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United States v. Michael LeBrun
Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-4005
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; October 3, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a district court ruling to suppress all statements made by Michael Edward LeBrun on September 21, 2000, in connection with the disappearance of Ensign Andrew Muns in January 1968. Muns disappeared while serving aboard the U.S.S. Cacapon, and a sum of approximately $8600 was reported missing from the ship's disbursement office shortly thereafter. Despite initial Navy investigations concluding that Muns had stolen the money and deserted, his sister prompted a reopening of the case in 1998. In November 1999, NCIS agents interviewed LeBrun multiple times regarding Muns' disappearance, during which he was read his Miranda rights. Initially, LeBrun provided vague answers and expressed a desire to recover repressed memories related to the incident. He underwent several interviews but did not take a polygraph examination. By September 2000, NCIS agents believed LeBrun was the primary suspect and planned a formal interview with him. Agents strategically planned LeBrun's transport and interview, including decisions about the reading of Miranda warnings and the decor of the interview room, which featured enlarged photos from his life. On September 21, 2000, Special Agent Early and Corporal Hunter approached LeBrun at his office without prior notice, dressed in plain clothes. Corporal Hunter informed LeBrun they were conducting an investigation but could not disclose details, assuring him it did not involve his family. Believing the inquiry related to potential illegal activities at his workplace, LeBrun agreed to accompany the officers. Once outside, the officers insisted on driving him in an unmarked patrol car, despite his offer to drive himself. At the Highway Patrol Station, LeBrun was informed he was not under arrest and could terminate the interview at any time. Agent Early advised him that the interview would be recorded and later identified himself as an NCIS investigator. The interview room was designed to be intimidating, with both agents seated close to LeBrun, who was made to face them while seated in a chair with no barriers in between. During the questioning, the agents falsely claimed to have substantial evidence against LeBrun, including eyewitness accounts and a purported suicide note implicating him in the death of Ensign Muns. Agent Early asserted that they were prepared to charge LeBrun with premeditated murder, threatening severe consequences for his reputation and finances, as well as implying that Muns' family was ready to forgive him if he admitted to a spontaneous act. After approximately thirty-three minutes of intense questioning, LeBrun confessed to killing Ensign Muns out of panic while committing theft, detailing the disposal of the body and reenacting the murder with Agent Early playing the victim. LeBrun, after a reenactment, requested a bathroom break and a cigarette, during which Special Agent Early accompanied him. Upon reentering, he was presented with the opportunity to apologize to Muns’ sister, who was accompanied by Special Agent Billington, posing as Muns’ brother. Agents Early and Grebas informed LeBrun of Billington's advanced cancer, which emotionally impacted LeBrun, leading him to apologize for Muns’ death and express a desire to stay in contact with the family, albeit advised to communicate through NCIS agents. The interview lasted about two hours, after which LeBrun consented to a search of his home, conducted by Agents Early and Grebas without an arrest that day; however, he was later arrested and indicted for felony murder. LeBrun sought to suppress statements made during the interview, arguing he was subjected to custodial interrogation without receiving Miranda warnings and that his confession was involuntary. The Government contended that the confession was voluntary and that LeBrun was not in custody, thus no Miranda warning was necessary. The district court found that most factors indicated LeBrun was in custody, leading to the conclusion that his confession was inadmissible due to failure to provide Miranda rights, and deemed the confession involuntary based on the circumstances. The review process for the district court's "in custody" determination entails a mixed question of law and fact, evaluating historical facts for clear error and applying legal standards de novo. While LeBrun was not formally arrested, formal arrest is not the sole condition necessitating Miranda warnings. The requirement arises when an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, which mandates informing them of their rights against self-incrimination and to counsel. A determination of custody involves assessing the totality of the circumstances to see if the individual was significantly deprived of freedom. The focus on a suspect alone does not automatically trigger Miranda warnings; rather, a suspect is considered in custody when either formally arrested or significantly restrained in their freedom of action. Key points include the factors determining whether a suspect is in custody during interrogation, based on the totality of circumstances rather than subjective perceptions. The primary factors to consider are: whether the suspect was informed of the voluntary nature of questioning, their freedom of movement, whether they initiated contact, the use of coercive tactics, the atmosphere of the interrogation, and whether the suspect was arrested afterward. The first three factors favor a non-custodial finding, while the last three indicate custody. In the case at hand, Agents Grebas and Early informed LeBrun he was not under arrest and that he could leave at any time. However, the situation is contrasted with Oregon v. Mathiason, where the Supreme Court deemed the suspect's presence non-custodial due to voluntary attendance, brief duration, and unrestricted freedom. In contrast, LeBrun was approached at his workplace by unfamiliar officers who requested he accompany them without initially disclosing the purpose, which was to question him about a disappearance. He was also prevented from using his vehicle, making him reliant on the officers for transportation. The court noted that although no direct deception was used regarding the interview's purpose, a strategic approach was employed to obscure the true nature of the questioning. The interview environment was described