The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed an appeal from the District Court for the District of Nebraska concerning the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska's operation of a gambling casino on its reservation. The District Court had denied the government's request for an injunction to enforce a temporary closure order issued by the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), which sought to halt the Tribe's class III gaming activities due to the absence of a necessary tribal-state compact. The court's ruling was reversed by the Appeals Court.
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), enacted in 1988, permits class III gaming on Indian lands if allowed by a tribal ordinance and in states that permit such gaming. The Tribe attempted to negotiate a compact with Nebraska but was unsuccessful, leading to the opening of a gaming facility in February 1996, which offered various slot and poker machines. The State of Nebraska responded by alleging that the Tribe was violating the IGRA and filed for declaratory and injunctive relief, but the District Court denied these motions, stating that the State failed to show that the Tribe's activities constituted a public nuisance.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, which ruled that Congress could not grant tribes the ability to sue states under the IGRA, the District Court dismissed the Tribe's suit against Nebraska. Following this, the Chairman of the NIGC issued a notice of violation and a temporary closure order, asserting that the Tribe's gaming was illegal without a compact and demanding closure by May 3, 1996.
The Tribe requested expedited review from the Chairman, who upheld his prior conclusions regarding violations but extended the closure date to May 5, 1996. The Tribe complied by closing its gaming facility on that date but appealed the Chairman's order to the full Commission and the District Court. In its District Court appeal, the Tribe sought a declaration that the tribal-state compacting provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) were unconstitutional, claimed that the state permitted class III gaming, and requested an injunction against the NIGC and the Department of Justice regarding gaming law enforcement. The Tribe reopened its gaming facility on June 28, 1996, and continued operations during the litigation.
On July 2, 1996, the United States filed a complaint against the Tribe, alleging violations of federal and state law regarding class III gaming, seeking enforcement of the closure order, and requesting an injunction against the Tribe. These cases were consolidated. The District Court dismissed the Tribe's case on July 7, 1996, ruling that the Chairman's closure order was not a final agency action eligible for judicial review and that the United States lacked the authority to seek a civil injunction because enforcement fell under the NIGC's jurisdiction. The court also found no statutory basis to enjoin the Tribe's gaming activities or classify them as a nuisance under state law.
On July 31, 1996, the NIGC upheld the closure order, making it final. The United States subsequently sought to file a supplemental pleading in the District Court, which was denied on December 31, 1996. The District Court suggested that the United States could only pursue criminal prosecution under the IGRA and that the NIGC had not authorized civil enforcement of its order. The United States appealed the denial of the injunction against the Tribe's gaming activities, raising the issue of whether the Attorney General has the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 516 to enforce the NIGC's closure order. The Tribe argued that the Attorney General lacks such authority.
The Attorney General has the authority under 28 U.S.C. 516 to seek enforcement of closure orders issued by the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), as authorized by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The IGRA allows the NIGC Chairman to issue temporary closure orders and impose civil fines for violations of the Act, its regulations, or tribal ordinances, with the possibility of appeal to the full Commission and subsequent appeal to district court. However, the IGRA does not explicitly grant the NIGC or its Chairman the authority to litigate these decisions, nor does it clarify the Attorney General's role in enforcing closure orders or fines against tribes. The silence of the IGRA on enforcement implies that Congress intended for the Attorney General to carry out this enforcement function. The Attorney General has exclusive control over litigation involving the United States unless Congress provides specific authority for an agency to act independently. The text references cases that support the premise that agency litigation authority requires clear congressional authorization. The NIGC’s power to assess fines and order closures without a means of enforcement suggests that the Attorney General's role is necessary. The District Court's refusal to enforce the Chairman's closure order is under review, with the closure order stemming from the lack of a tribal-state compact permitting class III gaming on the Tribe's lands, which is undisputed as per the definitions in the IGRA.
The District Court determined that the Chairman's closure order remains effective despite the Tribe's appeal but ruled that the United States is not entitled to civil injunctive relief to enforce that order. It reasoned that the IGRA only allows the Chairman to impose fines for violations of the IGRA and permits the government to seek criminal prosecution for violations of the Chairman's orders. However, it was concluded that under 25 U.S.C. 2713(a), the Chairman can levy fines for violations of the IGRA, not specifically for violating closure orders. The IGRA distinguishes between the enforcement mechanisms of temporary closure orders and civil fines. The regulations categorize closure orders as enforcement actions separate from civil fines. The District Court's refusal to enforce the closure order was deemed erroneous. Additionally, the United States argued it had the right to seek an injunction against the Tribe's ongoing illegal gaming activities, which violate both IGRA and Nebraska law, as such gaming can only occur legally if permitted by state law. The Court found that the Tribe's gaming activities represented a continuing violation and thus concluded that the District Court erred in denying the injunction, which is a remedy available under Nebraska law.
Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), federal law mandates that all state laws regarding the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling apply equally in Indian country. Specifically, Nebraska law prohibits the operation of video poker, blackjack, and slot machines, categorizing them as "gambling devices." The Tribe's operation of these devices violates Nebraska Revised Statutes, which expressly exclude mechanical, computer, electronic, or video gaming devices from permissible gambling activities. The Tribe's assertion that the approval of the "SLOTS" device by state authorities implies a broader approval of video gaming devices is rejected, as "SLOTS" merely facilitates viewing keno results and does not equate to a slot machine.
Consequently, the Tribe's gaming activities are illegal under both Nebraska law and the IGRA, justifying the United States' request for an injunction to halt this conduct. The District Court, however, denied the government's request based on the principle that equity typically does not enjoin criminal activities, acknowledging three exceptions for injunctions: national emergencies, widespread public nuisances, and specific statutory provisions allowing for such relief. The government contends that the language in 18 U.S.C. 1166(a) encompasses Nebraska's civil and criminal laws, including the authority to issue injunctions against gambling establishments deemed public nuisances, a view this summary supports.
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) incorporates all state laws regarding gambling, including both statutory and case law, without distinction. The Rules of Decision Act states that state laws serve as rules of decision in federal civil actions where applicable. The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that judicial decisions are considered state law under this Act. A Nebraska Supreme Court ruling classified a gaming operation with video gambling machines as a public nuisance, allowing for injunctive relief to protect public rights, regardless of criminal violations. The Tribe's ongoing illegal gambling activities are deemed a "continuing and flagrant" violation, warranting injunctive relief under Nebraska law, which is also permissible under federal law due to the IGRA.
The Tribe's argument, based on the Supreme Court's Seminole Tribe decision regarding the unconstitutionality of IGRA provisions related to tribal-state compacts, is not addressed since the State is not obligated to negotiate for illegal gambling. The statutory language indicates that the State need not negotiate over gambling forms it does not permit. Thus, as the Tribe's class III gambling activities are illegal under Nebraska law, the State has no duty to negotiate a compact. The District Court's decision is reversed, and the case is remanded for an order to enjoin the Tribe's class III gaming operations and to enforce the Chairman's closure order.
