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Davis v. City of Las Vegas

Citations: 478 F.3d 1048; 2007 WL 601988Docket: 04-17284

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 27, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Frankie Davis, the plaintiff-appellant, filed a lawsuit against multiple defendants, including the City of Las Vegas and Officer David Miller, for excessive use of force during his arrest. The incident occurred after Davis was found in a non-public area of the Las Vegas Club Hotel Casino. Following a call from casino security, Officer Miller responded and encountered Davis, who had already been handcuffed by casino personnel. When Davis refused a search, Miller forcefully slammed him against a wall, pinned him down, and punched him, resulting in a fractured neck. Davis, unarmed throughout the encounter, alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a claim under Nevada’s battery statute. The district court granted Miller summary judgment based on qualified immunity, prompting Davis to appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court, led by Judge Reinhardt, reversed the summary judgment, determining that the case warranted a trial on the merits, as the alleged use of force could be deemed excessive and thus a violation of Davis's clearly established constitutional rights.

Davis was taken to the Casino’s security office after being detained, where a Casino employee called the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department to report the custody and request an officer. Officer Miller arrived, confirmed Davis was handcuffed, and attempted to search him despite Davis’s refusal. A struggle ensued when Davis rotated away to prevent Miller from retrieving his wallet, leading Miller to use physical force. Miller pushed Davis into a corner, slammed him against walls, and ultimately threw him face-down on the floor, causing Davis’s teeth to hit the ground. Miller then kneeled on Davis’s back, punched him in the face, and fractured Davis's neck during the altercation. Afterward, Davis was transported to jail, where he expressed pain and was later diagnosed with a neck fracture at a medical center. The Police Department’s Internal Affairs concluded that Miller used excessive force, resulting in a ten-hour suspension and mandated training. Davis subsequently filed a lawsuit against Miller for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for battery. The district court granted Miller summary judgment, claiming the force used was not clearly excessive and granted him qualified immunity. The court also found immunity applicable to state law claims. On appeal, the court certified the summary judgment order, and the appellate court reversed the decision.

A district court’s grant of summary judgment is subject to de novo review, including decisions regarding an officer's qualified immunity. Davis appeals the district court’s finding that Officer Miller was entitled to qualified immunity concerning his excessive force claim, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Miller fractured his neck by slamming him into a wall and punching him while pinned to the floor. Under the Supreme Court's precedent in Saucier v. Katz, the court must first determine if the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established. A Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is analyzed under the reasonableness standard established in Graham v. Connor, which requires balancing the nature of the force used against governmental interests. Relevant factors in this assessment include the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and whether he is resisting arrest or attempting to flee. Davis argues that Miller's actions were unreasonable because the offenses were minor, he posed no threat as he was handcuffed and surrounded by security, he was not resisting arrest but merely opposing unlawful actions, and he was already incapacitated when punched.

The document analyzes a case of alleged excessive force by police officers, referencing Smith v. City of Hemet. In that case, police used severe force on an unarmed man, despite his non-threatening condition (being in pajamas) and the lack of immediate danger. The appellate court emphasized that excessive force claims typically require jury evaluation due to disputed facts and credibility issues, and that summary judgment should be granted sparingly. 

In applying the Graham factors to Smith's situation, the court found that the mere allegation of domestic violence did not justify the officers' extreme actions. Furthermore, despite Smith's refusal to comply with orders, he did not physically attack the officers or attempt to flee. The court also suggested alternative methods could have been employed to subdue him.

Similarly, in the current case involving Davis, the force used by Officer Miller was deemed excessively severe. Miller slammed Davis head-first into walls, resulting in a broken neck, and subsequently punched him after placing him on the ground. The offenses of trespassing and obstructing a police officer were not serious enough to justify such force. The document concludes that, like in Smith, the nature of Davis's alleged offenses provides insufficient justification for the police conduct, indicating a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

The assessment of Officer Miller's actions centers on three key factors regarding the use of force against Davis. First, Davis posed no immediate threat to Officer Miller or others, as he was unarmed, in handcuffs, and surrounded by security guards, making any attack implausible. Second, while Davis was somewhat uncooperative, he did not actively resist arrest or attempt to flee, given his restrained state and confinement. Third, there were numerous less forceful alternatives available to Officer Miller for conducting the search, such as persuading Davis, involving security personnel, using minimal force, or delaying the search until they reached the jail. Officer Miller was reprimanded for not employing the least amount of necessary force, specifically for punching Davis while he was handcuffed. 

