United States v. Jaime Torres

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-1055

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; August 3, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Jaime Torres, also known as Jamie Torres, pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He is appealing his sentence and questioning the authority of the magistrate judge to accept his plea. The plea was entered on September 22, 2000, as part of a deal that led to the dismissal of two other charges, and was approved by the district court on October 13, 2000. During the sentencing hearing on December 15, 2000, co-conspirators testified against Torres, indicating he was involved in significant methamphetamine sales. Torres admitted to selling methamphetamine but disputed the total amount attributed to him.

The court found Torres responsible for 5.85 kilograms of methamphetamine, determining a total offense level of 33 and a criminal history category of II. He was sentenced to 151 months in prison, the minimum of the guidelines, followed by five years of supervised release and a $100 special assessment.

On appeal, Torres argues that the drug quantity finding was excessive and that the magistrate judge lacked the constitutional authority to conduct the plea proceedings. The appellate court reviews the drug quantity finding for clear error and notes that although Torres disagrees with the amount determined, the district court's conclusion was supported by credible witness testimony. Torres also claims new evidence of perjury by a witness but did not raise this in the lower court, leading the appellate court to decline to consider it. Additionally, he contends the district court violated the ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey by not submitting the drug quantity issue to a jury. The appellate court affirms the district court's decisions.

The argument raised by Torres regarding his sentencing was not presented in the district court, necessitating a plain error review. Torres contends that receiving a 151-month sentence, despite facing a potential 0-20 year sentence under 841(b)(1)(C), constitutes plain error. However, the Apprendi ruling does not prohibit sentences unless they exceed the statutory maximum for the conviction, which in Torres’ case, for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, is 20 years. Since his sentence is below this maximum, it does not violate Apprendi, and thus there is no plain error.

Additionally, Torres argues that the practice in the District of Nebraska allowing magistrate judges to conduct plea colloquies with a defendant's consent infringes on his due process right to have an Article III judge preside. This claim was also not raised in the district court and is reviewed for plain error. Federal magistrate judges derive their authority from the Magistrates Act, which outlines specific duties and excludes others. The Supreme Court has indicated that magistrate judges cannot preside over felony trials, and plea colloquies are not explicitly mentioned in the Act, raising questions about their authority in this context. Other circuits, including the Second, Tenth, and Fifth, have determined that magistrate judges may conduct plea hearings with defendant consent, provided the district court conducts de novo reviews of the magistrate’s decisions. The Tenth Circuit further noted that such reviews are not mandatory unless requested by the parties. The decisions from those circuits reference Supreme Court cases that clarify the consent requirement for magistrate judges to perform certain functions, emphasizing that consent is crucial for delegating responsibilities, including Rule 11 allocutions in felony cases.

The Fifth Circuit, in the Dees case, determined that a magistrate judge can conduct plea allocutions as an additional duty under the Magistrates Act, aligning with the Act's explicit duties regarding evidentiary proceedings for plea voluntariness. The court examined whether this delegation infringed upon the structural protections of Article III. It established that while a magistrate judge presiding over a felony trial would violate Article III, taking a guilty plea does not compromise the district court's exclusive authority over felony trials. The court noted that Article III's protections extend beyond individual defendants' interests and acknowledged that delegating authority to magistrate judges could infringe on the case and controversy clause if they held final decision-making power on significant issues. However, it concluded that plea proceedings are sufficiently reviewable and do not pose structural issues since the district court retains ultimate authority and reviews pleas de novo. The court aligned its reasoning with the Second and Fifth Circuits, asserting that consent to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction waives the right to an Article III judge. After conducting a plea colloquy, the magistrate judge submitted a report to the district court, which then performed a de novo review before entering the conviction. This adhered to established procedures, affirming that the magistrate judge's role did not violate rights or exceed the powers granted by the Magistrates Act, affirming the judgment of conviction.