Johnny Rucker, Jr. v. Larry Norris

Citation: Not availableDocket: 08-1970

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; April 30, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Johnny A. Rucker, Jr. was convicted of capital murder by an Arkansas jury, with the conviction and life sentence later affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. His initial petitions for postconviction relief were denied, but in 2001, he sought relief under a new statute allowing for claims of actual innocence based on newly available scientific evidence. This petition was also denied after a limited hearing, leading Rucker to file a federal habeas petition asserting multiple claims.

The district court denied his habeas petition but granted a certificate of appealability on two specific issues: the voluntariness of Rucker’s confession and the denial of relief under the scientific-evidence statute. The Eighth Circuit reviewed these claims de novo, affirming the district court's denial under the deferential standard of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

Rucker's confession arose after he was arrested driving the victim's car, with evidence linking him to the crime scene. He admitted to shooting the victim while under the influence of crack cocaine, a confession recorded and later reaffirmed on videotape. The trial court had previously determined the confession was voluntary, despite evidence of Rucker's drug intoxication during the confession process. The defense attempted to introduce testimony suggesting Rucker was still under the influence at the time of the confession, but this was excluded. A jury instruction request presuming the confession to be involuntary was denied, as the court upheld its prior ruling on the confession's voluntariness. Defense counsel argued during closing statements that the confession should not be trusted due to Rucker's drug use.

Rucker contended on direct appeal that the trial court improperly excluded testimony from two inmates. The Supreme Court of Arkansas recognized a defendant's constitutional right to have the jury assess the 'weight and credibility' of a confession but upheld the trial court's decision, stating that the excluded testimony was cumulative to existing evidence showing Rucker was under the influence of drugs before and after the crime. The Court ruled that even if the exclusion was an error, it was harmless.

In Rucker's first state postconviction proceeding, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his trial attorney failed to request a jury instruction regarding the confession's credibility. The Supreme Court of Arkansas dismissed this claim, clarifying that Arkansas law stipulates the court, not the jury, decides on the confession's voluntariness, making any alternative instruction unlikely to succeed. Rucker did not pursue this issue on appeal.

On appeal, Rucker asserted that excluding jury consideration of his confession's credibility violated his Sixth Amendment right to a complete defense, citing Crane v. Kentucky. However, the district court deemed this argument procedurally barred since Rucker had not presented it adequately to the state court. Rucker had only raised the witness exclusion issue during his direct appeal and framed his postconviction argument solely in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The district court further concluded that even if the jury instruction claim were not procedurally barred, it lacked merit. Under Arkansas law, the court determines voluntariness, which is constitutionally acceptable. The trial included evidence related to the confession's credibility, and the defense effectively addressed this in closing arguments. No Supreme Court ruling clearly establishes a right to a jury instruction on this matter. Rucker also argued that excluding inmate testimony infringed upon his right to present a complete defense. He referenced Arkansas case law to support his position that defendants can introduce evidence affecting the weight and credibility of confessions.

In Leach, 831 S.W.2d at 621, the court reversed a decision to preclude evidence related to the credibility of a confession, referencing Crane. Kagebein, 496 S.W.2d at 440, affirmed that defendants have a constitutional right to challenge the credibility of voluntary confessions, supported by Lego, 404 U.S. 477, and followed in Crane. Although the Supreme Court of Arkansas recognized this right when affirming Rucker's conviction, it determined that any trial court error was harmless (899 S.W.2d at 450). The federal claim based on Crane was not procedurally barred, yet the district court appropriately denied Rucker relief on the merits. Crane limited the wholesale exclusion of credibility evidence but allowed states to apply evidentiary rules favoring fairness and reliability. The trial court had admitted significant evidence of Rucker's drug use around the time of the crime, and the defense adequately addressed credibility in closing arguments. The Supreme Court of Arkansas deemed the excluded evidence cumulative and its exclusion harmless, consistent with Rucker's constitutional rights as interpreted in Crane (28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1)).

Rucker's claim regarding new scientific evidence asserted that his federal constitutional rights to due process and a complete defense were violated when state courts denied his postconviction petition for additional fingerprint testing on a gun found near Smith’s body. Initial tests yielded no identifiable prints, but Rucker sought further testing with advanced technology. An evidentiary hearing revealed that no new technology would produce identifiable prints. The state courts denied relief, citing Rucker's failure to demonstrate that the requested testing could yield noncumulative evidence relevant to his actual innocence claim (Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-202(c)(1)(B) (2004)). This habeas claim was deemed procedurally barred as Rucker did not raise federal constitutional issues or cite federal authority in state courts (Carney v. Fabian, 487 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2007)).

State courts' misinterpretation or misapplication of the Arkansas statute for habeas relief based on new scientific evidence does not justify federal habeas corpus relief, as established in Evenstad v. Carlson. Rucker fails to cite any Supreme Court decision affirming that the right to a complete defense extends to postconviction proceedings or that due process includes the right to postconviction testing with new technology. This issue was not resolved in Tyler v. Purkett, nor has it been addressed by other circuits. Rucker's argument that the district court misused its discretion by denying fingerprint testing under Rule 6(a) is rejected, as he did not demonstrate 'good cause' for discovery since his federal claim is procedurally barred for not being raised in state court. Furthermore, the state courts' conclusion that Rucker did not show more than a slight chance of favorable results from additional testing was not based on an unreasonable factual determination. The judgment of the district court is thus affirmed.