The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled on August 31, 2006, in the case of Medina v. DiGuglielmo, which involved an appeal by David DiGuglielmo, the District Attorney of Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Attorney General against a decision granting habeas corpus relief to Jose Medina under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Medina, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, claimed ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to challenge the competency of a twelve-year-old witness, Marcos Toro, during his trial. The District Court found the state court's decision to uphold Medina's conviction an unreasonable application of federal law, leading to the habeas relief.
The Commonwealth argued that the District Court erred in assuming that all reasonable attorneys would have contested Toro's competency and asserted that Medina was not prejudiced by the lack of such an objection. However, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's order, determining that Medina did not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from his trial counsel’s failure to object. The testimony revealed that Toro and his brother had encountered Medina before the incident, and although Toro initially claimed to have witnessed the stabbing, he later stated he did not see the act but rather heard it from his brother.
During redirect examination by Assistant District Attorney Ann Ponterio, witness Marcos Toro was questioned about his interactions with the defendant's family, indicating they made him nervous, which led Judge Charles J. Margiotti to order their removal from the courtroom. Following this, Toro testified he witnessed Mr. Medina stab Mr. Bogan and then search his pockets. Defense counsel O. Robert Silverstein confirmed Toro's acknowledgment of the stabbing but did not challenge the witness's competency despite inconsistencies in his responses. Judge Margiotti stated he found Toro to be precocious and determined that the Commonwealth had established a prima facie case against Mr. Medina, ordering him held for trial.
Prior to jury selection, ADA Carol Sweeney raised concerns about the emotional state of Toro and his brother, Michael, who exhibited nervousness upon seeing the defendant's family, leading to fears of potential retaliation. Sweeney requested the defendant's family be kept outside during testimony. After confirming that Mr. Daly, representing Mr. Medina, had no objections to this request, Judge Stout granted it. During direct examination, Sweeney began by inquiring about Toro's age and understanding of truthfulness, but Toro struggled to articulate the difference between truth and lies, ultimately affirming his commitment to tell the truth when sworn in.
The court engaged in a dialogue with the witness, Marcos Toro, focusing on the importance of truth-telling. The judge prompted Marcos to articulate the consequences of lying, to which he initially did not respond but eventually confirmed that lying results in trouble. When asked if telling the truth is a good thing, Marcos initially stated it was not, though the court clarified this response. During direct examination by ADA Sweeney, Marcos was questioned about a specific incident involving Mr. Medina but failed to provide an answer when asked what occurred after Mr. Medina entered a store. Following this, ADA Sweeney sought a sidebar conference, noting that ADA Ponterio, who had previously handled the witness's preliminary hearing, might be more effective in questioning Marcos. Judge Stout acknowledged the relevance of the preliminary hearing’s notes but Mr. Daly objected to allowing a second attorney to continue the examination. Ultimately, the court permitted ADA Ponterio to sit at counsel table for assistance, and ADA Sweeney resumed the examination. The excerpt also references Pennsylvania law regarding the admissibility of witness testimony from prior hearings if the witness later becomes unable to testify.
Marcos Toro testified that he witnessed Mr. Medina stab a white man in the chest after leaving a "Chinese store," noting that no one approached the victim afterward. When questioned about his ability to read and his signed statement during a police interview, Toro did not respond clearly. Following a recess due to Toro's apparent distress, he testified that he heard the victim mention, "I will pay you tomorrow," and observed Mr. Medina searching the victim's pockets after he fell.
During cross-examination, Mr. Daly highlighted inconsistencies in Toro's previous testimony, revealing that much of what he recounted was based on what his brother had told him or his assumptions from seeing a knife at a restaurant. Toro confirmed he did not directly witness the stabbing. On redirect, ADA Sweeney reaffirmed Toro's assertion that he saw Mr. Medina stab the victim.
Mr. Medina was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and possession of crime instruments, receiving a life sentence after the jury deadlocked on the penalty phase. In his appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Medina contended that the trial court wrongly allowed the testimonies of two pre-teen boys, claimed ineffective assistance from his counsel regarding the boys' competency, and argued that the evidence did not support the verdict.
