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Ocean Advocates v. US Army
Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-36133
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 2, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The case involves multiple non-profit organizations and individuals (plaintiffs-appellants) challenging the United States Army Corps of Engineers and Ralph H. Graves (defendants-appellees) regarding environmental concerns associated with BP West Coast Products, LLC (intervenor-appellee). The appeal is from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, presided over by Judge Robert S. Lasnik. The court proceedings included arguments submitted on April 11, 2003, with a filed opinion on March 15, 2004, later amended on March 4, 2005. The key legal focus is the Corps' duty to assess the environmental impacts of increased vessel traffic and the associated risk of oil spills due to a dock extension at BP's facility. The amendments clarify that the extension allows for greater traffic in line with market demand and emphasizes the necessity for a more thorough Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) due to the reasonably close causal relationship between the permit issuance and environmental effects. The opinion cites relevant legal precedents, including Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation, to support the argument for a comprehensive environmental review. Specific amendments include the correction of terminology from "dock" to "refinery" and a more detailed articulation of the causal relationship between the Corps' actions and environmental impacts, aligning with established legal standards regarding environmental assessments. The district court granted summary judgment for the Corps and BP regarding Ocean Advocates’ environmental claims, concluding that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) did not mandate an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The court incorrectly reasoned that the pier extension's purpose was solely to manage existing tanker traffic, which was projected to rise due to market conditions regardless of the extension. It cited previous cases (Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA and Seattle Community Council Federation v. FAA) that involved projects aiming to enhance efficiency and safety. However, the current project’s stated purpose, as per the 1996 permit, is to "expand a petroleum product loading/unloading facility," lacking evidence that efficiency or safety were primary objectives. The court noted that the referenced cases were not applicable, as they did not involve a change in ground capacity, unlike the current situation where increased tanker traffic is directly linked to the pier expansion. Furthermore, existing planning documents did not account for the anticipated growth in tanker traffic. The document suggested inserting additional language to emphasize the absence of such analysis in the Environmental Assessment (EA). The court remanded the case to the district court, instructing it to evaluate Ocean Advocates’ request for injunctive relief and to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding whether the pier extension would lead to increased vessel traffic beyond market-driven increases, while also considering potential harms to BP from an injunction. The panel unanimously voted to deny Appellee’s petition for rehearing, with Judge Thomas supporting the denial of en banc rehearings, while Judges D. Nelson and D. Pregerson recommended the same. The full court was informed of the petitions for en banc rehearing, but no active judge requested a vote. The petitions filed on May 24, 2004, and June 4, 2004, are denied, though future petitions may be submitted. Ocean Advocates (OA) is appealing a summary judgment favoring the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and BP West Coast Products (BP) regarding a permit for an addition to BP's oil refinery dock in Cherry Point, Washington. OA contends that the permit violates the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Magnuson Amendment to the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). BP cross-appeals, arguing OA lacks standing and that laches applies. The Cherry Point Marine Terminal, a significant coastal area, has been under BP's operation since 1971, initially permitted for constructing a dock for crude oil delivery. BP constructed only one of two planned platforms, postponing the second until necessary. In 1992, BP reapplied for a permit for the northern platform, which would double berthing capacity. This new platform would alter the functions of the existing southern platform, which would then exclusively handle crude oil. The Corps issued a public notice, receiving comments from organizations like the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which expressed concerns regarding potential cumulative impacts and increased risks of oil spills due to heightened tanker traffic associated with the new platform. Three years post-public notice, the FWS requested an environmental impact statement (EIS) to evaluate the effects of increased traffic and the cumulative impact of BP's dock expansion. BP argued that the expansion would reduce the risk of oil spills by decreasing tanker waiting times at sea. They claimed the new dock would be equipped with advanced oil spill containment. The Lummi Indian Nation and Nooksack Indian Tribe expressed concerns over increased tanker traffic and potential oil spills, but later entered mitigation agreements with BP and withdrew their objections. The Corps, responding to the listing of the marbled murrelet as a threatened species, requested BP assess the impact on the bird. BP acknowledged that oil spills could harm murrelets but deemed the risk negligible due to containment measures. The Corps granted the permit on March 1, 1996, concluding that the project would likely not adversely affect fish and wildlife and would decrease spill risks. They issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), negating