James Tarsney v. Michael O'Keefe

Citation: 225 F.3d 929Docket: 99-2986

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; September 11, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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Forty-seven individuals filed a lawsuit against the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, and Commissioner Michael O'Keefe, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the use of state funds for certain abortions for low-income women. This legal action stemmed from a Minnesota Supreme Court ruling that invalidated a state statute allowing funding for childbirth-related medical services but prohibiting funding for therapeutic abortions. The plaintiffs, as taxpayers, claimed that this funding infringed upon their religious freedoms. However, the district court dismissed the case due to lack of standing, which the plaintiffs appealed. The Eighth Circuit Court upheld the dismissal, stating that without established standing, the court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of the complaint. The excerpt also references ongoing legislative and judicial issues surrounding abortion services since the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, including federal restrictions under the Hyde Amendment, which limits the use of federal funds for abortion, and Minnesota's own legislative restrictions on state funding for abortions enacted in 1987. These state restrictions had previously been challenged in the state court case Doe v. Gomez.

Plaintiffs in Doe argued that funding restrictions violated a woman's right to privacy under the Minnesota Constitution, which the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld, noting its authority to grant broader rights than the federal Constitution. The court emphasized that many state courts have similarly interpreted their constitutions to provide greater abortion rights than those recognized federally. The federal Medicaid program, influenced by the Hyde Amendment, restricts funding for abortions unless specific conditions are met, while Minnesota's GAMC program funds abortions for those not eligible under Medicaid.

In light of the Doe decision, appellants challenged state expenditures for abortions, asserting taxpayer standing to raise multiple claims, including violations of their rights to free exercise of religion and the unconstitutional use of public funds for private purposes. They contended that state payments for abortions beyond Hyde Amendment allowances breached the Privileges and Immunities Clause and claimed that the Doe decision was invalid due to lack of a case or controversy and separation of powers issues. The appellants sought a declaration that the Doe decision was void, an injunction against the use of public funds for certain abortion services, and a tax refund for funds used for abortion services. Most appellants were members of religious groups against abortion, with some being former state legislators. The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that taxpayer standing was limited to the Free Exercise Clause claim, while the appellants maintained they should be allowed taxpayer standing analogous to Establishment Clause claims.

The district court ruled that the appellants did not have taxpayer standing and dismissed their case. On appeal, the appellants argue they possess standing as state taxpayers to challenge the use of state funds for medically necessary abortions under the Free Exercise Clause, as well as under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983), the Hyde Amendment, and as state legislators. The state parties counter that taxpayer standing for Free Exercise Clause claims is not recognized, and the appellants failed to adequately plead alternative grounds for standing, which would not apply even if they had. The court reviews the dismissal for lack of standing de novo, looking at the complaint's allegations favorably to the plaintiff.

Standing is a fundamental requirement in federal cases, defined by Article III of the Constitution, necessitating that a plaintiff has suffered a tangible injury from the defendant's actions. The appellants claim that state funds used for abortions infringe upon their Free Exercise rights due to their moral and religious opposition to abortion. They argue for equal standing analysis under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, advocating for an expansion of the Supreme Court's ruling in Flast v. Cohen, which allowed taxpayer standing for Establishment Clause claims. The Supreme Court previously left open the issue of taxpayer standing for Free Exercise claims. The First Amendment, applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment, distinguishes between the two religion clauses, each addressing different forms of governmental interference with religious freedom. The Establishment Clause does not require proof of coercion, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, which does.

The Free Exercise Clause safeguards citizens' rights to practice their religion without government interference. It protects against laws that discriminate against religious beliefs or regulate conduct based on religious grounds. However, the Clause is not violated without evidence of direct government compulsion, and laws that apply generally with incidental effects on religion do not constitute a violation. The Supreme Court has ruled that individuals must comply with valid, neutral laws, even when these laws conflict with their religious beliefs. This principle extends to tax obligations, as exemptions for religious reasons would undermine the integrity of the tax system. The Court highlighted the impracticality of allowing religious exemptions from taxes, as it could lead to numerous challenges based on varying beliefs. Consequently, citizens cannot refuse to pay general taxes, including those for social security, based on religious objections. The Establishment Clause differs in that it allows taxpayers to claim injury when public funds are used in ways that promote religion, establishing a framework for taxpayer standing in cases involving government spending on religious institutions or education.

The Free Exercise Clause guarantees non-interference by the government with religious practices, meaning government appropriation of public funds does not violate the Constitution unless it directly hampers an individual's ability to practice their religion. For instance, a church member could have standing to challenge government actions if public funds were used to suppress their religious expression, such as opposing abortion. However, a taxpayer not directly impacted by such expenditures lacks standing to contest them. The Supreme Court has established that abstract injuries, like nonobservance of the Constitution, do not meet Article III standing requirements. The injury under the Free Exercise Clause arises from the limitations on religious practice rather than from the expenditure itself.

