Robert Riggs appealed a judgment from the District Court for the Western District of Missouri, which ruled in favor of the Kansas City, Missouri, Public School District on his employment discrimination claims. Riggs contended that the court erred by granting summary judgment on his discriminatory discharge claim and by not granting a new trial for his discriminatory promotion claim. The Eighth Circuit Court, comprising Circuit Judges Morris Sheppard Arnold, McMillian, and Melloy, affirmed the district court's decision.
Riggs, an Asian-American, was employed by the District from 1991 until his discharge in December 2001. Initially, he worked in student recruitment and public relations, later becoming a staffing specialist in human resources. In August 2000, he was appointed director of recruiting and staffing. Following the District's loss of state accreditation in April 2001, interim Superintendent Dr. Bernard Taylor appointed Brenda Thomas, an African-American, as interim executive director of human resources without considering other candidates due to their prior working relationship.
In July 2001, the District advertised for a permanent executive director position, requiring a bachelor’s degree in relevant fields. Both Riggs and Thomas applied; however, Taylor decided to keep Thomas in her interim role. After assuming her position, Thomas received complaints about Riggs's performance, leading her to issue a written warning to him for failing to produce necessary documentation and for not adhering to her directives. Complaints continued regarding Riggs’s behavior, including lack of leadership and inappropriate discussions about Thomas's qualifications.
Riggs was ultimately terminated on December 31, 2001, for insubordination and failure to comply with the written warning. He filed a complaint in February 2002, alleging that his non-promotion and discharge were due to his race, violating Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state law.
The District successfully filed a motion for summary judgment regarding Riggs's discharge claim, which the district court granted based on Riggs's inability to establish a prima facie case and failure to provide evidence that the District's reasons for his discharge were a pretext for racial discrimination. Conversely, the court denied the motion concerning Riggs's promotion claim. At trial, the court allowed Riggs the option for a mixed-motive jury instruction, which he declined, but it provided an instruction based on Riggs's proposal, stating that the jury should rule in his favor if race was a "determining factor" in the promotion decision. Ultimately, the jury ruled in favor of the District. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, which clarified that a Title VII plaintiff does not need direct evidence for a mixed-motive instruction, Riggs sought a new trial, but the district court denied this request, emphasizing Riggs's earlier choice to forgo the mixed-motive instruction.
In discussing the discharge claim, Riggs contended the district court erred in granting summary judgment, but the court maintained that Riggs failed to demonstrate he was meeting his employer's legitimate expectations, as established under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Riggs did not dispute that his subordinates had complained about him or that he failed to provide necessary documentation to a colleague. Additionally, he did not prove that the reasons given for his termination were baseless or that similarly situated African-American employees were treated more favorably. Riggs attempted to argue a discriminatory workplace attitude existed, citing preferences for appointing African-Americans during a previous administration, but he provided no evidentiary support linking those preferences to his termination decision made by Thomas. Furthermore, Riggs's claim that he was discharged to eliminate competition for a higher position was deemed unsubstantiated.
Thomas's discharge of Riggs does not demonstrate racial discrimination, as Riggs was not African-American and thus would not have been affected by a purported policy to appoint only African-Americans to the executive director position. The timing of Riggs's termination, occurring four and a half months after his application, fails to suggest racial motivation. Riggs's reliance on the Supreme Court case Desert Palace, which allows for mixed-motive instructions without direct evidence, is unavailing since he has not provided sufficient evidence—either direct or circumstantial—that race was a factor in his termination. Additionally, Riggs's motion for a new trial regarding his promotion claim was denied by the district court, which found that Riggs waived the issue during the instruction conference by declining the opportunity to include a mixed-motive instruction. This situation does not constitute an exceptional case for reversal. Thus, the district court's judgment is affirmed.