the need for an EIS. In October 1997, OA requested a reopening of the permit for a more thorough evaluation of cumulative impacts and compliance with the Magnuson Amendment, which the Corps declined. A July 1999 report from WSDNR indicated that ship traffic would increase by 18-36% over five years, raising the likelihood of spills despite reduced anchorage times. OA contacted the Corps again in September 1999, arguing that new data showed an increase in refinery output and subsequent tanker traffic, suggesting that the permit violated the Magnuson Amendment and warranted a full EIS. The Corps requested BP to address concerns raised by OA regarding a dock extension project. BP asserted that the extension would enhance environmental safety by reducing oil spill risks and claimed that further environmental analysis was unnecessary. In reference to the Magnuson Amendment, BP argued that the proposed dock would not increase crude oil handling capacity since the northern pier would exclusively load refined oil and would not alter the existing refinery infrastructure. BP contested OA's assertion that the dock extension would significantly raise vessel traffic levels. In March 2000, BP sought a one-year extension for its 1996 permit, originally expiring on March 1, 2001, to complete construction by late 2001. The Corps delayed the extension pending consultation with FWS regarding its potential impact on newly listed threatened species but opted not to issue a public notice or accept comments. The WSDNR raised concerns about the narrow focus of the SLERA report and the cumulative effects of multiple projects on the Cherry Point area, particularly regarding the newly listed Puget Sound Chinook salmon and bull trout. Despite these concerns, the Corps granted the permit extension on June 29, 2000, aligning with BP's interpretation of the Magnuson Amendment, determining that the project would not increase the refinery's crude oil offloading capacity. The Corps rejected OA's claim regarding increased oil handling capacity due to refined oil use, asserting that market forces would dictate tanker traffic levels rather than refinery modifications. Ultimately, the Corps concluded that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unnecessary for assessing cumulative impacts. Subsequently, OA filed a legal action against the Corps on November 21, 2000. The district court allowed BP to intervene and ruled in favor of the Corps and BP on OA's environmental claims, finding that an EIS was not required as the extension aimed to reduce existing tanker traffic and that traffic would rise regardless of the dock extension. The court also accepted the Corps’ interpretation of the Magnuson Amendment and determined that BP's permit extension request did not necessitate public notice and comment. The district court denied BP's summary judgment motion regarding OA's standing and laches defense. Following the court's judgment, an injunction was established prohibiting BP from using the dock extension for crude oil loading or unloading unless a permit is obtained. Even with a permit, BP may not simultaneously use the new platform and the original southern platform for these activities, allowing only one platform to be in use at any given time. The standard for reviewing the district court's summary judgment is de novo, requiring consideration of evidence favoring the nonmoving party to ensure correct application of the law and to identify any genuine material fact disputes. Judicial review of the Corps’ actions is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which mandates that decisions must not be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The review involves assessing whether the Corps considered relevant factors and maintained a rational connection between the facts and its decisions. Environmental organizations, including Ocean Advocates (OA), have established standing to sue, with OA’s standing alone being sufficient for the appeal. OA must demonstrate constitutional standing by showing a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent, traceable to the defendant's actions, and likely redressable. Additionally, OA's interests must fall within the protective "zone of interests" of relevant statutes such as NEPA and the Magnuson Amendment. OA is committed to preventing oil spills in Washington State waters, reflecting its longstanding dedication to ocean protection. OA members, who own property on Haro Strait, engage in activities such as photographing marine life and fishing. Fred Felleman, the director of OA, has waterfront property near the BP refinery and works as a marine biologist and wildlife photographer. He is concerned that increased tanker traffic, pollutant discharge, and potential oil spills threaten his professional and personal interests at Cherry Point. To establish 'injury in fact,' an individual must demonstrate a sufficient connection to the area of concern that impacts their aesthetic or recreational satisfaction. Evidence indicates that the dock extension will likely increase tanker traffic and the risk of oil spills, which would significantly reduce OA members' enjoyment of Cherry Point for ecological study and recreation. Felleman’s interests would also be adversely affected. Injury in fact is satisfied if an individual shows an aesthetic or recreational interest that is impaired by a defendant's actions, and this injury does not need to stem from existing environmental harm; increased risk alone suffices. The injury is traceable to BP’s actions, as agreed upon by all parties at the start of litigation regarding the new dock platform and anticipated increased traffic. OA has adequately claimed that the dock extension will heighten the risk of an oil spill, and while the causal connection for standing does not need to be definitive at this stage, it should not rely on speculation or conjecture about unrelated parties' actions. The excerpt establishes that Ocean Advocates (OA) has constitutional standing due to the clear connection between the newly constructed platform and increased