Odd v. Malone

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-4287

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 4, 2008; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a precedential opinion in the consolidated appeals of Odd v. Malone (Docket No. 06-4287) and an associated case (No. 07-1490) on August 4, 2008. The appeals focus on the issue of prosecutorial immunity concerning actions taken by prosecuting attorneys who obtained bench warrants for material witnesses crucial to murder cases. The attorneys failed to keep the courts updated on the status of the criminal proceedings and the custody of these witnesses, raising the question of whether they could be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their omissions.

The court examined two specific instances: in No. 07-1490, whether a prosecutor could be sued for not informing authorities that a witness's testimony was delayed for nearly four months; and in No. 06-4287, whether a prosecutor could be liable for not notifying authorities that a witness remained incarcerated after the related case had been dismissed. The court's review was limited to the facts as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaints, accepting these facts as true and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.

The case also highlights the circumstances of Plaintiff-Appellant Nicole Schneyder, who was a key witness in multiple trials against Michael Overby for first-degree murder. Her testimony was previously deemed unavailable, and her sworn statements were used in evidence, leading to complications that resulted in a new trial ordered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court due to violations of Overby’s Sixth Amendment rights.

Assistant District Attorney Gina Smith obtained a material witness bench warrant for Schneyder's arrest in preparation for the prosecution of Overby. Schneyder was unable to post a $300,000 bail set by Judge Rayford Means after a hearing on January 27, 2005. Judge Means directed Smith to inform him of any delays in the Overby case, indicating that Schneyder would be released if there was a continuance. On February 2, 2005, the Overby trial was continued until May 25, but Smith failed to notify Judge Means, resulting in Schneyder's continued detention despite requests for her release. Following her father's death, Schneyder was permitted to attend a brief funeral under strict conditions. Attorney Paul Conway informed Judge Means about the continuance, leading to Schneyder's release on March 21, 2005, after 54 days in custody.

Similarly, Korvel Odd was arrested on November 17, 2004, due to a bench warrant issued after he failed to appear as a witness in the murder case against Alvin Way, Jr. Odd did not receive a bail hearing, and ADA Thomas Malone did not call him to testify during the preliminary hearing, resulting in the dismissal of the case against Way. Because Malone did not inform Judge Marsha Neifield of Odd's arrest, she was unaware of his detention. Odd's situation was only addressed after he sought help from the Defender Association of Philadelphia, leading to his release on January 13, 2005, after 58 days in custody.

Both Schneyder and Odd alleged that the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office bore the sole responsibility for monitoring the status of detained material witnesses. They filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the DA’s Office and the ADAs, claiming their detention was without probable cause, violating their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed Schneyder's § 1983 claim against Smith, granting her absolute prosecutorial immunity, and dismissed the state law claims against the DA’s Office under the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act.

Schneyder voluntarily withdrew her federal claim against the District Attorney’s Office and initiated an appeal to contest the District Court's ruling on immunity. In the related case, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to dismiss § 1983 claims against Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Malone and the DA’s Office, determining that Malone was no longer acting as a state advocate after the dismissal of Way. Malone subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the denial of his absolute prosecutorial immunity.

The appellate court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the District Court's final order dismissing Schneyder's claims and granting Smith prosecutorial immunity, as permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It also has jurisdiction over Malone's interlocutory appeal based on the collateral order doctrine. The appellate court will review the District Court’s dismissal of Schneyder’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, accepting the factual allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences in her favor. Schneyder’s case will be affirmed only if it is clear she cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle her to relief, while Odd's case will be affirmed if it states a claim for relief.

ADAs Smith and Malone assert prosecutorial immunity as a defense, which is not merely a defense to liability but a fundamental right not to stand trial. Prosecutors carry a "heavy burden" to establish entitlement to absolute immunity. Given the Supreme Court's limited recognition of absolute immunity in § 1983 cases, the presumption favors qualified immunity unless the prosecutor demonstrates they were acting as the state’s advocate when the actions occurred. This determination focuses on the function performed rather than the individual performing it. Absolute immunity applies to judicial or quasi-judicial actions but not to administrative or investigatory activities that are unrelated to judicial proceedings.

The appeal necessitates a careful examination of the actions of Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs) to ascertain whether these actions qualify as "quasi-judicial," thus granting them absolute immunity, or as "administrative or investigatory," which would not afford such immunity. The analysis begins with established Supreme Court precedents regarding prosecutorial immunity, notably from the case of **Imbler v. Pachtman**, where the Court recognized absolute immunity for prosecutors in the context of § 1983 suits, citing both a common law tradition and significant policy reasons. In this case, Deputy District Attorney Pachtman faced allegations of misconduct after he discovered new evidence that could exonerate the convicted defendant, Imbler. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of Imbler's suit, affirming that prosecutors are immune when initiating prosecutions and presenting cases.

