Mary Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 99-3348

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; June 26, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Mary Buettner appeals the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri's July 21, 1999 order granting summary judgment to Arch Coal Sales Co. Inc. and Arch Coal, Inc., thereby dismissing her retaliation and wage discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Missouri Human Rights Act. Buettner, hired in March 1993 as Vice President, Secretary, and General Counsel for Arch Coal Sales, experienced a contentious relationship with her supervisor, Patrick Panzarino. A key conflict arose in October 1994 over a secretary assignment, leading to a decrease in her workload and alleged attempts by Panzarino to cut off her work. Despite her complaints to General Counsel Jeffrey Quinn, her situation did not improve. Buettner's claims regarding a hostile work environment were previously amended out of her complaint and are not addressed in this appeal. The court affirms the lower court's ruling, focusing solely on the retaliation and wage discrimination claims.

Buettner reported that co-worker Jennifer Russell resigned in the summer of 1995 after expressing frustration over being overlooked for promotion. She alleged Panzarino told Russell that women and minorities did not belong in the coal business. After informing Quinn of this remark, Quinn communicated that Panzarino claimed women and minorities "can’t succeed" in the industry, which Buettner found even more offensive. Buettner subsequently wrote a memo to Panzarino in June 1995, addressing concerns about increasing ACS agreements being signed without her review, and requested that employees refrain from seeking legal advice externally.

On June 15, 1995, a disagreement arose between Buettner and Panzarino regarding her attendance at a client meeting, which Panzarino stated she was not invited to. Despite this, Buettner reached out to the client's attorney to attend without notifying Panzarino. Following a meeting called by Buettner to discuss her role, they agreed to seek clarification from Quinn and Carter. Buettner suggested in an email to Quinn that Panzarino had deemed her "too aggressive."

Joe Stearman testified that Buettner indicated Panzarino was unhappy with him, leading Stearman to confront Panzarino, who reacted angrily and instructed Buettner to leave the building. Buettner denied that a specific event triggered Panzarino’s actions and claimed she had not disclosed any confidential information. Although there was some disagreement about whether Panzarino officially fired Buettner, it was acknowledged that she later spoke with Steve Leer, CEO of AC, who assured her she was not terminated. Buettner retained her employment and benefits.

On June 22, 1995, Buettner met with personnel officials, where it was suggested that the issues stemmed from communication problems and personality conflicts. Buettner asserted there were no sexual harassment issues, but affirmed a belief that Panzarino had a problem with women. This meeting's details were not communicated to Quinn. Additionally, the corporation underwent a re-engineering process due to poor performance in 1994, which included a workforce reduction. Quinn had requested a separate review of the legal department, leading to the engagement of Cindy Munger for this purpose.

Quinn aimed to reduce legal costs by reallocating work from more experienced attorneys to paralegals and less experienced attorneys. By March 1995, Arch Coal had three attorneys handling commercial contracts: Bussell (general contracts), Buettner (coal sales and transportation), and O’Donnell (real estate). In September 1995, their salaries were $100,980, $78,224, and $56,210 respectively. Quinn decided to lay off Bussell and Buettner, leaving O’Donnell to take on their responsibilities. After this reorganization, O’Donnell’s salary increased to $64,000, still lower than Buettner's prior salary. Buettner claimed she was discriminated against regarding her pay compared to male attorney Bob Jones, who had more experience and a mining engineering background. Buettner contended that Quinn had informed her she would earn less than Jones upon her hiring but would eventually be compensated fairly as her performance improved. The document also outlines the standard of review for summary judgment, stating that it is assessed de novo to determine if there are any genuine issues of material fact. Additionally, Buettner alleged retaliation under Title VII for her termination after expressing concerns about discriminatory practices, invoking the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) engagement in protected activity; 2) occurrence of an adverse employment action; and 3) a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. These standards are also applicable under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). In this case, the arguments presented do not support a 'reduction in force' cause of action, as the plaintiff, Buettner, contends that her termination resulted from her belief that her employer engaged in discrimination, not due to her age, race, or ethnicity. 

Once a prima facie case is established, the employer must provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. If successful, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that this reason is a pretext for retaliation, ultimately requiring proof of intentional discrimination by the employer. Notably, a finding of unlawful retaliation does not depend on the merits of the underlying discrimination claim. 

The protections against retaliatory discrimination extend to a range of activities, including filing complaints or expressing concerns about discriminatory practices. A plaintiff need only demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the actions they opposed were unlawful, rather than proving the conduct was actually discriminatory. In evaluating Buettner's claims, there appears to be sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that she engaged in protected activity, as she expressed a belief that certain statements made by her employer were discriminatory. For instance, Buettner indicated that it was discriminatory for an employer to suggest that women and minorities should not be in the coal business, which may support her claim of a reasonable belief that the conduct violated the law.