The Superior Court upheld the conviction, citing sufficient evidence including identification testimony from Michael Toro and circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the homicide. The appellant was present at the crime scene, possessed a knife similar to the murder weapon, had previously threatened to kill someone, and was seen rifling through the victim’s pockets post-stabbing. Although the murder weapon was not recovered and Toro's identification was not entirely definitive, the jury found the Commonwealth's evidence credible enough to establish the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court noted potential merit in the appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the competency of witness Michael Toro and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. If the trial counsel was deemed effective, the sentence would be reimposed; if ineffective, a new trial would be ordered. During the evidentiary hearing, trial attorney Mr. Daly explained his decision not to object to Toro's competency was based on the belief that Toro was capable of testifying, as he had reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript and observed Toro's demeanor. Daly's strategy involved cross-examining Toro to highlight inconsistencies in his testimony, which he believed created reasonable doubt. Following the hearing, Judge Stout indicated her intention to deny the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance.
The docket includes a handwritten entry denying the defense motion for ineffective assistance of counsel and granting the defendant, Mr. Medina, thirty days to appeal to the Superior Court, signed by Judge Stout. No formal order denying the motion was entered by Judge Stout, who later passed away. On October 10, 1997, Judge Legrome D. Davis issued an order formally denying Mr. Medina's motion. In subsequent appeals, the Court of Common Pleas stated it could not grant relief based on hindsight regarding trial counsel's tactical decisions. This decision was affirmed by the Superior Court on February 16, 2001, which held that the counsel's strategy, though arguably flawed, had a reasonable basis. Mr. Medina's Post Conviction Relief Act petition was filed on December 11, 2001, and dismissed by the trial court, a dismissal that was upheld by the Superior Court on September 17, 2003. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his petition for allowance of appeal on December 16, 2003. Mr. Medina then pursued habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising six claims, primarily alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. His claims included failure to challenge the competency of witnesses, inadequacies in introducing medical evidence, and improper remarks by the prosecution. His appointed counsel categorized these into five claims, omitting a due process violation regarding the competency inquiry, which the District Court did not address due to a lack of objections from the parties involved.
Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states that a district court is not obliged to conduct a de novo review of a magistrate judge's report if no objections were raised by the parties. Mr. Medina did not claim that his due process rights were violated due to the trial court's failure to hold a sua sponte hearing on the competency of the Toro brothers, nor did he file a protective cross-appeal on this issue. Consequently, his claim has been deemed abandoned or forfeited.
The District Court had previously granted Mr. Medina’s habeas corpus petition, ruling that the state court's dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable application of federal law. The District Court found that the lack of an objection from Mr. Medina’s trial counsel regarding Marcos Toro's competency was prejudicial, as his testimony could have created reasonable doubt about Medina's guilt.
The Commonwealth has appealed this decision, arguing that the District Court incorrectly found that Mr. Daly’s representation was ineffective. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal habeas corpus claim cannot be granted if it was already adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s decision was contrary to established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Supreme Court's ruling in Williams v. Taylor outlines that a federal court can grant a writ if the state court’s conclusion contradicts federal law or misapplies it. For such a writ to be issued, the state court's application of law must be objectively unreasonable. Ineffective assistance claims are assessed under the Strickland v. Washington standard, which requires showing both deficient performance by counsel and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense.
The defendant must establish that deficient performance by counsel prejudiced the defense, specifically showing a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the errors. A reasonable probability undermines confidence in the result. Knowledge of relevant law is essential for competent representation, as established in Everett v. Beard, where an attorney must be aware of applicable legal standards. In Pennsylvania, the competency of witnesses under fourteen years of age is governed by the precedent set in Rosche v. McCoy, which states that competency is presumed for those over fourteen, while those under require a judicial inquiry into mental capacity. This inquiry must consider the child's ability to communicate, observe events, and understand the duty to tell the truth. The burden to prove incompetency lies with the party asserting it. In this case, trial counsel failed to request a competency hearing for Marcos Toro, despite Toro’s admission of not knowing the difference between truth and lies, signaling potential incompetency. Counsel's justification for not pursuing a hearing, based on his belief in Toro's competency after reviewing prior testimony, was deemed unreasonable. Additionally, the strategy of discrediting Toro's testimony through cross-examination, instead of challenging competency, was also found to be objectively unreasonable. This aligns with the ruling in Commonwealth v. Mangini, where similar ineffective assistance of counsel was identified. Overall, Mr. Daly's performance fell below the professional standards expected in Pennsylvania, impacting the defense adversely.