The Court, however, did not resolve whether absolute immunity applies to actions where prosecutors act as administrators or investigators. This was addressed in **Burns v. Reed**, where the Court differentiated between two roles: one where prosecutor Reed acted as a legal advocate during a probable cause hearing, for which he received absolute immunity, and another where he advised police during the investigation, which did not qualify for immunity. The Court emphasized that extending immunity to investigative actions would undermine the principle that administrative and investigatory acts of prosecutors are not absolutely immune, as this could allow any prosecutorial action to be linked to the decision to prosecute. Policy considerations further supported this conclusion, as there was no common law precedent for immunity in such contexts, and withholding immunity posed no significant risk of frivolous lawsuits, while also ensuring accountability for prosecutorial conduct prior to formal charges.

The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons assessed the actions of prosecutor Fitzsimmons in obtaining a murder indictment against Buckley. Buckley alleged that Fitzsimmons fabricated evidence and made false statements about him. The Court ruled that Fitzsimmons was not entitled to absolute immunity for these actions. Specifically, it determined that Fitzsimmons lacked probable cause at the time of the alleged evidence fabrication, as no indictment or judicial proceedings had commenced, categorizing his actions as investigatory rather than prosecutorial. Regarding Fitzsimmons's public statements, the Court differentiated between in-court and out-of-court statements, granting absolute immunity for the former but only qualified immunity for the latter, thus denying Fitzsimmons absolute immunity for his false public statements. 

In Kalina v. Fletcher, the Court examined prosecutor Kalina's actions related to a burglary prosecution. Kalina filed unsworn documents to initiate prosecution, but her sworn "Certification for Determination of Probable Cause" contained false statements. The Court granted absolute immunity for the filing of the information and warrant but ruled that her personal attestation to the Certification was non-prosecutorial and thus not protected by absolute immunity.

The excerpt emphasizes the complexity surrounding prosecutorial immunity, cautioning against establishing rigid rules. The Supreme Court and the Third Circuit advocate for a fact-specific analysis of prosecutorial actions, rejecting the idea that timing or location alone (pre- or post-indictment, in- or out-of-court) determines immunity. Instead, they focus on the nature of the prosecutor's function, noting that absolute immunity does not apply when a prosecutor's advocacy role has not commenced or has concluded.

Prosecutors in Yarris's case allegedly engaged in misconduct by withholding and destroying exculpatory evidence, fabricating a false confession, and obtaining a false statement from a jailhouse informant. The court could not determine whether the fabrication of the confession occurred during the preliminary investigation or after Yarris was indicted, leading to a refusal to grant absolute immunity for that act. Likewise, withholding exculpatory evidence post-conviction did not warrant absolute immunity, as there was no evidence that the prosecutors were acting as advocates in adversarial post-conviction proceedings, thus allowing only for qualified immunity. Conversely, the prosecutors were granted absolute immunity for obtaining a false statement from the informant since Yarris had already been charged, indicating they were acting as advocates.

The court emphasized that prosecutors typically operate in a "quasi-judicial" role between indictment and final judgment. However, certain egregious acts, such as deliberately destroying exculpatory evidence, fall outside their prosecutorial role and do not qualify for absolute immunity. Administrative actions, like mishandling or improperly withholding seized property, also do not merit absolute immunity, as illustrated in cases like Giuffre and Schrob. In Reitz v. County of Bucks, a prosecutor failed to return seized property despite a court order, resulting in no immunity from liability, reinforcing that compliance with judicial orders is mandatory for prosecutors.

The excerpt concludes by preparing to address the specific complexities related to Nicole Schneyder's case, focusing on defining the underlying issues of her suit.

Schneyder admits that ADA Smith was acting in her role as a prosecutor when she obtained the material witness warrant for his arrest. However, he claims that Smith's failure to inform Judge Means about the continuation of the Overby case was an administrative error. Once this clerical duty was fulfilled, Schneyder contends, Smith could advocate for Schneyder's release freely. Smith, in contrast, describes her failure to seek Schneyder's release as a prosecutorial discretion decision that cannot be separated into administrative and advocative parts. Her counsel argued that even clear prosecutorial actions, like filing information, involve necessary administrative tasks that do not negate prosecutorial immunity. 

The discussion references the Supreme Court case Imbler v. Pachtman, where the Court ruled that a prosecutor's request to police regarding a witness was a prosecutorial function. However, the context differs in Schneyder’s case, as Smith's actions took place during a period of judicial inactivity, while Pachtman's occurred during a courtroom recess, making his actions more closely tied to the judicial process.

Furthermore, Smith's failure to notify the court violated explicit instructions, indicating her act involved less discretion than Pachtman’s. Even when considering Smith’s action at a broader level, it would still afford her less immunity compared to Pachtman’s actions. The analysis emphasizes that to effectively distinguish between advocative and administrative acts, one must narrowly define the actions in question, as almost any prosecutorial task can relate back to the overall prosecutorial function, thus not all actions warrant absolute immunity.

