Lee Smith, an African-American employee of International Paper Company (IP), appealed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of IP regarding his claim of retaliation for reporting harassment by his supervisor, George Boyette, a Caucasian man. Smith worked for IP from August 1999 until his termination on January 6, 2003. He alleged that Boyette routinely yelled and cursed at him and that a confrontation over a safety violation led to racial comments by Boyette, which Smith interpreted as discriminatory.
Following Smith's complaints about Boyette's behavior during a peer review training session, IP's human resources initiated an investigation. However, after Smith admitted to Boyette that he had complained, Boyette allegedly threatened him. Over the next fourteen months, Smith received disciplinary actions following IP's four-step disciplinary policy, culminating in his discharge. The first disciplinary action was a verbal warning for damaging company property, which Smith acknowledged. He received further disciplinary steps without contesting any of them formally, despite having the right to appeal.
The court affirmed the district court's ruling, indicating that the summary judgment in favor of IP was appropriate.
On January 18, 2002, Smith received a written warning for failing to promptly report damage to the Bobcat he was operating, which he claimed he did not consider an accident. Boyette, his supervisor, issued the warning based on a company rule mandating immediate reporting of any work-related incident. Smith refused to sign the warning, asserting he did not violate the rule. On February 23, 2002, Smith received a final written warning after Boyette found him sleeping on the job, which Smith admitted might have happened.
On December 30, 2002, Boyette confronted Smith about unreported damage to the Bobcat observed two days prior. Smith expressed frustration about the constant issues with the Bobcat and argued that the reporting rule only applied to accidents, not general damage. Following this, Boyette recommended Smith's discharge, which was approved by three management members unaware of Smith's prior complaints against Boyette. Smith was terminated on January 6, 2003, and he refused to sign the discharge report.
Subsequently, Smith filed a lawsuit against IP for racial discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII. The district court granted IP's motion for summary judgment on all claims, with Smith appealing only the retaliation claim. The court found insufficient evidence to link Smith's termination to any protected conduct as required under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Smith contends that Boyette’s statement, "I’m going to get you," made after learning of Smith’s harassment complaint, demonstrates retaliatory intent and satisfies the criteria for a prima facie case of retaliation, citing a significant increase in disciplinary actions following the statement. He argues that both direct and circumstantial evidence support his claim against IP.
A district court's grant of summary judgment can be affirmed on any supported basis, and such judgments are reviewed de novo, favoring the non-moving party. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff must provide probative evidence beyond mere self-serving allegations to establish a genuine issue of material fact. In retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) engagement in protected conduct, (2) a materially adverse action that a reasonable employee would find significant, and (3) a causal link between the adverse action and the protected conduct. Protected conduct refers to opposing unlawful employment practices as defined by Title VII, which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. While Smith’s complaint about prejudice could be seen as protected conduct, he does not claim it as the basis for his retaliation claim; rather, he relies on a later complaint regarding harassment. Even with potential direct evidence of retaliatory intent, Smith must prove he engaged in protected conduct. His EEOC charge and district court complaint do not assert retaliation based on racial discrimination, focusing instead on general complaints about treatment by his supervisor. The absence of allegations linking his complaints to protected conduct limits the viability of his retaliation claim.
Smith's October 30 complaint regarding treatment from his supervisor did not allege racial discrimination or harassment. In response to IP's summary judgment motion, Smith asserted he was terminated in retaliation for complaining about race discrimination, a claim unsupported by evidence. Smith acknowledged that his complaint did not mention race, focusing instead on allegations of his supervisor yelling and cursing at him. The court noted that such complaints about workplace behavior do not qualify as protected conduct under Title VII, referencing several cases that illustrate that complaints must address unlawful employment practices to be protected. Consequently, Smith failed to provide sufficient evidence for a jury to determine that his complaints constituted protected activity, leading to the conclusion that his retaliation claim is without merit. The court affirmed the decision.
