United States v. Tyrese Hyles

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-1381

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; March 21, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

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Tyrese D. Hyles, also known as Little Ty, was indicted on murder-for-hire and conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1958(a) and 2. The government sought the death penalty. Hyles was convicted by a jury but sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole instead of death. Hyles appealed his conviction, contesting the district court's denial of his motion to suppress a videotaped statement and various evidentiary rulings. The appeal was heard by the Eighth Circuit, and the court affirmed the lower court's decision.

The case background reveals that Coy Smith, a key witness against Hyles in a state drug case, was found murdered shortly after testifying. Hyles was in jail at the time of the murder, and his cellmate, David Carter, had agreed to carry out Smith's murder in exchange for bail. Hyles and co-defendant Amesheo Cannon conspired for Cannon to travel to Missouri to kill Smith. Hyles was initially charged in federal court, but those charges were dismissed in favor of state charges. Following the dismissal, Hyles expressed a desire to speak with officers during transport, leading to a videotaped statement. Federal indictments followed, with the government seeking the death penalty. The trial was eventually severed, while Hyles's state charges remained active until June 2003.

On February 11, 2002, Hyles filed a Motion to Suppress Statements, arguing that any statements the Government intended to use against him were involuntary, obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, and resulted from an unlawful arrest. A suppression hearing took place on June 27, 2002, where testimony was heard regarding a videotaped statement Hyles made during his transport from federal to state custody on June 15, 2001.

During the hearing, Caruthersville Police Sergeant Robert Lockett and Officer Tina Cruz testified about the events of June 15. While being transported, Hyles expressed a desire to speak with Lockett, aiming to assist his wife, Tonya, who faced federal charges. Lockett informed Hyles he could not talk and sought legal advice. Despite this, Hyles continued to request a conversation, prompting Lockett to stop the vehicle and read Hyles his Miranda rights, which Hyles acknowledged. At this stage, no questions about Smith’s murder were posed, and Hyles did not request an attorney or invoke any rights.

Lockett later facilitated a videotaped statement at the Missouri State Highway Patrol office after consulting with the Pemiscot County prosecutor, who indicated that providing a statement might benefit Hyles's wife. At the office, Hyles was informed of his Miranda rights again and signed a waiver without requesting an attorney. Lockett did not interview him until after he had spoken with the prosecutor.

During the videotaped statement, Hyles confirmed he understood his rights and voluntarily waived them, asserting he spoke of his own free will. He admitted to discussing a witness, Coy Smith, with his associate Cannon, who suggested that he would eliminate Smith if necessary. Hyles understood this to mean Cannon would kill Smith, and he recounted further conversations with Cannon regarding Smith's potential testimony, indicating Cannon's intention to act on Hyles's behalf.

Hyles' cellmate, David Carter, allegedly discussed killing Smith on Hyles' behalf. Although Hyles bailed Carter out the same day, he denied any intent to facilitate Smith's murder or offering Carter anything in return. Hyles later learned from Cannon that he had killed Smith, detailing the method of the murder, including cutting phone wires and shooting Smith. Hyles acknowledged Cannon's actions but denied promising anything in exchange. During police interviews, Hyles did not request legal counsel or indicate a desire to remain silent, and he appeared calm throughout. The district court upheld a magistrate judge's recommendation to deny Hyles' motion to suppress his statements, noting Hyles had initiated the conversation and had been informed of his Miranda rights multiple times.

Additionally, Hyles filed a motion to exclude or delay the trial due to the late disclosure of six CDs containing over seventy-eight hours of his recorded jail conversations, obtained by the government via subpoena. He argued that the late disclosure hindered his ability to prepare an adequate defense, despite having received a list of conversations that might be used at trial. The government explained the delay in reviewing the tapes was due to ongoing concerns about witness safety and Hyles' continued phone activity during Cannon's trial.

