The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's decision to grant a writ of habeas corpus to Richard Louis Marcrum, who had been convicted of murder and armed criminal action in the 1994 killing of Kenneth Reeves. The district court found that Marcrum's Sixth Amendment rights were violated due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, trial counsel failed to introduce evidence of Marcrum's psychosis on the day of the crime and did not adequately cross-examine the prosecution's expert, which constituted a deficiency in legal representation. The court held that these omissions created a reasonable probability that the trial's outcome would have differed had they been addressed.
The Superintendent of the Potosi Correctional Center, Al Luebbers, challenged the district court's ruling, arguing that the decisions made by trial counsel were strategic rather than errors and that there was no significant impact on the trial's result. Luebbers also claimed that Marcrum's habeas petition was time-barred. However, the court found overwhelming evidence against Marcrum, who was accused of killing Reeves with a fireplace poker after an alleged blackmail attempt. During the trial, Marcrum maintained that he was in a relationship with Reeves and denied the murder, while also asserting an insanity defense based on a seizure disorder.
The appellate court noted the importance of contextualizing the evidence known to the jury, trial counsel, and the state court during postconviction proceedings. The details of the trial included witness accounts of Marcrum's statements after the killing, as well as physical evidence linking him to the crime. The appellate court ultimately reversed the district court's decision, indicating that the state courts' determinations regarding counsel's performance and the timing of Marcrum's petition were not unreasonable.
Clothing items introduced as trial exhibits contained DNA evidence identified as Kenneth Reeves's. Katie Reeves testified about her husband, a Presbyterian minister who supported the poor financially. She detailed that Kenneth, a paraplegic due to a tree accident, had employed Marcrum in the late 1980s for furniture refinishing, but Marcrum failed to complete the work despite being paid and later demanded additional money, threatening to expose Kenneth's sexual orientation. After Kenneth's death, Katie discovered unauthorized checks drawn from their account. She also noted that Kenneth had co-signed an auto loan with Marcrum shortly before his murder. A bank teller confirmed that Kenneth frequently cashed checks for large amounts, which Marcrum later brought in for cashing with prior approval.
Marcrum testified about a ten-year sexual relationship with Kenneth, claiming he received around $90,000 and multiple cars from him. He claimed no memory of the day of the murder but had previously made inconsistent statements about being at Kenneth's house, recalling a seizure that left him helpless. During cross-examination, Marcrum acknowledged the passive nature of his seizures. Witnesses, including family members and neighbors, testified that they did not see blood on Marcrum when he returned home. Additionally, a car dealer confirmed that Kenneth had purchased a vehicle co-signed with Marcrum shortly before the incident. Marcrum's family attested to his regular pickups by Kenneth, and his ex-girlfriend recounted instances of Kenneth providing financial support to Marcrum.
Marcrum reportedly received significant monetary support from Reeves, leading to testimony from multiple witnesses, including his family and acquaintances, regarding his seizures and erratic behavior associated with them. Witnesses described Marcrum's seizures as ranging from mild disorientation to severe episodes where he exhibited violent behavior and extreme confusion, including claims of being God. During these episodes, he would sometimes become aggressive, as evidenced by Marilyn McManus's testimony about an incident where he twisted her arm.
The witnesses noted that Marcrum's bizarre behavior could occur both before and after seizures, with episodes intensifying in 1993, culminating in a violent incident on December 27, 1993, when he was arrested for assaulting McManus. Testimony indicated that on the day before Reeves's death, Marcrum displayed unusual behavior, accusing his mother of poisoning him and ranting about his divinity.
When taken to the hospital, he was often medicated and released due to lack of insurance. On June 3, the day of the incident, Marcrum returned home behaving erratically, prompting his brother to call for an ambulance. The ambulance driver suspected intoxication based on Marcrum's slurred speech and unsteady gait; however, a blood test indicated very low alcohol levels, with defense counsel expressing uncertainty about the test's implications but arguing it suggested Marcrum was not drunk at the time.