as a restrictive, windowless room, affirming the district court's assessment of the circumstances surrounding LeBrun's consent to the interrogation. The room where LeBrun was interviewed featured photos from the U.S.S. Cacapon and his life, with no furniture between him and Agents Grebas and Early, who were seated close by. LeBrun was informed of audio and video recording of the interview, which was conducted in a manner suggesting high pressure and intimidation. The agents asserted that they had definitive evidence against him regarding the murder of Ensign Muns and warned him of potential grand jury proceedings. They used threats related to his personal life, including the risk of losing his home, family, and job, and referenced the wealth of Muns' family who could pursue civil litigation. The document cites the Supreme Court's ruling in Stansbury regarding the objective circumstances of interrogations, noting that the officers' beliefs can impact the perceived freedom of the individual being questioned if communicated effectively. It emphasizes that a reasonable person in LeBrun's situation would likely feel their freedom of action significantly constrained due to the threats and claims of incriminating evidence made by the agents. The court highlighted that coercive tactics were employed during the interrogation, specifically identifying the “friendly-unfriendly” approach and “casting blame on the victim” as utilized by the agents. The district court found no error in determining that these coercive techniques were present, evident in the contrasting demeanors of the agents during the interview, with Early adopting a more congenial tone while Grebas played the role of the antagonistic interrogator. A finding of the "blame the victim" tactic is supported by interrogation videotapes. Agents employed tactics to bond with LeBrun, appealing to his loyalty and threatening his social and financial well-being if he did not cooperate. These factors suggest a strong case for custody. The interrogation's length and nature also play a role; even brief questioning can indicate custody if the detainee feels pressured to provide desired answers. Agents informed LeBrun five times that he could leave after the interview, with Agent Early suggesting that LeBrun's confession could end the questioning. A reasonable person in LeBrun's position would likely believe that questioning would persist until the agents received the information they sought. While the appellant argues that a lack of LeBrun's confession would hinder prosecution, the document cites the complexity of legal systems and the necessity of upholding the rights granted by the Constitution, acknowledging that some criminals may evade prosecution as a result. Factors against a finding of custody include LeBrun being told he was free to leave and not being arrested after the interrogation. However, the record indicates restricted freedom of movement, less than voluntary consent to questioning, the use of deceptive tactics by law enforcement, and an overall police-dominated environment. Thus, LeBrun was in custody during his initial confession and should have received Miranda warnings. Even if the court found LeBrun not to be in custody, the district court's decision would still be upheld because his confession was involuntary. The voluntariness of a confession is a legal issue reviewed by appellate courts, which consider the entire record for signs of coercion or overborne will. The court uses a flexible totality of circumstances approach, factoring in interrogation tactics, details of the questioning, and the accused's characteristics. Custodial statements are presumed involuntary, placing the burden on the government to prove otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. LeBrun, in his mid-fifties and recently recovered from cancer, was a project manager who had previously attended college and one year of law school. He was married, had a stepdaughter, and another child on the way. Prior to his confession on September 21, 2000, he had been questioned multiple times by law enforcement about Muns’ disappearance, during which he was informed of his Miranda rights on three occasions. He had no prior law enforcement contact before 1999. The interrogation tactics employed by Agents Early and Grebas were particularly aggressive, involving deception about the evidence against LeBrun, including false claims of “incontrovertible” evidence and threats of charges in Alaska if he did not confess. They exploited LeBrun’s personal concerns, suggesting that a trial would harm his family’s reputation and finances, and misleadingly assured him that confessing to a "spontaneous" act would prevent prosecution due to the statute of limitations. They also falsely indicated that Muns’ sister was willing to forgive him if he confessed. While individual tactics might not have been coercive enough to override LeBrun’s will, the cumulative effect created a police-dominated and coercive atmosphere designed to elicit a confession. The agents misled LeBrun regarding the nature of potential charges, implying that only premeditated murder would lead to prosecution. Despite the defense arguing that LeBrun misunderstood the legal implications of his confession without fault from the officers, the overall circumstances indicated that a reasonable person in his position would interpret the agents' statements as a promise of non-prosecution for a spontaneous act. The agents specifically aimed to have LeBrun admit to a scenario that would qualify as felony murder, manipulating him to believe there were only two types of murder charges: premeditated or spontaneous. The interrogation transcript reveals agents encouraging LeBrun to claim his actions were spontaneous, promising no prosecution, further demonstrating the coercive nature of their tactics. The dialogue reveals a conversation regarding the legal implications of a potential confession by LeBrun concerning the death of Andy Muns. Special Agent Early clarifies that the statute of limitations for manslaughter, which is treated as a form of second-degree murder in the federal system, is five years from the incident date. Grebas indicates that if LeBrun's actions were spontaneous, he would likely avoid prosecution, affirming this interpretation throughout the interrogation process. However, the defense argues that the agents' use of the term "spontaneous" was misleading and that their interrogation tactics were coercive, suggesting that LeBrun's confession was involuntary. The