The government contended that the issue at hand was moot since it had reduced the number of conversations it might utilize at trial. The district court, at Hyles's request, postponed a decision on the motion until he could assess the provided list. Hyles subsequently renewed his motion on the first day of voir dire, stating he received an additional eleven hours of recorded conversations shortly before trial, making adequate review unfeasible. He argued that under these circumstances, his counsel could not perform competently. The government indicated it planned to use very few recordings during the guilt phase and would notify Hyles in advance if any were to be introduced, asserting that the conversations were equally accessible to the defense. The district court denied Hyles's request for a lengthy continuance but was open to considering a shorter one as necessary during trial; ultimately, none of the calls were presented at trial.

During the trial, the government introduced evidence including a photograph of a Pontiac Parisienne linked to the murder-for-hire scheme, and two images of Hyles and Cannon together, which had inscriptions on the back connecting them. The district court allowed these writings as evidence despite Hyles's objections regarding foundation and hearsay. Testimony from Omar Wiley and Captain Tony Jones provided context on statements made by Cannon, including a threat to kill Coy Smith and an argument over the Pontiac after Smith's murder. These statements were admitted as co-conspirator statements and against interest despite Hyles's hearsay objections.

Additionally, April Leatherwood, Cannon's ex-girlfriend, testified for the government. Hyles sought to introduce jail phone conversations between her and Cannon to challenge her testimony, but the court excluded them due to insufficient compliance with evidentiary rules and because they were deemed cumulative. Hyles's former attorney also testified, and the government was permitted to cross-examine him, limited to facts known from any source.

Hyles was convicted on two counts, with the jury recommending life imprisonment without parole. He appeals the conviction, asserting the district court erred in several areas: denying the motion to suppress his videotaped statement, excluding certain jail phone conversations, admitting writings on photographs, and limiting cross-examination of his former attorney. 

In analyzing the motion to suppress Hyles's statement, he argues a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and claims the statement was involuntary. The appellate court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Hyles contends that authorities created a gap in his legal representation to obtain his statement. The government counters that Hyles waived this claim by not raising it pretrial, but the court ultimately found the merits of his claim insufficient. 

The court noted that Hyles had been advised of his Miranda rights, and his waiver was valid. Even if he had invoked his right to counsel, the court determined he initiated the interrogation himself. Furthermore, the court upheld that nothing in the Sixth Amendment prevents a defendant from voluntarily speaking to police without an attorney present. 

Regarding the Fifth Amendment, the district court found that Hyles waived his Miranda rights knowingly and intelligently. The appellate court agreed, concluding there was no violation of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.

Hyles claims his statement was coerced, violating his Due Process rights. A confession is deemed involuntary if obtained through threats, violence, or promises that overwhelm the defendant’s will. The assessment of voluntariness considers the totality of circumstances. The district court noted that Hyles was permitted to smoke, eat, and use the restroom during the interrogation, which lasted five to six hours, and he appeared calm. Hyles argued he felt coerced by a prosecutor's promise that his statement would aid his wife, Tonya, but there was no evidence that his will was overborne. He himself inquired about the potential benefit to his wife and received no information about his own situation. The district court concluded Hyles's statement was voluntary.

Regarding the audiotapes of Hyles's jail phone calls, he pre-trial requested their exclusion, claiming the government violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 by not disclosing them timely. Hyles also sought a six to eight-week continuance to review the tapes, which the district court denied. Rule 16 requires timely disclosure of relevant statements within the government’s control if known by the prosecutor. The district court has discretion to impose sanctions for Rule 16 violations, and even if a violation occurred, exclusion of the tapes was not mandated. The court indicated that if issues arose at trial, Hyles would receive a short continuance to review the tapes, which was a reasonable exercise of discretion. Hyles's argument that the denial of a continuance prejudiced his trial preparation was noted, but district courts generally disfavor continuances unless a compelling reason is shown. Reversal of a denial requires demonstrating an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice.

Hyles contends that his counsel may have overlooked exculpatory evidence within the recorded conversations due to the rushed review process mandated by the government. He argues that the district court's denial of a lengthy continuance adversely affected his trial preparation. Although the court allowed a potential short recess if the government used the recordings, none were ultimately presented as evidence. The government cites United States v. Hernandez, where the defense claimed prejudice from late notification of a witness who ultimately did not testify. The court ruled that Hernandez did not demonstrate actual prejudice, affirming the denial of his continuance request. Similarly, Hyles failed to specify how the late access to recordings would have altered his trial outcome, nor did he present evidence supporting a Brady v. Maryland claim, as he did not identify any exculpatory content. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of his continuance motion.