tanker traffic, which raises the risk of oil spills. OA seeks a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and an injunction under the Magnuson Amendment, both of which would address its concerns regarding increased tanker traffic. The excerpt emphasizes that OA is not required to prove that further government analysis would yield different results; rather, they only need to demonstrate that environmental considerations could influence the Corps' permitting decisions. OA meets the prudential standing requirement as its interests align with the objectives of NEPA and the Magnuson Amendment, which aim to protect the environment and reduce the risks associated with increased tanker traffic. The excerpt notes that OA's objectives are clearly related to these statutes' purposes, satisfying the lenient zone of interests test. Additionally, OA establishes organizational standing, as its members would individually have standing to sue, the interests involved are relevant to OA’s mission, and the claims do not necessitate individual member participation. Overall, OA's focus on preventing oil spills aligns with its mission to protect marine environments, confirming its standing to pursue the case. OA must demonstrate statutory standing under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by proving two elements: (1) a final agency action has adversely affected OA, and (2) this action results in a legal wrong or injury that falls within the "zone of interests" of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Magnuson Amendment. It has been established that OA's claims are relevant to both NEPA and the Magnuson Amendment, with the Corps' permit qualifying as the final agency action in question. BP claims that the doctrine of laches bars OA's action, which would render consideration of other issues unnecessary. Laches is rarely applied in environmental litigation, as these cases typically involve broader community impacts from environmental harm. The application of laches is case-specific and at the trial court's discretion. To succeed in a laches defense, BP must prove OA's lack of diligence in pursuing its claim and that this lack caused prejudice. Factors in assessing OA's diligence include whether OA communicated with the Corps prior to filing suit, the Corps' response, and whether any events prompted OA to investigate legal challenges to the project. There is a dispute over the timeline for assessing OA's diligence; BP contends OA should have acted soon after the 1996 permit issuance, while OA argues it acted reasonably after the 2000 permit extension. Evidence indicates OA engaged with the Corps shortly after the initial permit was granted and maintained communication, escalating efforts leading to the 2000 extension, which was necessary for BP to lawfully proceed with construction. Additionally, changes in the threatened species list since the original permit was issued effectively suspended the permit's force, further complicating the timeline of OA's actions. An email exchange among Corps members highlighted the necessity for BP to refrain from commencing work until the completion of Endangered Species Act (ESA) consultation, as initiating work could lead to legal complications. The addition of species to the threatened list effectively suspended the permit's validity until ESA consultation was finalized, meaning BP lacked the necessary authorization for construction. The 2000 permit extension was significant because it was the first instance addressing potential violations of the Magnuson Amendment concerning the dock extension project. Legal precedent indicates that delays of eight to ten years do not necessarily imply a lack of diligence when litigation closely follows a final agency decision. In this case, within six weeks of the permit extension, Ocean Advocates (OA) notified the Corps of its intent to sue, filing the lawsuit about three months later. Even if the 2000 permit extension did not provide final authorization for construction, OA demonstrated diligence by communicating its concerns to the Corps prior to litigation. OA made multiple requests to reopen BP's permit and urged the Corps to evaluate compliance with the Magnuson Amendment. The Corps' responses led OA to believe that administrative remedies might resolve the issue, especially after the Corps acknowledged a prior error regarding BP's refinery capacity, which prompted reevaluation of OA's permit reopening request. OA's second request occurred in September 1999, with the Corps responding as late as May 22, 2000, indicating consideration of OA's request based on new circumstances and potential violations of the Magnuson Amendment. Laches should not bar OA's action as it made reasonable efforts to address its Magnuson concerns administratively before resorting to litigation. OA had no motivation to investigate further legal bases for challenging the permit due to a lack of visible developments, despite Felleman's awareness of the permit since 1996. Public notice of the 1992 application was not provided to the plaintiffs, and BP's construction did not commence until June 2000, following a permit extension. Unlike the Apache Survival Coalition case, where the plaintiff failed to respond to solicitations and delayed action, OA maintained ongoing communication with the Corps prior to filing suit. BP did not demonstrate a lack of diligence, negating the need to assess undue prejudice. Under NEPA, OA contends that the Corps improperly failed to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before approving BP's permit. NEPA mandates that federal agencies include a detailed statement assessing environmental impacts for major federal actions significantly affecting the environment. An EIS is required if the project has a significant environmental impact, while a less significant impact may lead to an Environmental Assessment (EA) and potentially a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). NEPA's purpose is to ensure agencies, like the Corps, thoroughly evaluate potential environmental consequences. The Corps