In re: Michael Morgan

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-11175

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; April 12, 2013; Federal Appellate Court

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Michael Morgan has submitted an application to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals seeking permission to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This request is permissible only if the court certifies that the motion includes claims based on newly discovered evidence that could convincingly prove his innocence or a new constitutional law rule made retroactive by the Supreme Court. Morgan seeks to raise a claim regarding his Eighth Amendment rights, asserting that his mandatory life sentence without parole for crimes committed as a juvenile is unconstitutional, referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in *Miller v. Alabama*, which declared such sentencing schemes unconstitutional for juvenile offenders.

Morgan argues that the *Miller* decision represents a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactive, similar to the precedent set in *Graham v. Florida*. He contends that the reasoning in *Graham*, which addressed life sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders, supports his claim concerning *Miller*. The court must determine if Morgan's application makes a prima facie showing that it meets the criteria for authorization based on the new constitutional rule established by *Miller*, which prohibits mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles. The court highlights that a rule is considered new if it was not clearly dictated by existing precedent at the time of the defendant's final conviction.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for minors and life sentences without the possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses committed by minors, as established in Roper and Graham. However, the Supreme Court had not previously addressed non-capital sentences for minors committing homicide until the Miller decision. Miller mandated that sentencing authorities consider the defendant's characteristics and the offense details before imposing a life sentence without parole on juveniles, indicating that such a mandatory scheme violates constitutional protections. Although the Miller decision was influenced by previous precedents, it did not extend retroactively to cases on collateral review, as established by Tyler v. Cain. The Court has not recognized Miller as retroactively applicable, despite arguments to the contrary. Miller clarified that while it prohibits mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders, it does not categorically ban such sentences. Instead, it requires that sentencers account for the unique differences of children when considering life sentences. The Court also did not establish a categorical prohibition against life without parole for juveniles aged 14 and younger.

Morgan contends that Miller's decision is retroactive because it broadens sentencing options for certain defendants by mandating the possibility of lesser sentences. However, the court disagrees, clarifying that the Supreme Court has established that rules prohibiting specific punishments based on a defendant's status or offense are retroactive only if they place a class beyond the government's power to impose certain punishments, independent of procedural considerations. In contrast, rules affecting the determination of culpability are deemed procedural.

The court cites Penry, which deemed a rule that allows consideration of mitigating evidence in death penalty cases as retroactive due to its procedural nature dictated by precedent. Conversely, a rule that merely expands sentencing options does not qualify as substantive. As a result, Morgan's request for a second or successive motion to vacate his sentence is denied.

Circuit Judge Wilson concurs but emphasizes that the determination of a rule's retroactivity is based on whether it is procedural or substantive. He acknowledges that while Miller does not categorically prohibit life sentences without parole for juveniles, it does impose procedural requirements for sentencing, such as considering the offender's youth. Notably, Wilson points out that the government has conceded in another case that Miller's prohibition of mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles may be viewed as a substantive rule. This acknowledgment supports the argument that if a similar motion is grounded in Miller, it should be allowed to proceed in court, contrasting Morgan’s situation.

In light of the Miller decision, defendants like Morgan, who would have previously faced life imprisonment without parole, are now likely to receive lesser sentences. The ruling suggests that sentencing juveniles to life without parole should be rare. It raises the possibility that Miller could be considered a quasi-substantive rule that is retroactive for cases under collateral review, or at least a procedural rule distinct from those previously established. However, due to uncertainties regarding its application, a cautious approach is preferred rather than making definitive changes. Currently, Miller aligns more closely with rules that affect how a defendant's culpability is assessed, which are categorized as procedural. Therefore, it is agreed that the Miller ruling is not retroactive at this time, pending further guidance from the Supreme Court or an en banc decision.