The Free Exercise Clause does not restrict Congress's taxing and spending powers as discussed in Flast, with taxpayer standing only arising from demonstrated direct injuries. The concurring opinions in Flast by Justices Stewart and Fortas emphasized the narrow scope of standing allowed. Subsequent cases have maintained this narrow interpretation, with the Court not recognizing taxpayer standing for Free Exercise Clause claims unless direct injury is shown. The Flast case itself did not address taxpayer standing under the Free Exercise Clause, focusing instead on the Establishment Clause. The Court has reiterated this limited standing principle in later decisions, rejecting broader applications and confirming that taxpayer standing remains constrained to specific circumstances recognized in Flast and related cases. Federal appellate courts have similarly adhered to these limitations, refusing to expand the exceptions established by the Supreme Court.

Taxpayer standing is established to allow claims pertaining to the Establishment Clause. Federal taxpayer standing, as articulated in *Flast v. Cohen*, is limited to cases where a taxpayer challenges congressional appropriations under Article I, Section 8 that allegedly violate the Establishment Clause. Subsequent cases, like *Rocks v. City of Philadelphia* and *Taub v. Kentucky*, further delineate that this standing applies narrowly and specifically to federal taxpayers regarding congressional actions.

The Constitution's Article III mandates that federal court jurisdiction is confined to actual "cases" and "controversies," necessitating that plaintiffs demonstrate a direct injury to establish standing. Allowing state taxpayers to pursue claims against state expenditures without proving direct injury would threaten the balance of federalism, potentially allowing for widespread litigation based on personal beliefs regarding various state-funded programs. 

In the present case, appellants must show a direct injury from state actions affecting their Free Exercise rights. They claim their tax contributions to abortion funding conflict with their beliefs, but they fail to cite any legal precedent recognizing such a moral objection as a valid direct injury. The Supreme Court has clarified that standing requires identification of personal injury resulting from alleged constitutional violations, rather than mere psychological discomfort from opposing views. Thus, the intensity of a litigant's beliefs does not equate to standing under Article III.

Appellants lack taxpayer standing to challenge state funding for abortions for low-income women under the Free Exercise Clause and have not demonstrated a direct injury necessary for standing. They assert alternative grounds for standing, including claims under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983), the Hyde Amendment, and as former state legislators. The court declines to consider these theories as they were not presented in the district court and do not establish standing. The Civil Rights Act provides remedies but does not create substantive rights, requiring a separate basis for standing. Appellants argue they can enforce the Medicaid statute through the Hyde Amendment but fail to show they are intended beneficiaries and do not claim misappropriation of federal funds by Minnesota. Former legislators Olhoft and Jude claim standing based on their legislative history; however, individual legislators lack standing to intervene in cases where a statute is declared unconstitutional, and their standing would have ceased upon leaving office. Ultimately, the court concludes that appellants do not have standing under any asserted grounds, affirming the district court's dismissal of their claims. A dissenting opinion argues that the majority misapplies the standing analysis by conflating federal and state taxpayer standing, asserting that state taxpayers can raise claims not limited to the Establishment Clause.

The majority erred by applying federal taxpayer standing principles to a case involving state taxpayer standing, incorrectly asserting that the precedent set in Flast was applicable. Flast addressed the constitutionality of federal fund expenditures for religious school materials, establishing a test limited to federal taxpayer cases. The Supreme Court's framework for federal taxpayer standing does not translate to state taxpayer claims, as highlighted by circuit court rulings. The Eighth Circuit, in Minnesota Federation of Teachers v. Randall, confirmed that state taxpayer standing is governed by Doremus v. Board of Education, which requires a measurable expenditure of tax money rather than an increased tax burden. Other circuits, including the Tenth Circuit in Colorado Taxpayers Union, have also noted that reliance on Flast in state taxpayer standing disputes is inappropriate, reinforcing that Doremus provides the relevant legal standards for such cases.

The court reaffirms that the principles established in Doremus apply to state taxpayer cases, as supported by various circuits, including the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. In Taub v. Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit specified that for standing, a state taxpayer must allege a direct and palpable injury, aligning with the 'good-faith pocketbook' requirement of Doremus unless an Establishment Clause violation is claimed. The Tenth Circuit emphasizes that taxpayers must demonstrate that illegal appropriations led to an increased tax burden to establish standing. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, in Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, does not impose this requirement, instead adopting a three-part test for standing: taxpayer status, appropriation of state funds, and spending those funds for unlawful purposes. The Ninth Circuit found that plaintiffs had standing as they met all three criteria, specifically challenging the use of taxpayer funds for a program perceived to violate racial classification principles.

The Eighth Circuit's stance on taxpayer standing is ambiguous, with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits interpreting the Eighth Circuit's decision in Randall as adopting the Ninth Circuit's test for state taxpayer standing. This view posits that the Eighth Circuit may have limited its ruling in Randall to Establishment Clause claims, which do not necessitate the usual requirement of demonstrating an increased tax burden for state taxpayers. The Ninth Circuit's test is persuasive, but the lack of consensus among the majority on the issue complicates the determination of which test the Eighth Circuit may adopt or whether the current plaintiffs meet the standing requirements. The majority's conflation of state and federal taxpayer standing has led to a flawed conclusion regarding the plaintiffs' standing in non-Establishment Clause claims. A clear distinction is needed, as state taxpayers can have standing for any claim if they meet the criteria established in Doremus. The dissent criticizes the majority for not adequately addressing the complexities of state taxpayer standing, emphasizing that prior cases show no limitation of state taxpayer standing to Establishment Clause claims.