cannot avoid preparing an EIS through vague assertions of insignificance; it must provide a convincing rationale for its decisions. An EIS is necessary when substantial questions arise regarding potential significant degradation of environmental factors. To trigger the requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under NEPA, a plaintiff only needs to raise substantial questions regarding the potential for significant environmental effects, rather than demonstrate that such effects will definitively occur. The Council on Environmental Quality has established regulations that define "significantly" through two components: context and intensity. Context pertains to the setting of the proposed action, while intensity refers to the severity of the impact. Agencies must consider various factors to assess significance, including unique geographic characteristics, the cumulative impact of related actions, and the potential for violating environmental laws. In the case at hand, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers failed to adequately justify its determination that the dock extension would have a negligible environmental impact, thereby not demonstrating that it took a thorough examination of the potential effects. The permit issued in 1996 concluded that the action would not significantly impact the environment, yet this conclusion lacked a convincing rationale. While the Corps noted concerns from the Fish and Wildlife Service regarding increased tanker traffic and the risk of oil spills, the response did not suffice as a comprehensive statement of reasons for not preparing an EIS. The court found that the Corps' findings were insufficient to dismiss the substantial question raised about possible significant environmental degradation caused by the dock extension. The Corps determined that the new pier would reduce the likelihood of oil spills during tanker bunkering by using containment booms and decreasing turnaround times at anchorage. Despite this, the determination was deemed inadequate for several reasons. First, the Corps did not explicitly acknowledge the potential increase in tanker traffic, failing to assess this significant impact. Second, while the Corps referenced BP’s claims about the refinery operating at maximum capacity, it did not adopt or substantiate this assertion, which was later disproven by Ocean Advocates (OA). This reliance on an inaccurate assertion undermines the Corps’ conclusion of no significant environmental impact. Third, the Corps based its findings solely on BP’s claims without a thorough evaluation of the increased traffic risk, raising doubts about the rigor of its assessment. The permit extension granted in 2000 similarly concluded that the project would not significantly impact the environment and did not provide sufficient justification for skipping a formal Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The Corps reiterated its earlier no significant impact finding without adequately addressing OA’s concerns regarding cumulative effects on the Cherry Point area, and it failed to convincingly demonstrate that a hard look was taken at potential impacts. The Corps relied on BP's Biological Evaluation (BE) and a letter from BP claiming that the dock extension would not increase vessel traffic. However, the permitting decision lacked any critical assessment of BP's assertions, which were seen as self-serving. Despite Cherry Point being designated as an aquatic reserve, the Corps failed to adequately evaluate the potential increase in tanker traffic resulting from the dock extension. It was suggested that BP's investment aimed to enhance its capacity for handling more tankers, potentially leading to increased traffic. The Corps did not sufficiently analyze BP's claims regarding vessel traffic, which was considered unreasonable, particularly in light of rising tanker traffic trends in the 1990s and BP's acknowledgment of a possible increase in demand for refined products. Ocean Advocates (OA) raised significant concerns about the dock extension's potential environmental impact, specifically the increase in tanker traffic that the Corps overlooked in both the 1996 and 2000 permit decisions. The Corps erroneously stated that the dock extension would not result in increased tanker traffic due to maximum refinery capacity. OA pointed out that the Corps neglected to consider key factors outlined by the Council on Environmental Quality and highlighted the severe environmental impact likely resulting from increased tanker traffic in Puget Sound. Evidence indicated that the dock was already operating near full capacity, and BP had anticipated increased marine traffic following project completion. The new platform was expected to double the dock's berthing capacity, further intensifying vessel access to the refinery. Overall, OA raised substantial questions regarding the cumulative environmental effects of increased tanker traffic in the Cherry Point area. Between 1995 and 1999, the BP refinery experienced an average increase in throughput of 672,000 gallons per day. The capacity for tanker traffic at the BP refinery was already near its limit in 1992, raising concerns about the potential for further increases in tanker traffic resulting from a dock extension. Although market forces could drive an increase in tanker traffic, the dock extension enhances the facility's ability to accommodate this traffic. The Corps of Engineers had a responsibility to investigate the causal relationship between the dock extension, increased vessel traffic, and the associated risk of oil spills, particularly in light of the precedent set by Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp. Increased tanker traffic poses a significant risk of oil spills, which can severely impact the ecosystems in Puget Sound and threaten endangered species in the Cherry Point Region. The Corps underestimated the implications of the dock extension and its potential to increase tanker traffic, which is critical for NEPA compliance. The concept of cumulative impact is essential, as it