government acknowledges that if LeBrun's initial confession was found to be illegal, his subsequent confession to Muns' sister would be considered "fruit of the poisonous tree," referencing Wong Sun v. United States. Consequently, the court concludes that LeBrun was in custody during his initial confession and that it was involuntary, leading to the judgment that both confessions were illegally obtained. In dissent, Judge Hansen disagrees with the majority's view that LeBrun was in custody under Miranda standards when he confessed and reenacted the crime. Hansen argues that LeBrun was not dependent on authorities for transportation, as he possessed a cell phone and could have arranged alternative transport during the interview. The dissent highlights the distinction between LeBrun's situation and past cases, asserting that the majority's reasoning lacks persuasive strength. The court finds that the interview of LeBrun was conducted in a police-dominated and coercive environment, citing the small size of the interview room, the agents' coercive tactics, and their misrepresentation of evidence against him. However, it emphasizes that a noncustodial situation does not automatically become custodial under Miranda due to a coercive environment, as established in Mathiason. The court indicates that the police-dominated nature of the setting was expected since the interview occurred in a highway patrol station. The agents' exaggeration of evidence is deemed irrelevant to the custody determination. Further, the court argues that the coercive aspects of the interview are overstated, noting that LeBrun was not physically restrained, was transported in an unlocked vehicle, and had access to his cellular phone during the interview, which allowed him to communicate with the outside world. The presence of the phone is highlighted as a factor that mitigates feelings of isolation and coercion typically associated with custodial interrogations. Additionally, the court critiques the lower court's failure to consider LeBrun's age, work experience, education, and prior interactions with law enforcement, which collectively suggest that a reasonable person in his position would not feel their freedom significantly restricted. This analysis aligns with legal precedents emphasizing that the assessment of custody must consider the individual's specific circumstances rather than a generalized standard. The age and experience of the interviewee, LeBrun, are pertinent to the custody determination. LeBrun, in his mid-fifties, is a military veteran, a manager in a real estate office, and has a college education with some law school experience. He has interacted with NCIS investigators on four occasions without being arrested, leading him to reasonably believe he would not be arrested during the current interview. He was explicitly informed multiple times that he was not under arrest and could leave at any time, which the district court found he believed at the onset of the interview. The absence of an arrest post-interview supports the conclusion that he was not "in custody." Evaluating the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable, educated individual with prior law enforcement experience would not feel their freedom was restrained as with a formal arrest. This aligns with the precedent set in Mathiason, leading to the recommendation to reverse the district court's judgment. Regarding the voluntariness of LeBrun's incriminating statements, the test is whether his will was overborne or his self-determination impaired. The agents were unarmed, did not shout or threaten him, and the court found these facts were not clearly erroneous. While the government acknowledged the use of psychological coercion, such tactics are not inherently coercive. Historical rulings indicate that various forms of psychological pressure do not automatically render confessions involuntary. The court's conclusion that the agents' tactics combined with their statements about nonprosecution made LeBrun's confession involuntary is disagreed with, as it remains unclear if any explicit promise was made. Agent Grebas stated that it was only "possible" that LeBrun would not be prosecuted, leaving ambiguity about any promise made regarding prosecution for murder or "spontaneous murder." The district court rejected the magistrate judge's findings about the alleged promises, noting only that LeBrun believed he would not be prosecuted if he confessed to a "spontaneous" murder. The court did not determine if any promise was made or its legal implications. Consequently, the appellate court based its assessment on the district court’s specific findings. It concluded that LeBrun's confession was not compelled, as a mistaken belief regarding prosecution does not make a confession involuntary. Citing relevant case law, the court noted that while a promise from law enforcement is a factor in evaluating police conduct, it does not automatically render a confession involuntary. Even if discussions about nonprosecution influenced LeBrun, a but-for analysis is insufficient for assessing voluntariness; the totality of circumstances must be considered. Ultimately, despite any coercive implications, LeBrun's confession was deemed freely and voluntarily made, occurring after just thirty-three minutes of conversation with the agents. The analysis emphasizes that the interrogation of LeBrun did not involve prolonged or coercive questioning that could undermine his will. LeBrun's understanding of his Miranda rights is highlighted as a critical factor supporting the voluntariness of his confession. His sophistication and legal training are also significant; these attributes mitigate concerns about suggestibility or vulnerability to coercion. The fact that he had prior interactions with NCIS investigators and was aware of his environment during the interview further supports the conclusion that he was not easily coerced. The videotape of the interrogation reveals LeBrun’s engagement in the discussion, particularly regarding potential legal outcomes, suggesting a calculated approach to his confession. The decision aligns with prior case law, which indicates that confessions are deemed voluntary unless the individual demonstrates extreme cognitive impairment. The conclusion drawn is that LeBrun's confession was voluntary, contrasting with cases involving defendants with significant mental limitations. The author of the excerpt expresses dissent regarding the court's decision, indicating a disagreement with the majority's findings.