The legal blood alcohol limit for driving in Missouri is 0.08% (equivalent to 80 milligrams per deciliter), significantly higher than the 10 milligrams per deciliter referenced. Evidence presented at trial suggested that Marcrum may not have had any alcohol in his system. Testimony from Marilyn McManus revealed Marcrum's history of alcohol and substance abuse, stating he became violent while drinking but not during or immediately after seizures. Expert testimony from Dr. Allan G. Barclay indicated Marcrum suffers from an organic personality disorder linked to his seizure disorder and past substance abuse. Barclay asserted that this mental condition could compel Marcrum to act impulsively and interfere with rational planning.
During cross-examination, the prosecutor highlighted that symptoms associated with Marcrum's mental disease fluctuated with his seizures, suggesting he could be lucid at times. Barclay admitted he could not determine Marcrum's mental state at the time of the killing, acknowledging a direct relationship between seizures and loss of reality. He confirmed that Marcrum had no history of psychosis outside of seizures and stated there were no recorded instances of violence during the post-ictal phase. Additionally, the prosecutor noted that Marcrum remembered events from June 3, suggesting he was not in a nonreality state during the incident.
Barclay testified that Marcrum experienced "intermittent psychotic episode[s]" linked to his organic brain damage and seizure disorder. He acknowledged that Marcrum's psychotic claims on the day of the killing were consistent with his medical history. Barclay stated that a person in a psychotic state could perform intentional acts, while Dr. Sam Parwatikar, the state's psychiatrist, noted that seizures impair consciousness and physical ability, making violent actions improbable during or immediately following a seizure. Parwatikar identified a "post-ictal psychotic period" during which Marcrum would struggle to drive safely or engage in violence. The jury received instructions on various murder charges and the possibility of a not guilty verdict due to mental illness. The prosecutor contended Marcrum killed out of greed and emphasized the brutality of the act, while the defense claimed Marcrum was not the killer and was psychotic at the time. The defense failed to provide a plausible explanation for blood on Marcrum’s clothes. In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that for Marcrum to be psychotic, he must have had a seizure, asserting that psychosis does not occur without it. The jury ultimately convicted Marcrum of first-degree murder and armed criminal action, leading to a life sentence without parole. Marcrum's appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals was affirmed. Subsequently, he sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for not calling medical witnesses, failing to submit psychiatric hospitalization records, and not cross-examining Dr. Parwatikar.
Dr. William Logan, a forensic psychiatrist, evaluated Marcrum's medical records and concurred with the diagnosis of a seizure disorder leading to an organic personality disorder. However, he introduced a critical distinction: uncontrolled seizures, particularly when Marcrum was unmedicated with anti-epileptic drugs like Dilantin, resulted in organic psychosis, characterized by hallucinations and delusions, unlike the organic personality disorder previously diagnosed. Logan noted that Marcrum had a history of non-compliance with his medication, leading to multiple uncontrolled seizures, which in turn resulted in psychotic features. He clarified that psychotic episodes do not typically arise directly from a single seizure but from a series of them, and the psychosis persists until medication is reinstated.
Logan highlighted specific behaviors exhibited by Marcrum on the day of the killing, including accusations of poisoning and violent statements, indicating he was psychotic at that time. He emphasized that Marcrum's violent behavior was associated with his psychosis, not a direct result of seizure activity. Logan asserted that Marcrum could not comprehend the nature or consequences of his actions during the incident.
The post-conviction proceedings questioned trial lawyer Alfred Speer's failure to call relevant medical witnesses and utilize records from Marcrum's past hospitalizations. On June 6, 1996, Speer endorsed witnesses from the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center and ambulance workers involved on the night of the killing, but the state objected to this late endorsement. Speer later included additional medical personnel who treated Marcrum during that emergency.
The trial court noted that the case had been pending for over two years, during which the defense failed to adhere to the court's scheduling order despite ample discovery opportunities. The court permitted Speer to call ambulance workers as witnesses but excluded doctors while allowing the defense access to their medical records, which could be introduced through expert testimony. However, Speer did not present these records during the examination of either expert.