considers the collective environmental effects of the proposed action along with other past, present, and future actions, regardless of the responsible entity. Cumulative impacts, even if individually minor, can lead to significant environmental consequences over time. The agency must provide detailed information regarding cumulative impacts and cannot rely solely on general statements. A thorough analysis of cumulative impacts is necessary, and the Corps' findings should be respected only if they are well-informed. Clear errors in judgment, however, are not excusable. The cumulative impact analysis includes the Cherry Point refinery and two nearby facilities—an aluminum plant and the Ferndale oil refinery—resulting in significant maritime traffic. Currently, an average of fifteen large commercial vessels and up to ten small boats navigate the Strait of Georgia daily, with more than 100 fishing boats present during peak season. Annually, approximately 600 ships visit the Ferndale refinery, 30 the aluminum plant, and 200 the BP pier. A proposed Gateway Pacific terminal is expected to increase average large vessel traffic in the Strait from two to three movements per day. The Corps determined that the dock extension would not increase crude oil tanker traffic, attributing any potential increase to market dynamics rather than the project itself, based on BP's unverified claims regarding alternative transportation methods. This conclusion was criticized for lacking a thorough examination of cumulative project effects and failing to provide detailed or quantified information. Furthermore, it was foreseeable that the dock extension could lead to significant cumulative environmental impacts. The Corps relied on a SLERA report indicating that vessel traffic would rise through 2002 regardless of the dock extension but acknowledged that the report was limited in scope and did not evaluate cumulative impacts adequately. The Corps concluded in 1995 that the construction and operation of the dock would not significantly increase oil pollution risks, citing the presence of spill containment technology and improved docking efficiency. However, it did not assess the risk of oil spills from increased tanker traffic while en route to the docks, neglecting to balance this risk with the potential reduction of spills while docked. The Corps did not properly evaluate how increased tanker traffic could negate the purported benefits of the new dock, which is essential for a thorough assessment of cumulative impacts. The district court ruled in favor of the Corps and BP, concluding that NEPA did not necessitate an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) since the dock extension was intended to manage existing tanker traffic that would rise regardless of the extension. This ruling was based on a flawed analogy to previous cases that focused on increasing efficiency and safety, which does not apply here. The 1996 permit explicitly states that the project's purpose is to enlarge a petroleum loading/unloading facility, not to enhance safety or efficiency. Unlike the referenced cases, this project represents a change in ground capacity, as the anticipated increase in tanker traffic is directly linked to the pier's expansion. Additionally, while past cases involving highway construction did not require further analysis due to existing planning documents, the potential growth in tanker traffic from this expansion has not been addressed in any such documents. The Corps' evaluation of cumulative impacts was insufficient and lacked detail, raising significant concerns about potential cumulative negative environmental effects. Furthermore, where the environmental impacts are uncertain or involve unknown risks, an EIS is required to prevent speculation, as the extent of the increase in tanker traffic associated with the dock extension remains largely unknown. Data collection or projection analysis could have assessed the anticipated rise in tanker traffic due to market forces, dock extension, and the cumulative effects of nearby facilities. However, such analysis is absent from the Environmental Assessment (EA) in OCEAN ADVOCATES v. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, nor is there justification for the lack of more comprehensive information. The Corps' ignorance does not exempt them from preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS); it necessitates further investigation. Merely identifying a general risk not specific to the pier does not fulfill the requirement for a thorough evaluation that would excuse the need for an EIS. Citing Public Citizen, the court noted that while an increase in traffic was anticipated, the EA failed to examine the underlying causes of this increase. The Department of Transportation's position—that traffic increases were contingent on international trade agreements—parallels BP and the Corps’ claim that increases depend solely on market factors, ignoring the pier extension's influence. The Corps relied on BP's unsupported claims without sufficient justification. They overlooked uncertainties regarding increased traffic linked to the BP refinery's additional berthing capacity and its relationship to oil spill risks. Ocean Advocates (OA) raised significant concerns about these uncertainties, and the Corps acted arbitrarily in failing to collect necessary data. Regarding remedies, the completion of the dock extension does not affect the conclusion, as an appropriate remedy can still be established. OA requests an order for the Corps to prepare an EIS that thoroughly investigates the potential direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of increased vessel traffic due to the facility. Additionally, OA seeks injunctive relief to limit vessel traffic to pre-2000 levels until the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process is completed. While NEPA aims to prevent environmental harm before it occurs, OA’s challenge pertains only to the operation of the new platform, not its construction. OA clarified they do not seek the destruction of the dock but