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Rubin R. Weeks v. Mike Bowersox
Citation: Not availableDocket: 95-4123
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; July 24, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Rubin R. Weeks appealed a denial of federal habeas relief after pleading guilty in Missouri state court to kidnaping and rape, resulting in concurrent sentences of thirty years and life imprisonment. Weeks had previously defaulted on postconviction relief in state court and was denied collateral relief. The district court, presided over by Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Davis, ruled that Weeks defaulted on his federal claims by failing to timely petition for state postconviction relief, and found he did not demonstrate cause and prejudice for his default or actual innocence. Weeks argued that his actual innocence warranted an evidentiary hearing, claiming he could provide evidence of his innocence. He contended that even without such evidence, his allegations combined with an assertion of potential evidence sufficed for a hearing. The court detailed the circumstances of the crimes, describing how Weeks attacked and raped Ms. Jolynn Alicia Doe. Ultimately, the appeals court affirmed the district court's decision. Weeks was arrested in Mississippi and extradited to Missouri, where he faced charges of kidnaping and raping Ms. Doe. On February 13, 1992, he pled guilty in state court under a plea agreement, which involved the dismissal of additional charges and a stipulation for concurrent sentences. His attorney informed the court that, despite the potential for a harsher penalty as a Class X offender, the state agreed not to pursue that classification in light of the plea. The court provided discretion in sentencing, with ranges from five to thirty years for kidnaping and ten to life for rape, both to run concurrently. Weeks confirmed his understanding of the plea agreement and admitted to the charges during the hearing, explicitly acknowledging his guilt and describing his actions. He also stated that no external promises influenced his decision to plead guilty, affirming the voluntary nature of his plea. Weeks affirmed that no coercion or threats influenced his guilty plea and confirmed his mental clarity during the proceedings, despite being on various prescription medications, including Prozac, Mevacor, and Diphenhydramine, for health issues. He stated these medications did not affect his willingness to plead guilty. His attorney, Mr. Robbins, supported Weeks's understanding of the situation, indicating that Weeks comprehended the implications of his plea, even if he was unhappy about it. During questioning, Weeks acknowledged feeling drowsy but clear-headed and confirmed he understood the proceedings and his decision to plead guilty. At the sentencing phase, Weeks's counsel advocated for a determinate sentence rather than life imprisonment, emphasizing the impact of the crime on both the victim and Weeks's own life. Choosing a thirty-year sentence means Weeks must serve eighteen years before eligibility for release. His health issues and limited life expectancy, along with family ties, influence his decision. The case is not a murder charge; the victim is alive and testified, and Weeks' guilty plea spared her and the state from further trauma and trial processes. However, due to the brutality and premeditation of his crimes, prosecutors requested a life sentence. The court sentenced Weeks to thirty years for kidnapping and life imprisonment for rape, informing him of postconviction relief options under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035. This rule allows a person claiming constitutional violations related to a felony conviction to seek relief by filing a motion. The court provided Weeks with the necessary form and instructions, but did not specify the ninety-day filing requirement post-plea. Weeks did not appeal his sentence or file a Rule 24.035 motion. Consequently, the Missouri state court dismissed his habeas petition due to the lack of a Rule 24.035 motion, which is the exclusive means to challenge a guilty plea in Missouri. On September 13, 1994, Weeks filed a federal habeas petition in the Eastern District of Missouri, asserting several claims: unlawful arrest in Mississippi without an extradition hearing, involuntary guilty plea, lack of arraignment on a rape charge, improper prior offender designation, and denial of the right to present evidence and a defense. The State of Missouri contended that Weeks failed to exhaust state remedies and had procedurally defaulted his claims by not filing a Rule 24.035 motion. In the following months, Weeks submitted multiple motions, including requests for an immediate hearing, to compel, and for counsel, alleging he did not plead guilty, was beaten and denied medical care while in custody, and had seven eyewitnesses to support his alibi. He filed a traverse listing twenty-seven potential witnesses and challenged the victim's identification of him. The district court denied Weeks's motions for a hearing and counsel, citing insufficient justification. A