At the post-conviction hearing, Speer explained his decision not to introduce the medical records concerning Marcrum's psychiatric crises or to cross-examine the state's expert, Dr. Parwatikar. He asserted that the essential records for forming a medical opinion had been presented and deemed additional records unnecessary. He acknowledged that some medical records were delayed, which led to their exclusion, and expressed doubts about their potential usefulness. Speer also indicated a concern about trial duration and intended to avoid introducing cumulative evidence, citing an abundance of existing documentation. Importantly, he sought to exclude evidence of Marcrum's history of pedophilia and violence, which would have emerged from the medical records.
Speer described his tactical reasoning for not cross-examining Dr. Parwatikar, highlighting the latter's professional demeanor and courtroom competence, suggesting that an attack on him would likely be ineffective and counterproductive.
The medical records introduced at the post-conviction hearing documented a pattern of Marcrum's emergency room visits and subsequent hospitalizations from 1989 to 1993, often linked to non-compliance with taking his medication, Dilantin. Notable incidents included episodes of bizarre and violent behavior correlated with low medication levels, including running naked in public, aggressive actions towards others, and acute psychosis. The records indicated a steady increase in such episodes leading up to 1993, underscoring Marcrum's deteriorating mental health and the impact of his medication regimen.
Marcrum exhibited combative and delusional behavior, claiming responsibility for the deaths of children and stating he was acting on divine instruction. He had not taken his medication for a week prior to a seizure on March 12, 1994, which resulted in him being taken to the emergency room. Medical records indicated he was in "florid psychosis," and his Dilantin and phenobarbital levels were sub-therapeutic. In his post-conviction proceedings, Marcrum argued that his lawyer inadequately presented a defense based on his mental state. However, the state trial court found that his attorney acted reasonably by employing Dr. Barclay, whose testimony supported the mental disease defense and diminished capacity. The court determined that hiring another expert was unnecessary, as Barclay's credentials were sound and his testimony was relevant. Additionally, the court accepted that further cross-examination of the state's expert by Marcrum's counsel would not have strengthened the defense and could have unnecessarily extended the trial.
Marcrum's appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals also failed, with the court identifying three key reasons for rejecting his claims. Firstly, Dr. Barclay had already addressed the relevant medical facts during trial, making additional records cumulative. Secondly, strategic decisions to omit certain evidence, which could have portrayed Marcrum negatively, were deemed legitimate. Thirdly, Marcrum could not challenge his own expert's interpretation of the evidence as a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded there was substantial evidence of Marcrum's sanity at the time of the killing, indicating that any potential deficiencies in counsel's performance did not prejudice him.
The Missouri Court of Appeals determined that Speer’s decision not to cross-examine Dr. Parwatikar was reasonable, as Parwatikar's direct testimony reflected his professional opinion and was unlikely to be undermined by cross-examination, which could instead bolster his credibility with the jury. In habeas proceedings, Marcrum argued that Speer's assistance was ineffective for failing to present extensive records of his mental illness, particularly those from June 3 that indicated a significantly low anticonvulsant level and a diagnosis of "florid psychosis." The district court ruled that failing to introduce these records was not a reasonable strategic choice, as they were crucial to establishing the link between Marcrum’s past psychotic episodes and violent behavior, contradicting Parwatikar’s assertion that there was no history of violence. The district court criticized the state courts for concluding there was no prejudice from counsel's inaction, emphasizing that the evidence of Marcrum’s sanity at the time of the killing was weak and primarily derived from less relevant prior evidence. Ultimately, the district court granted Marcrum's habeas petition, finding that he received ineffective assistance related to his insanity and diminished capacity defenses, and stayed its order pending appeal. Additionally, the Superintendent claimed the habeas petition was barred by the one-year statute of limitations, arguing that the clock began ticking fifteen days after the Missouri Court of Appeals decision, contrary to the district court’s calculation starting 90 days later.