The analysis concludes that the severity of the force used by Officer Miller was disproportionate to the minor offense and minimal threat posed by Davis. This led to the conclusion that Miller's actions were unreasonable, violating Davis's Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, while Officer Miller may claim qualified immunity, the conduct in question was sufficiently clear as excessive force, even without directly analogous case law. The established legal standards would have informed any reasonable officer that such force was unlawful, thus undermining Miller's defense of qualified immunity.

Smith is one of several cases highlighting law enforcement's constitutional duty to avoid excessive force. In Drummond v. City of Anaheim, the court determined that no specific federal precedent was necessary to establish that the police conduct in question violated clearly established law. Drummond, suffering from severe mental illness, was taken into custody when he posed a risk to himself. Police officers used excessive force by knocking him to the ground, handcuffing him, and applying pressure to his back and neck, leading to his loss of consciousness and permanent brain damage. The court ruled that reasonable officers should have recognized this conduct as excessive, despite the absence of a directly analogous Ninth Circuit case.

Similarly, the current case involving Officer Miller shows that a reasonable officer would have understood that repeatedly slamming a handcuffed individual against a wall and punching him while he was face down constituted excessive force. Cited precedents, such as Chew, Palmer, and Hansen, support the conclusion that the use of severe force is unwarranted when the suspect does not present an immediate threat. The Department’s Internal Investigations Bureau also found Miller's actions unreasonable, indicating a lack of minimal necessary force. Miller's defense lacks credibility, as he fails to cite relevant Ninth Circuit cases and improperly relies on out-of-circuit authority, which does not support his claim that his actions were lawful.

Davis was handcuffed during his encounter with Officer Miller and did not attempt to resist, flee, or harm the officer, distinguishing his case from Hinton and Melton. In Melton, the individual actively resisted arrest and engaged in violent behavior. The court concludes that a reasonable officer in Miller's position would recognize that his actions constituted excessive force, negating Miller's claim to qualified immunity. Furthermore, the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment to Miller regarding Davis's state law battery claim. Although Davis did not explicitly oppose Miller's summary judgment motion on the battery claim, he preserved his right to appeal by filing his own motion for partial summary judgment on that issue. The court clarifies that a plaintiff can challenge a summary judgment despite not opposing the defendant's motion if they seek their own summary judgment on the same claim. Davis argues that the district court mistakenly deemed Miller immune under state law, referencing Yada v. Simpson, which supports that excessive force during an arrest constitutes battery. However, the quote from Yada reflects a jury instruction rather than a definitive ruling. Overall, the ruling emphasizes that excessive force can lead to liability under both federal and state law.

The court upheld the jury's verdict regarding the excessive force claim against Officer Miller but did not determine the accuracy of the jury instruction related to reasonable force in Nevada law. The verdict was maintained due to substantial evidence supporting it and not being clearly erroneous, while the court refrained from addressing the claim's permissibility under Nevada law. Under Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 41.032, public officers are typically immune from lawsuits for discretionary functions unless actions are taken in bad faith. Discretionary acts are those requiring personal judgment rather than adherence to orders. The court noted that, while police officers usually enjoy immunity for acts involving judgment during arrests or seizures, actions conducted in bad faith negate this immunity. Bad faith is characterized by actions that exceed the authority granted, while abuse of discretion occurs within that authority. The court concluded that a reasonable juror could interpret Officer Miller's actions—specifically, slamming Davis into a wall and punching him while he was down—as malicious and in bad faith, warranting further examination rather than summary judgment. Thus, the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to Officer Miller was reversed, and the case was remanded for trial on both the excessive force and state law battery claims.