Trial counsel in the case of Mangini did not object to a witness's competency, opting instead to attempt discrediting the witness through cross-examination. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined this decision constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, explaining that counsel had two viable options available and that failing to pursue one—specifically, disqualifying the witness—was unreasonable. The court noted that the trial counsel's inaction regarding witness Marcos Toro's competency did not meet the objective standard of reasonableness as established in Rosche and Mangini.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court's ruling that Mr. Daly's strategy was reasonable, despite being incorrect in hindsight, was deemed an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's Strickland decision, as it overlooked professional standards. The Commonwealth's argument that Judge Margiotti's ruling of Marcos Toro's competency was sufficient was rejected, as the judge did not conduct a thorough inquiry into the child's mental capacity. Notably, during the trial, Toro stated he did not understand the difference between truth and lies, a response that should have prompted counsel to request a competency hearing.
The analysis also considered whether Mr. Medina could show that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome would likely have been different. The prosecution had strong circumstantial evidence against Medina, including testimony from Hector Toro, who described an encounter with Medina and his threatening behavior, and Maria Caraballo, who witnessed a man running down the street shortly after the incident. This evidence suggested that even without Marcos Toro's testimony, sufficient evidence existed to convict Mr. Medina.
Ms. Caraballo observed Mr. Medina near a car, where he appeared agitated and was being restrained by a woman. After hearing that a dead person was found at a nearby corner, she recognized Mr. Bogan as the individual who had previously run past her. Meanwhile, Police Officer Robert Fetters, working undercover, received a report about a man with a knife in a white sweatshirt near the location of Mr. Bogan's murder. At approximately 9:34 p.m., Officer Fetters spotted Mr. Medina at an intersection, stopped him, and conducted a frisk, finding him unarmed. Mr. Medina was released after two minutes as there was no evidence of the reported crime. During the interaction, he mentioned he had money for a birthday card. After leaving the officers, he joined three males and walked to a nearby bar.
Upon returning to the bar, Officer Fetters noticed Mr. Medina had removed his white sweatshirt, which was unbloodied, suggesting an attempt to evade police scrutiny related to the earlier report. Officer Thomas Grieco, responding to a call in the same area, was assisted by local boys, including Marcos and Hector Toro, in locating Mr. Bogan's body, which was lying on the street. Officer Eugene Harris confirmed Mr. Bogan was deceased and noted his pockets were emptied, with no wallet or money found, though his driver's license was positioned on his back. The rescue unit arrived shortly after.
Assistant Medical Examiner Edwin Lieberman conducted the autopsy on Mr. Bogan, determining that he died from a single stab wound to the chest, approximately six inches deep, consistent with a six-inch single-edged knife.
Dr. Lieberman identified a triangular abrasion near the wound site, suggesting the knife was inserted to the handle, which could support Hector Toro's estimation of the blade's length. Ephraim Torres, the sole defense witness, testified about his two-year acquaintance with Mr. Medina and described him as a peaceful, law-abiding citizen. It was stipulated that Mr. Medina's mother would testify similarly if called. Judge Stout informed Mr. Medina of his right to testify, but Medina chose not to, stating his decision was voluntary. The District Court determined that without Marcos's testimony, there was a reasonable probability the jury might not have convicted Medina, as Marcos was the only witness claiming to have seen the stabbing. The District Court, however, did not fully consider the impact of other testimonies, including circumstantial evidence suggesting Medina threatened to kill with his "Rambo" knife shortly before the stabbing. The trial court instructed the jury that identity could be established through circumstantial evidence and allowed for the consideration of witness credibility, specifically regarding prior inconsistent statements. Mr. Daly, the defense attorney, effectively argued against the credibility of Marcos Toro, highlighting contradictions in his testimony, including his admission that he did not see the stabbing. The jury was thus capable of relying on circumstantial evidence, including Medina's threatening statement, to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite Mr. Daly’s shortcomings in not requesting a competency hearing, the strong circumstantial evidence indicated that his performance did not prejudice the outcome. Consequently, the District Court's ruling on Mr. Daly's ineffective assistance was affirmed, and the order granting habeas corpus relief was reversed, confirming Mr. Medina was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's actions.