In Marcrum v. Luebbers, the court noted that the case Riddle v. Kemna, which addresses the statute of limitations, is pending en banc. The court opted not to determine the timeliness of the petition given its resolution on the merits. In habeas corpus proceedings, the district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact, also reviewed de novo. Under the Strickland standard, assessing ineffective assistance requires deference to trial counsel's decisions and to state courts' application of federal law.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective counsel, defined as representation necessary for a fair trial. A defendant must demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. The performance standard is based on objective reasonableness, without imposing strict rules. Factors for assessment include the context of the case at the time of counsel's actions and whether those actions ensured adversarial testing of the prosecution's case. A defendant’s wishes and statements can influence the evaluation of counsel’s reasonableness. Courts must maintain a high degree of deference to counsel's decisions, assuming their conduct falls within a reasonable range of professional assistance. The burden lies with the petitioner to prove that counsel's performance was unreasonable and not based on sound strategy.
The Supreme Court has established that habeas courts must not create strategic justifications for counsel's actions when those actions stem from inattention or neglect. If a petitioner demonstrates that counsel's performance was deficient due to such neglect, the presumption of strategic judgment is rebutted, regardless of any potential strategic reasons offered by the government. In Kimmelman, the Court found counsel ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to suppress evidence due to ignorance rather than strategy, noting that a lack of discovery prevented counsel from understanding the significance of the evidence. Similarly, in Wiggins, the Court criticized the post hoc rationalizations for counsel's limited pursuit of mitigating evidence, determining that if counsel’s performance was indeed deficient, relief is warranted only if the petitioner shows a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had the errors not occurred. The assessment of counsel's errors must be contextual, considering their impact on the trial's overall proceedings, particularly where the evidence supporting the verdict is weak.
In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) significantly revised the federal statute governing habeas corpus review for state convictions. Under Section 2254(d), a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted for claims adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's decision was either contrary to established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court or involved an unreasonable application of that law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The "unreasonable application" clause is particularly relevant when a state court applies the correct legal rule to a case. A typical state-court decision applying established rules would not be considered "contrary to," but could be deemed an "unreasonable application" if it misapplies the law to the case's facts. This unreasonableness is assessed objectively, with the Supreme Court indicating that the standard does not necessitate unanimous agreement among reasonable jurists. Additionally, the Supreme Court's guidance on effectiveness claims, particularly under the Strickland standard, suggests that deviations from this general principle would rarely be found unreasonable. The flexibility in applying general legal principles complicates the determination of unreasonableness, as broader rules allow for varied interpretations in different cases. However, the Court has acknowledged that even general standards can be applied unreasonably.
The Supreme Court has determined on three occasions that state courts applied the Strickland standard unreasonably under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), granting prisoners relief via habeas corpus for ineffective assistance of counsel. In Rompilla, Wiggins, and Williams, the Court found that counsel failed to present critical personal history aspects that were a result of inadequate trial preparation. Specifically, in these cases, counsel did not investigate or present evidence of the defendants' backgrounds, which included significant issues such as parental abuse, childhood trauma, and mental health concerns, leading to ineffective representation.
Although Marcrum's case does not involve a death sentence, it shares similarities with the omissions noted in these cases. Evidence presented at trial indicated that Marcrum may have been experiencing psychosis at the time of the killing, but the jury was not made aware of medical evidence indicating his failure to take anti-convulsants, which could have illustrated a pattern of behavior linked to his psychosis. Counsel's failure to introduce this critical medical information was deemed neglectful rather than a strategic decision.
The analysis concluded that even if the medical records had been introduced, it was unlikely they would have changed the jury's verdict, as they alone could not establish a causal link between Marcrum's lack of medication and his violent behavior. Furthermore, the decision of Marcrum's attorney to rely on a qualified mental health expert’s interpretation of the medical records met the Sixth Amendment performance standard, as there was no indication of doubting the expert's competence.