motion for the district court to provide copies of government files was also denied, as Weeks could access them from the state court. He requested limited discovery for exculpatory evidence, including blood and semen samples, eyewitness statements, and medical records, which was denied. Further motions for records and counsel were dismissed or denied as moot. An affidavit attached to one motion detailed alleged events at his plea hearing, claiming he did not intend to plead guilty and faced physical abuse from law enforcement afterwards. The affiant was influenced by a drug that led him to plead guilty against his will during a court appearance. On June 29, 1995, Weeks filed motions to disqualify the magistrate judge, appeal in forma pauperis, and obtain a certificate of probable cause, all of which were denied. Subsequently, the district court withheld ruling on Weeks's request to present affidavits for disqualification or reassignment for thirty days, warning that failure to comply would result in denial of his motions and continuation of the habeas corpus ruling process. Weeks did not respond, and on October 27, 1995, the district court denied his habeas petition, citing his failure to file a Rule 24.035 motion, which led to a default of his claims without sufficient cause or evidence of actual innocence. Weeks appealed, claiming his guilty plea was coerced and asserting actual innocence regarding the charges of kidnapping and rape. He argued that the district court’s inaction constituted a miscarriage of justice and sought to have his procedural default excused based on his alleged illiteracy and lack of adequate guidance on post-conviction relief. However, a panel of the Court reviewed and rejected these arguments, affirming that the federal writ of habeas corpus is available only after state remedies have been exhausted, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. 2254. The exhaustion of state remedies is essential as it allows states to address potential constitutional violations independently and aids in developing a factual record for potential federal court proceedings. Federal courts review federal legal issues de novo but are generally bound by state court factual findings. State prisoners must adhere to state procedural requirements; failure to do so can result in defaulting their claims, as exemplified by Weeks's untimely Rule 24.035 postconviction motion. Federal courts typically will not consider a habeas claim that has been defaulted in state court due to procedural issues, rooted in the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine. This doctrine serves to uphold state interests in law enforcement and procedural finality, preventing federal courts from overriding state court determinations. While this jurisdictional bar is not absolute, the Supreme Court has outlined two exceptions for overcoming a procedural default: a prisoner must show cause for the default and actual prejudice or demonstrate that not addressing the claims would lead to a fundamental miscarriage of justice, which requires a demonstration of actual innocence. To prove actual innocence, a petitioner must provide new, reliable evidence not presented at trial and show it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him based on this new evidence. The actual innocence exception allows for the review of procedurally barred claims only in rare cases where a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur. This gateway is constrained by principles of comity and finality, with few petitions qualifying as implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court has indicated that most cases of actual innocence can meet the cause-and-prejudice standard, but in extraordinary situations where a constitutional violation likely led to the conviction of an innocent person, federal habeas courts may grant relief without needing to show cause for procedural defaults. In *Schlup*, the Court established that credible actual innocence claims must be supported by new, reliable evidence not presented at trial, such as exculpatory scientific evidence or trustworthy eyewitness accounts. Claims of actual innocence are rarely successful due to the unavailability of such evidence in most cases. The court found that Weeks did not provide new reliable evidence to support his claims, which included a conspiracy involving state officials to coerce him into a guilty plea. His sole supporting affidavit was his own, lacking corroboration from any of the alleged twenty-seven witnesses or specifics about their potential testimony. Although Weeks claimed substantial evidence of his innocence, he failed to present any concrete proof. Consequently, he was unable to pass through the actual innocence gateway, leading the district court to correctly determine that his procedural default barred consideration of his federal habeas claims. Weeks further argued that actual evidence was not necessary to demonstrate innocence, but the court found his interpretation unsupported by relevant case law. A proposed rule allowing a waiver of state procedural default based solely on allegations