Smith bore the burden of proving her entitlement to absolute immunity, with the analysis focusing on the nature of her actions as a prosecutor. The distinction between informing the court about a detained witness's status and actively seeking that witness's release is significant. Schneyder characterized Smith’s actions as failures to notify authorities about the plaintiff’s custody status and the continuation of the underlying case. Conversely, Smith described her actions as attempts to secure the witness's release. Adopting Schneyder's characterization led to the conclusion that Smith was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Smith's obligation to inform Judge Means of the case's delay and the witness's continued incarceration was deemed administrative rather than advocative, particularly given a prior court order mandating such notifications. The timing of Smith's failure to act, which occurred during a judicial recess, cast doubt on her claims of remaining "intimately associated" with judicial proceedings. Additional allegations indicated that Smith disobeyed Judge Means’s directives, which further undermined any claim to immunity, as disobedience of a court order is generally not considered an advocative act. Furthermore, it was established that the District Attorney’s Office had a customary responsibility for monitoring detained witnesses, aligning with federal practice requiring government attorneys to report on the status of material witnesses held in custody.

F ED. R. C RIM. P. 46(h) mandates that prosecutors keep the court updated on the status of detained material witnesses, with a biweekly reporting requirement that is administrative in nature. The rule aims to limit unnecessary detention, allowing for a maximum of 10 days holding without court notice or justification. In this case, Smith was held for over 50 days without proper notification or justification, indicating that the determination of custody duration is a judicial, not prosecutorial, function. Smith’s oversight in failing to notify the court about Schneyder’s status does not entitle him to absolute prosecutorial immunity. 

In the case of Korvel Odd, ADA Malone failed to notify authorities of Odd's continued incarceration after the dismissal of the relevant case. Malone's act is characterized as an omission to ensure Odd's release, aligning with the understanding that the prosecutorial role concluded with the dismissal. The handling of a prisoner post-dismissal is an administrative duty rather than a prosecutorial one, meaning that the district attorney defendants are only entitled to qualified immunity for any delay in Odd's transfer back into federal custody. The Second Circuit's reasoning supports that keeping a witness in custody after all charges have been terminated is unrelated to the prosecution, reinforcing that neither absolute nor qualified immunity protects a prosecutor who fails to act promptly to secure a witness's release after a court order.

An administrative oversight by the prosecutor does not justify absolute immunity. In prior cases, such as Reitz, a prosecutor was denied immunity for failing to return property despite a court order, illustrating that similar failures regarding individuals should also not warrant immunity. In this instance, after Judge Neifield dismissed the Way case, Odd’s testimony became irrelevant; nonetheless, ADA Malone did not inform the judge of Odd’s detention, resulting in unnecessary incarceration. The termination of the Way prosecution undermines Malone's claim of needing to advocate for Odd's release, as Judge Neifield acted promptly upon learning of Odd's situation without requiring advocacy. 

The distinction between this case and others, like Nicole Schneyder’s, is that Odd’s case was terminated, favoring his argument against absolute immunity for ADA Malone. The court highlights that policy considerations also argue against granting absolute immunity in such cases. The Supreme Court evaluates extensions of absolute immunity based on common law traditions, the risk of vexatious lawsuits, and existing checks on prosecutorial abuse. Here, no common law tradition supports absolute immunity for prosecutors failing to notify the court about a detained witness, and the nature of the allegations does not parallel those for which immunity is traditionally granted. Furthermore, denying immunity in this case is unlikely to hinder prosecutors' independent decision-making since the ADAs were bound by court orders to act.

Judges ultimately decided on the release of the Plaintiffs after the prosecutors completed their ministerial duties. The cases at hand are notably different from typical prosecutorial immunity cases, as unindicted third-party witnesses, rather than criminal defendants, are suing the Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs). While allowing detained witnesses to sue prosecutors is unlikely to lead to an overwhelming amount of litigation, denying the ADAs absolute immunity does not leave them unprotected from frivolous lawsuits; they may still qualify for qualified immunity if their actions were objectively reasonable concerning the affected constitutional rights. 

The Plaintiffs, as third-party witnesses, lack the protections afforded to criminal defendants, including the appellate process. The ADAs' failure to inform relevant parties of the Plaintiffs’ status prevented judicial review of their continued detention, undermining judicial oversight. Consequently, it is determined that neither ADA Smith nor ADA Malone is entitled to absolute immunity, as they did not fulfill a basic administrative duty to notify judges regarding the unnecessary continued incarceration of the Plaintiffs. The standard policies supporting prosecutorial immunity do not apply as strongly in these instances involving unindicted witnesses. Therefore, both Schneyder and Odd have valid claims under Section 1983 against the ADAs. The District Court's dismissal of Schneyder’s claim against Smith is reversed, the denial of Malone’s motion to dismiss Odd’s claim is affirmed, and both cases are remanded for further proceedings.