rather a serious evaluation by the Corps of how the platform's operation could affect vessel traffic. Construction of the dock extension is complete; however, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) retains the authority to impose operational conditions on permitted terminals to ensure compliance with legal requirements and protect public interests. If the Corps finds that dock operations could significantly harm the environment, it may enforce restrictions or mandate mitigation measures, potentially necessitating an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to address harm to Ocean Advocates (OA). The court remands the case to the district court to evaluate injunctive relief, including OA's demonstration of need, potential harm to BP from an injunction, and public impact. The Magnuson Amendment prohibits federal officials from approving permits for any construction or modification of facilities affecting navigable waters in Washington that could increase crude oil handling capacity, except for oil refined for local consumption. This case represents a first interpretation of the Magnuson Amendment, emphasizing the importance of statutory language and context. "Any such facility" encompasses the entire terminal, including BP's Cherry Point Marine Terminal, rather than just the dock extension. Therefore, courts must assess the terminal's capacity, not just the refinery's, aligning with legislative intent expressed by Senator Magnuson, which clarified that the amendment applies specifically to dock facilities in the Puget Sound region. BP’s stipulation against using the dock extension for loading or unloading crude oil does not necessarily prevent the Corps from having violated the Magnuson Amendment by issuing the permit if the permit allows for an increased volume of crude oil handling at the terminal. The legality and factual capability of the new platform to handle crude oil is examined. BP asserts that the new platform lacks the capacity for crude oil, as it is neither designed nor permitted for such use. The district court found that the permit allowed for a “petroleum product loading/unloading facility,” which should exclude crude oil based on its definition as oil to be refined. However, this ruling is viewed as erroneous. The permit’s language is ambiguous regarding whether it imposes a legal limitation on the new platform's use, and the term “loading/unloading facility” suggests potential for crude oil offloading. The Corps’ Permit Evaluation indicates a broader understanding of the dock’s function, implying that the entire facility is considered a petroleum product loading/unloading facility, without clear restrictions on crude oil handling. If the new platform cannot handle crude oil, it raises the question of what modifications would be necessary for it to do so, with historical context showing that BP previously operated a dock permitting crude oil unloading. BP opted to construct only one of the two planned platforms and postponed the second. Modifications were made to the single platform's hardware to enable dual-use capabilities. The redesign of crude and product pipelines facilitated this dual utilization. The Corps' permit may have inadvertently increased the facility's capacity to handle crude oil, prompting the case to be remanded to the district court for clarification on two critical questions: 1) Is the new platform currently capable of handling crude oil? and 2) Can it be modified to handle crude oil without requiring additional permits? A positive answer to either question would indicate a violation of the Magnuson Amendment. The Corps argued that strict compliance with permits prevents sudden modifications; however, it was found that the permit does not limit use as asserted. The discussion further highlights that the capacity to handle crude oil is not solely based on theoretical hydraulic capacity but must also include berthing limitations. The Corps acknowledged that the terminal's capacity, as of the Magnuson Amendment's benchmark date, should factor in berthing capacity. Despite the terminal's potential to unload over one million barrels per day, actual operations are constrained to one boat per hour for docking and undocking. Therefore, the district court must assess how the permit impacts the terminal's berthing capacity, as any increase could signify a violation of the Magnuson Amendment. If a permit enhances the berthing capacity at a terminal, allowing for an increased number of crude oil-carrying ships to dock in a day, it thereby raises the volume of crude oil the facility can manage. The district court is tasked with determining whether the permit modifications indeed increased this capacity. A positive finding would indicate a violation of the Magnuson Amendment. The court also acknowledges that this determination may relate to prior questions they’ve posed. The adequacy of BP’s stipulated restrictions on terminal use as a remedy for any potential violation will also be evaluated upon remand. The district court's denial of BP’s summary judgment motion based on OA's lack of standing and laches is affirmed. Conversely, the denial of OA’s summary judgment motion regarding NEPA and the Magnuson Amendment is reversed. The case is remanded with instructions for the Corps to (1) prepare a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that assesses the effects of anticipated increases in tanker traffic, and (2) reassess the dock extension's compliance with the Magnuson Amendment. The district court should instruct the Corps to revoke the permit or impose operational conditions as necessary to comply with the law. Additionally, the district court will consider OA’s request for injunctive relief, conducting an evidentiary hearing to evaluate whether the pier extension will lead to increased vessel traffic beyond what market forces would typically generate, as well as any potential harms BP may experience due to an injunction. The opinion of the district court is partially reversed, partially affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.