of actual innocence contradicts the Supreme Court's Schlup decision and undermines the intended limitations of the actual innocence exception. The argument put forth by Weeks, who merely asserts his innocence without substantial evidence, fails to meet the necessary criteria to access this exception. The court emphasizes that mere claims of innocence cannot justify reopening defaulted claims, as this would compromise the principles of finality, comity, and judicial efficiency. Weeks's request for an evidentiary hearing to present exculpatory evidence is rejected, as he did not pursue this evidence in state court after entering a guilty plea. His assertion of being entitled to a prehearing hearing to establish actual innocence lacks legal foundation and is deemed unfounded. The court declines to create a new entitlement not supported by law or precedent, reaffirming its adherence to previous rulings in Bannister v. Delo and Battle v. Delo. In Bannister, the petitioner attempted to bypass a procedural bar on his successive habeas claims by asserting actual innocence. The court clarified that the petitioner incorrectly claimed an evidentiary hearing was necessary to present evidence supporting his assertion of actual innocence. Citing Battle, the court rejected the notion that an evidentiary hearing could remedy the petitioner’s evidentiary default, labeling this reasoning as circular and without merit. The Battle decision emphasized that the burden lies with the petitioner to substantiate claims of actual innocence with new, reliable evidence, not the court. Furthermore, the court noted that even if a hearing were essential for presenting new evidence, the petitioner failed to demonstrate the necessary cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to justify his earlier failures in state court. The purpose of the actual innocence gateway is not to provide a new trial but to allow a petitioner, who has defaulted on available remedies, to present compelling evidence that raises significant doubt about their guilt. The Supreme Court's ruling in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes established that a petitioner must demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to relitigate facts not developed in state court proceedings. Subsequently, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 codified this requirement, stipulating that evidentiary hearings are permitted only when a petitioner shows reliance on a new constitutional rule or previously undiscoverable facts, and that these facts could convincingly demonstrate that, absent constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have convicted them. The Act narrows the Tamayo-Reyes standard, especially where omissions in state court records are attributed to the petitioner. Applying either the Tamayo-Reyes or the superseding 2254(e)(2) standard leads to the same conclusion regarding a state prisoner's inability to develop material facts in state court, addressing concerns of finality, comity, and judicial economy. The argument presented by Weeks for a prehearing hearing contradicts these principles, as his guilty plea inherently included all necessary factual and legal elements for a final judgment of guilt. Weeks's failure to further develop facts in the state trial court is his responsibility, and relitigating the factual basis of his conviction in federal court would undermine foundational principles of finality and comity. A review of the facts that support Weeks's conviction is only permissible if he can demonstrate a valid reason for not developing exculpatory evidence in state court. While it may seem more convenient for habeas petitioners to have evidentiary hearings to support claims of actual innocence, such convenience does not warrant a broader interpretation of the actual innocence gateway. Despite the potential for gathering evidence, habeas petitions are generally decided on the factual record from the state trial court, with evidentiary hearings being rare. In this case, Weeks failed to present evidence to the district court to waive his procedural default, having over a year to do so but only providing an unsubstantiated affidavit. Despite a court order allowing him to submit supporting affidavits, Weeks did not respond with any evidence beyond his own claims, neglecting the opportunity to bolster his position regarding the magistrate judge's jurisdiction. Weeks failed to provide evidence to support his claim of actual innocence despite filing numerous motions regarding unusual events. Consequently, his request for a novel prehearing hearing entitlement is denied, leading to the affirmation of the district court's judgment. Circuit Judge Loken, with Judge Beam concurring, emphasizes that Weeks’ guilty plea is the crucial factor in this case. Historical Supreme Court cases regarding the actual innocence exception to procedural bars involve petitioners convicted after trials, not guilty pleas. Loken argues that a guilty plea waives the right to contest actual innocence, suggesting that such a plea should bar post-conviction claims of innocence, although this