Speer's decisions, although potentially below acceptable competence, did not prejudice Marcrum, and his choice of expert did not constitute deficient performance. Marcrum argues that Speer's failure to introduce medical records was due to negligence rather than a strategic choice. Legal precedent indicates that a lack of investigation undermines the presumption of competence, but strategic decisions regarding the use of investigated evidence are generally protected from scrutiny by habeas courts. Prior to the trial, Speer possessed the medical records in question, which he provided to expert Barclay for review and analysis of Marcrum's mental state. Barclay confirmed the completeness of the records he received. Unlike cases where deficient performance was found due to failure to discover evidence in time, Speer's main error lay in not timely disclosing witnesses who could testify about Marcrum’s medical history. The trial court excluded these witnesses due to Speer's failure to adhere to pretrial orders but allowed Barclay to present the medical records. At the post-conviction hearing, Speer attributed the failure to introduce the records to their exclusion by the court, though he suggested they would not have been helpful, indicating a misunderstanding of the court's ruling. Ultimately, this failure stemmed from Speer's negligence.
Speer's assertion that he introduced certain medical records was inaccurate, indicating that his failure to do so could stem from another error rather than a strategic decision. He opposed "cumulative" evidence yet did not reject records he mistakenly believed he had submitted or those he attempted to submit but thought were excluded due to lateness. The trial transcript reveals Speer's belief in the necessity of the excluded treating doctors for his defense involving mental disease or defect. Performance assessment must be based on Speer's perspective during the trial rather than hindsight. Arguments from Speer and state courts regarding the strategic nature of not introducing the records are deemed irrelevant. Marcrum did not demonstrate that the excluded treating doctors would have added significant value beyond the medical records, negating the need to separately assess their absence.
The Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that the failure to introduce the medical records was not a failure, as the reliance on such reasoning constituted an unreasonable application of federal law. To claim ineffective assistance, Marcrum must show that the absence of the records likely influenced the trial's outcome. The medical records, spanning seven hundred pages and often illegible, contained complex terminology that would likely confuse a jury. Even with the treating doctors' readings, it is improbable that the jury would have established a causal link between the medical issues and violent behavior. The failure to introduce the records alone would not have realistically altered the trial's outcome; specific presentation of the records would have been necessary for any effect. Despite some relevant facts being missing from the testimony, including a lab report indicating low medication levels on the day of the crime, the potential introduction of such evidence may have been countered by the state questioning its relevance.
Psychosis in Marcrum was observed only immediately after a seizure, with no evidence of a seizure occurring at Reeves's house on the relevant day. The absence of expert testimony linking the psychosis to a series of seizures left the jury unable to conclude that Marcrum's psychosis that night indicated he was psychotic earlier that afternoon. Barclay's testimony raised doubts about whether Marcrum was psychotic on June 3, despite affirming he was psychotic when he left and returned home. During cross-examination, Barclay could not confirm Marcrum's mental state at the time of the killing and only suggested a "high degree of probability" that he was psychotic in the interim, which did not contradict his earlier statements. The prosecutor emphasized a direct connection between seizures and psychotic episodes, suggesting that without a seizure at Reeves's house, psychosis would not have occurred, potentially misleading the jury.
Contrastingly, Dr. Logan argued that once Marcrum entered a state of organic psychosis due to prior seizures, he could remain psychotic and violent, irrespective of subsequent seizures, until receiving adequate anti-epileptic medication. The jury lacked the expertise to interpret medical records indicating Marcrum had subtherapeutic levels of his anti-epilepsy medication, which was compounded by evidence of noncompliance with his treatment regimen. Witnesses inconsistently characterized the relationship between seizures and psychosis, with some stating bizarre behavior occurred before seizures and others suggesting a post-seizure connection. Overall, the jury was not adequately equipped to understand the complexities of Marcrum's medical condition and its implications for his mental state during the incident.
