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Yeng Thao v. City of St. Paul
Citation: 481 F.3d 565Docket: 06-2339
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; April 2, 2007; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Yeng Thao, Peter Yang, and Michelle Yang, co-trustees for the estate of Ki Yang, filed an appeal following the dismissal of their lawsuit against the City of St. Paul, the St. Paul Police Department, and several individual officers after the police shot and killed Ki Yang, who had a history of paranoid schizophrenia. The lawsuit cited violations under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, which the plaintiffs appealed, focusing specifically on the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and MHRA. The court noted that while the district court found Ki Yang may not be considered disabled under the ADA, for the appeal's purposes, it was assumed he qualified as disabled. On September 27, 2002, Peter Yang called 911 to report that his father had barricaded himself in their home, fearing poisoning by his family. He detailed his father’s mental health history to the dispatcher, who then sent both medics and police to the scene. Officers Sills and Tharalson arrived and, after assessing the situation and being informed by the family about Ki Yang’s aversion to police, decided to remain out of sight while the family attempted to communicate with him. The officers directed medics to leave and consulted Sergeant Kellerman before determining that Ki Yang did not pose an imminent threat. They treated the incident as a domestic issue, ultimately assisting the family in forcibly entering the home to retrieve personal belongings. The appellate court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Family members of Mr. Yang reported that he had retrieved a gun and was threatening them, although others claimed it was just a BB-gun. Inside the house, Mr. Yang's wife requested that Tharalson take him to the hospital, which he declined, asserting that Mr. Yang had not made any threats. Tharalson entered the house and saw Mr. Yang armed with a traditional Hmong weapon resembling a sickle and a BB-gun. Mr. Yang demanded that the group leave, prompting Tharalson to order him to drop his weapons. When Mr. Yang approached Tharalson in a threatening manner, Tharalson shot him multiple times, resulting in Mr. Yang's death. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the Defendants, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on all claims, which the Plaintiffs are appealing regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Summary judgment is granted when there are no genuine material facts in dispute, and the party moving for judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, as per Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court reviews the evidence favorably toward the nonmoving party. The Plaintiffs allege that inadequate police training concerning mentally disabled individuals contributed to the dangerous situation that led to Mr. Yang's death, violating the ADA. However, recent case law has not extended the ADA to cover failure to train claims in similar contexts, indicating that the deceased’s actions were the cause of the shooting rather than a training failure. Title II of the ADA does not apply to an officer's immediate responses to disturbances involving individuals with mental disabilities before securing the scene. Although there was some ADA training provided to the St. Paul police, the adequacy of this training is disputed, yet the court concluded that even with better training, a different response was unlikely. At the time of the police's arrival, all parties acknowledged that Mr. Yang posed no apparent threat, and his family merely wanted to enter the home to retrieve belongings. The family of Mr. Yang informed police that he did not have any dangerous weapons, and none believed he posed a threat. Both Michelle and Peter Yang stated that Mr. Yang had not threatened himself or others that day. Chang Yang and Zua Yang expressed disbelief that Mr. Yang would confront anyone with a weapon. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that enhanced training for police on handling situations involving mentally disabled individuals would have led officers to enter the home despite the family's requests, given the circumstances. Expert testimony from Lou Reiter suggested that proper training would have involved contacting mental health professionals but not forcibly entering the home. Reiter acknowledged that without evidence of Mr. Yang threatening violence, the police were not justified in entering the residence. The officers had to balance Mr. Yang's rights with those of his family. According to Minnesota law, police may detain a person believed to be mentally ill and a danger to themselves or others, but in this case, there was no immediate threat. Although the family sought police assistance to enter the home, this did not create a dangerous situation since Mr. Yang unexpectedly possessed a weapon. The police might have acted differently had they known of the weapon, but the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to suggest that different training would have changed the police response. The district court's decision is therefore affirmed.