issue was previously left unresolved in Brownlow v. Groose. He acknowledges exceptions for extraordinary cases where a guilty plea may be invalidated, such as those involving coercion, but insists that a clear standard must distinguish these rare instances from typical guilty pleas, which pose a significant barrier to collateral proceedings. Loken critiques the panel's standard for evaluating actual innocence, stating it overlooks the significance of Weeks' guilty plea, which serves as a conviction in itself and negates the need for the government to provide evidence of guilt at the plea hearing. He asserts that the proposed evidentiary comparison is unrealistic and favors the habeas petitioner unduly. The panel concludes that even if the State were allowed to present trial evidence at an actual innocence hearing, the analysis would still be affected by the time elapsed, which hampers the government's ability to prove its case. Therefore, the focus in guilty plea cases should primarily be on the plea itself. A habeas petitioner must present newly-discovered evidence indicating that their guilty plea was a false admission of guilt to pass through the actual innocence gateway. This standard may significantly limit the actual innocence gateway in such cases, which is deemed appropriate due to the importance of finality in convictions based on guilty pleas. A guilty plea is characterized as a serious commitment that should not be easily overturned. In the case of Weeks, he admitted in court to the crime of dragging, threatening, and raping the victim, acknowledging the truth of the charges against him. Weeks has not provided newly-discovered evidence to contest his admission of guilt, and his claims of having pleaded guilty due to police coercion lack corroboration and credibility. Thus, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his involuntary guilty plea claim. Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold, dissenting, argues that Weeks' habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was dismissed prematurely. Weeks claimed actual innocence and mentioned potential exonerating witnesses and forensic evidence that could establish his innocence. While the court dismisses these allegations as insufficient, it does not categorize them as delusional. The dissent criticizes the court for conflating the concepts of pleading and proof, asserting that the rules governing habeas petitions only require a summary presentation of the facts supporting the grounds for relief, not exhaustive proof at this stage. The appendix to the rules lacks a specific form for a petitioner's responsive pleadings regarding procedural defaults but includes a form for cases where a respondent claims a petition is successive. Petitioners are instructed to state "FACTS" to clarify their position. Habeas petitioners are only required to present facts that, if true, would warrant the legal relief sought, without needing to plead evidence. Imposing a stricter pleading standard would be unauthorized and contrary to existing rules, as established in Leatherman v. Tarrant County. While heightened pleading standards could be beneficial, they must come from amending the rules rather than judicial interpretation. There is also no requirement for petitioners to attach affidavits or documentary evidence to their pleadings, although judges may request such materials to assess if factual disputes necessitate an evidentiary hearing. In the current case, the district court did not require Mr. Weeks to support his claim of actual innocence with affidavits, which the dissent argues is irrelevant to his procedural posture. The dissent contends that Mr. Weeks's pleaded facts, if proven, could excuse his procedural default, allowing his case to proceed. If he proves his actual innocence, the district court must address his underlying claim regarding a coerced plea, as outlined in prior case law. The dissent is joined by Circuit Judge Morris Arnold. Concerns are raised about the handling of habeas petitions claiming actual innocence. When a petitioner presents a credible gateway claim of actual innocence with proper documentation, it is recommended to grant an evidentiary hearing. The case of Weeks illustrates this dilemma; despite his guilty plea, which included strong statements linking him to the crime, he asserts his innocence, claiming coercion through beatings and torture. This situation creates a conflict: if Weeks is indeed innocent, failing to hold a hearing would result in a significant miscarriage of justice. Conversely, if he is guilty and falsely claims innocence, it could constitute an abuse of the legal system, potentially implicating his attorney if they possess knowledge of his guilt. To mitigate such abuses, sanctions should be imposed on petitioners whose claims lack merit, while still allowing genuinely innocent individuals to pursue justice. The record raises doubts about Weeks's guilt, supporting the decision to remand for an evidentiary hearing to clarify these issues. The opinion aligns with Judge Morris Arnold's dissent, endorsing the need for further examination of the case.