Additionally, Hyles challenged the district court's admission of writings on the back of photographs, citing lack of foundation and hearsay objections. The court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and will stand unless the error is deemed harmless. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 901, evidence requires sufficient authentication. Hyles also argued that the denial of his continuance violated his Due Process rights; however, the court found no merit in this claim, indicating that the denial was not arbitrary given the case circumstances.

The government presented a photograph of the Pontiac Parisienne and accompanying writings to illustrate the car's significance to Cannon, noting that he kept a picture of it while in jail. The photographs, depicting Cannon and Hyles together, were intended to establish their close relationship relevant to the conspiracy case. The government emphasized that the identity of the person who wrote on the back of the pictures was inconsequential. A deputy testified to observing the writing during the seizure of the photographs, and other officers confirmed the identities of Cannon and Hyles and recognized the car. The admission of the photographs and writings was deemed appropriate by the district court, which found no abuse of discretion despite Hyles's objections regarding foundation.

Regarding hearsay, the writings were not considered hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, as they were not offered to prove the truth of the statements but rather to demonstrate their significance and the relationship between the co-conspirators. The actual meanings of the phrases written, such as "Da-Pony G. Ride" and "2’ of Da Most Wanted," were not explained to the jury; thus, their relevance lay in their existence rather than their content. Even if deemed hearsay, any potential error in their admission was considered harmless due to substantial evidence of the relationship between Hyles and Cannon presented at trial, including Hyles's own admissions.

Hyles also contended that the district court wrongly excluded prior inconsistent statements to impeach witness April Leatherwood. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b), extrinsic evidence of such statements is inadmissible unless the witness has the chance to address the statement or if justice requires otherwise.

The district court excluded recorded conversations between Leatherwood and Cannon because Leatherwood could not explain or deny the conversations as mandated by Rule 613(b). Although she had testified, she was absent when Hyles attempted to introduce her prior statements. The court refused to recall her, citing concerns under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 that the evidence would be cumulative. Leatherwood’s credibility was already compromised, as she admitted on cross-examination that her statements to investigators were false. The court acted within its discretion, as Rule 403 permits exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by cumulative evidence. Hyles's argument that his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses was violated was rejected; the exclusion of evidence is justified when there is sufficient reasoning, which the court provided.

Regarding the admission of statements made by Cannon, the district court has broad discretion in conspiracy trials. Hyles contested the admissibility of Omar Wiley's testimony, which included Cannon’s intention to kill Coy Smith and an argument over a car. These statements were deemed admissible: Cannon's intent was relevant to his state of mind and thus not excluded by hearsay rules, while Wiley's observation of the argument did not constitute hearsay. 

Captain Tony Jones testified about a conversation with Cannon after the murder, where Cannon discussed a vehicle that he claimed Tyrese had told him he could have. Hyles challenged this statement as hearsay, but the government argued it was a co-conspirator statement in furtherance of the conspiracy. Although there are concerns about this characterization, the court did not need to rule on it.

Allowing Cannon’s statement into evidence, even if erroneous, did not prejudice the trial's outcome due to substantial additional evidence linking Cannon and the Pontiac to the conspiracy. This evidence included multiple witness observations of Cannon driving the car, its use as collateral by Tonya for David Carter's bail, a witnessed altercation between Tonya and Cannon over the vehicle, Jones's recollections of prior statements, and a photo of the Pontiac found in Cannon’s jail cell. Hyles failed to demonstrate that the trial's result would have differed without Cannon's statement.

Hyles also challenged the district court's decision to permit the government to cross-examine his former attorney, claiming a violation of attorney-client privilege. This argument was rejected as Hyles waived the privilege by calling his former attorney as a witness and discussing their communications. The court noted that voluntary disclosure of such communications waives the privilege. The government limited its questions to facts known to the attorney from any source, which does not breach the privilege, as the privilege applies only to communications, not to the underlying facts. The district court's actions were deemed within its discretion. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.