United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez

Citation: Not availableDocket: 05-30066

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 5, 2006; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed two key questions in the appeal of United States v. Adolfo Guerrero-Velasquez: (1) whether a guilty plea constitutes an admission of the facts in the indictment, and (2) whether an Alford plea, where a defendant pleads guilty while maintaining innocence, qualifies as a guilty plea under Taylor v. United States. The court affirmed that both a guilty plea and an Alford plea are considered guilty pleas. 

Guerrero-Velasquez was charged with being an alien in the U.S. after deportation. He pled guilty on September 28, 2004. The government contested the presentence investigation report's treatment of his previous second-degree burglary conviction, advocating for a 16-level enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines due to it being categorized as a crime of violence. However, the district court, applying the modified categorical approach from Taylor, determined that the government failed to demonstrate that Guerrero-Velasquez’s second-degree burglary conviction met the criteria for a crime of violence. Consequently, the district court sentenced him without the enhancement.

The appeal resulted in the court vacating Guerrero-Velasquez’s sentence and remanding for resentencing, as the legal standards regarding guilty pleas and the classification of his prior conviction were clarified.

'Burglary of a dwelling' is defined under sentencing guidelines as involving unlawful entry into or remaining in a building with intent to commit a crime, as established by the Supreme Court in Taylor. The definition is specific to dwellings, following the same principles. A 'categorical approach' is employed to determine if a conviction constitutes a crime of violence, focusing on the statutory crime rather than the underlying facts. If a conviction does not fit the statutory definition, a limited factual inquiry can be permitted to assess if the conviction aligns with generic burglary elements, particularly when jury findings are involved. Courts can review documentation or judicially noticeable facts to verify a conviction as a predicate for enhancement.

In the case of United States v. Wenner, the Ninth Circuit ruled that second-degree burglary under Washington law does not qualify as a categorical crime of violence, a decision the district court correctly followed. However, the district court mistakenly limited its inquiry to the criminal information and police reports, which were deemed insufficient to establish that Guerrero-Velasquez had been convicted of a crime of violence. It is established that charging documents alone cannot determine conviction elements, especially when the statute is broader than the generic definition, and presentence reports are also inadequate for this purpose.

The district court did not properly consider Guerrero-Velasquez's signed plea agreement, where he pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary. By entering this plea, Guerrero-Velasquez admitted to the factual allegations in the indictment, which stated that he unlawfully entered a residence with intent to commit a crime. Consequently, the court could take judicial notice of his conviction for burglarizing a dwelling. Courts can use charging documents alongside signed plea agreements to assess whether a defendant has pled guilty to the elements of a generic crime. The defense argued that Guerrero-Velasquez entered an Alford plea, maintaining his innocence while seeking a lighter sentence. However, this argument was rejected, as the legal implications of a guilty plea remain unchanged regardless of the plea type. The key issue is whether there is a conviction for a crime of violence, not an admission of guilt. The district court's misapplication of the modified categorical approach led to the decision to vacate Guerrero-Velasquez's sentence and remand for resentencing under the discretionary guidelines.