Parwatikar indicated that psychosis could resolve within two hours to two days, characterizing it as a "postictal psychotic period" that occurs immediately after a seizure. Trial experts did not support Logan's narrative that medication deprivation resulted in multiple seizures leading to persistent organic psychosis, which would only improve with anti-epileptic treatment. Without establishing a clear causal link between medical observations and Logan's claims, evidence of Marcrum's noncompliance with medication and his paranoid state did not substantiate a defense of insanity at the time of the killing. The testimony of Barclay and Parwatikar was deemed sufficient for the jury, and the introduction of additional evidence, such as a lab result indicating low phenobarbital levels or an emergency room note of "florid psychosis," would not have significantly impacted the jury's decision or impeached Parwatikar's testimony regarding the absence of a connection between Marcrum's psychosis and violent behavior. Cross-examination of Parwatikar on contradictions in his testimony and medical records was considered unlikely to alter the trial outcome; thus, the evaluation of whether Speer’s performance was deficient in this aspect was unnecessary. Both Barclay and Parwatikar confirmed that there was no documented correlation between nonviolent psychosis and violent actions in Marcrum's history, with Barclay stating that no violent incidents were associated with the "nonreality stage" following seizures.
Expert testimony indicated that Marcrum’s psychosis did not consistently manifest through religious delusions and violence, contradicting Logan's claims. While Marcrum exhibited violence during psychotic episodes, evidence also showed violent behavior unrelated to seizures or low anticonvulsant levels. For example, on June 30, 1990, he was treated for injuries from a fistfight without any mention of a seizure. Witness testimony suggested that not all episodes of delusions led to violent actions. The case of Hill v. Lockhart was referenced; in that instance, the defendant’s failure to take medication was noted but did not result in vacating his conviction due to evidence of drug and alcohol abuse overshadowing the argument of insanity. The excerpt concludes that without expert testimony linking Marcrum’s medication noncompliance to his psychosis, merely introducing medical records or cross-examining a witness would not have significantly impacted the trial outcome. The Missouri Court of Appeals was justified in its conclusion that Marcrum did not suffer prejudice from the defense's actions.
The central issue is whether Speer's failure to present an expert like Dr. Logan, whose testimony could have potentially affected the trial outcome, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Dr. Barclay, a qualified Ph.D. clinical psychologist, spent 12 to 20 hours evaluating Marcrum, including interviews and reviewing extensive records, and his analysis was consistent with another expert's view. Legal precedent indicates that if counsel employs a qualified expert and has no reason to doubt their findings, there is no obligation to seek a second opinion. The mere availability of a later, more favorable expert opinion does not imply ineffective assistance. Although there are cases where ineffective assistance was found due to inadequate expert evaluation, here, Barclay's thorough examination did not suggest a deficiency in Speer's strategy. Additionally, the lack of clear evidence linking Marcrum's psychosis to violence complicated Speer's obligation to contest the expert's assessment. Ultimately, the state courts deemed Speer’s representation constitutionally adequate, affirming that reliance on Barclay's interpretation was reasonable.
Marcrum failed to demonstrate that his constitutional right to counsel was violated or that the Missouri courts acted unreasonably in their findings. He argued for affirmance based on his attorney Speer's ineffectiveness in not objecting to the prosecutor's closing argument; however, the district court found no reasonable probability that such an objection would have changed the trial outcome, a conclusion with which we agree. Marcrum also alleged that Speer was ineffective for not timely filing a motion for a new trial, claiming this constituted a deprivation of counsel at a critical stage. The court viewed this as a mere mistake by counsel rather than a denial of counsel, thus requiring Marcrum to show prejudice. Following the district court's assessment, Marcrum failed to demonstrate any prejudice since the Missouri Court of Appeals reviewed his arguments during the post-conviction stage and found none would have succeeded. Despite commendable efforts from habeas counsel and thorough analysis by the district court, it was ultimately determined that Marcrum was not denied effective assistance of counsel at trial, leading to the conclusion that the state courts did not unreasonably apply established federal law. Consequently, the district court's judgment is reversed.
