy and attempted possession of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and pleaded guilty to both. He argued at sentencing that the mandatory minimum should not apply due to the absence of actual drugs. The district court, however, imposed two concurrent 120-month sentences, stating that without the statutory minimum, it might have considered a lesser sentence.

On appeal, the court affirmed the district court's decision, emphasizing that a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 carries the same mandatory minimum sentence as the substantive offense under § 841, regardless of whether actual drugs were present at the time of the offense. The court noted that the statutory interpretation was reviewed de novo and underscored that defendants are still subject to mandatory minimum sentences even when contraband is not physically involved in the offense, aligning with the precedents established in previous cases.

Defendant acknowledges his conviction for conspiracy and attempt but argues that a mandatory minimum sentence requires the presence of actual contraband. However, the statutes do not support this claim. According to Section 846, any person attempting or conspiring to commit an offense defined in the subchapter faces the same penalties as those for the completed offense. The relevant substantive offense, as outlined in 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), involves possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The penalties for this offense vary based on the type and quantity of the substance, with 50 grams or more of methamphetamine resulting in a minimum sentence of 10 years to life under Section 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). 

The text of the statute is explicit in imposing the same penalties for conspiracy and attempt as for the underlying offense, which does not require the crime to be completed. Relevant case law, including United States v. Penagos and United States v. Morales-Perez, affirms that conspiracy and attempt are inchoate offenses. The legislative history aligns with the statutory text, as established in Buckland, emphasizing the necessity to respect unambiguous statutory language unless clear legislative intent suggests otherwise. 

The Supreme Court previously addressed an earlier version of Section 846 in Bifulco v. United States, which indicated that sentences could not exceed the statutory maximum related to 841(b). In response to this, Congress amended Section 846 in 1988 to ensure that penalties for conspiracy align with those for substantive offenses under 841(a). Subsequent case law, including United States v. McNeese and Dabdoub-Canez, confirms that after the 1988 amendment, penalties for offenses under Section 846 are equivalent to those for corresponding offenses under Section 841(a).

The Sixth Circuit upheld a mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) following a conviction for conspiracy and attempt to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, despite the absence of actual contraband in the case of United States v. Kottmyer, 961 F.2d 569 (1992). Kottmyer was arrested during a reverse sting operation where government agents presented baking soda instead of cocaine. He contended that he should not face a mandatory minimum sentence because he would have received a legal substance, but the court ruled that the statutory minimum applied regardless of the nature of the substance involved. The court clarified that whether the packages contained cocaine, baking soda, or were nonexistent did not affect the guilt for conspiracy or attempt. The decision emphasized that Congress intended for penalties for conspiracy and attempt to mirror those for actual distribution, irrespective of the presence of contraband. The district court's imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence was thus affirmed, with the court noting that the issue did not require referral to an en banc review as it was not previously decided.