Buettner failed to demonstrate a materially adverse employment action from her June 16, 1995, firing, as there was no evidence of changes in pay, benefits, seniority, or responsibilities resulting from the confrontation with Panzarino. Buettner retained her job with ACS, rendering her retaliation claim unviable for that incident. However, her termination in September 1995 qualifies as an adverse employment action. The court agreed with the district court's assessment that Buettner did not establish a causal link between her discrimination complaints and her September dismissal. A key issue is whether Quinn, the employer, was aware that Buettner's statements constituted protected activity. Buettner’s claim of retaliation hinges on her contention that Panzarino's comments indicated discrimination, but Quinn denied understanding her remarks as such. Although there is a question of fact regarding Quinn's knowledge, Buettner failed to provide sufficient evidence linking her complaints to her dismissal. The only potential evidence of a causal connection was a comment by Panzarino about 'troublemakers' being let go, but Buettner did not establish that those who complained about illegal practices were labeled as such. Additionally, while there was temporal proximity between her complaints and her termination, mere timing is generally insufficient to demonstrate retaliation. Arch Coal provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Buettner’s termination related to cost reduction and efficiency improvements, further undermining her claims.

Arch Coal's decision to eliminate Buettner's position is justified by findings from a re-engineering study indicating that the legal work in the commercial contract area could be handled by fewer, less experienced staff. Evidence reveals that Buettner and Bussell were the highest-paid attorneys in this area, prompting Quinn to retain the lower-salaried, allegedly more productive attorney, Anne O’Donnell. Arch Coal's rationale for Buettner's termination meets the McDonnell Douglas burden for summary judgment, as Buettner fails to sufficiently challenge the claims that her termination was part of a legitimate reduction-in-force.

To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide admissible evidence that raises genuine doubt about a defendant’s motives. Buettner argues that Quinn's statement regarding the consultant's recommendation to terminate her was a pretext to hide his true intentions. She cites a memo from Quinn predicting $130,000 in savings from replacing two attorneys with paralegals, dated before receiving the consultant’s recommendation, and claims that the consultant initially recommended eliminating one position. However, the re-engineering process was collaborative, and there is no evidence that the consultant disagreed with the final recommendation to eliminate two positions. The consultant confirmed that her recommendation was independent of Quinn's influence.

Buettner also contends that Arch Coal's assertion that her work could be performed by a less experienced attorney is untrue. She points out that Quinn acknowledged the complexity of her work and initially believed there was enough work for a full-time attorney. Additionally, Buettner notes that she was ranked higher than her colleagues for advancement. However, these arguments do not provide sufficient evidence to dispute Arch Coal's legitimate reasons for her termination.

Buettner's evidence does not successfully counter Arch Coal’s claim that her dismissal was for cost and efficiency reasons. Her references to her capabilities and potential for promotion do not address the impact of her discharge on Arch Coal's operational efficiency. Buettner's argument, based on a consultant's report recommending retention of a senior commercial counsel just before her layoff, fails to undermine Arch Coal's rationale. Although she claims she was the logical choice for this position due to her prior work, the later decision to eliminate this role supports Arch Coal's stance on cost-cutting measures. 

Buettner also argues that Quinn's actions and ambitions suggest retaliatory motives for her termination following her complaints about gender discrimination. However, her claims lack substantiation beyond speculation, failing to challenge Arch Coal’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her layoff. The court emphasizes that to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide substantial evidence supporting their claims. After reviewing the district court's decision, the court confirms that summary judgment was appropriately granted on Buettner’s Title VII and Missouri Human Rights Act retaliation claims.

Buettner claims to have established a prima facie case of wage discrimination under Title VII, asserting that the standards of the Equal Pay Act apply. To succeed, she must demonstrate that male employees were paid more for equal work that required comparable skill, effort, and responsibility under similar conditions. Key factors in assessing equal work include experience, training, education, physical or mental exertion, and accountability. The burden of proof initially lies with the plaintiff, who must show that the jobs are equivalent.

Buettner compares her compensation to that of Bob Jones, noting they graduated law school in the same year and had similar responsibilities at ACS. However, she acknowledges that Jones had two more years of experience at ACS, more extensive mining industry experience, and had supervisory duties that she did not hold. Despite her claims about Jones's responsibilities at the time she was hired, Quinn testified that Jones was primarily responsible for litigation, contradicting Buettner's assertion.

Buettner’s failure to demonstrate that she and Jones shared similar responsibilities, seniority, or background undermines her claim of equal pay discrimination. The court concludes that the district court correctly granted summary judgment, affirming the decision.