United States v. Paul Richard Barry

Citation: Not availableDocket: 96-1941

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; October 17, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Paul Richard Barry was convicted of multiple drug and firearm offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(c)(1), 21 U.S.C. 841 and 844, and 26 U.S.C. 5861(d) and 5871, following two traffic stops in Missouri. The district court denied Barry's pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment and suppress evidence. He received a 190-month prison sentence, appealing all counts except for possession of methamphetamine.

The first traffic stop occurred on March 15, 1995, due to Barry running a red light. During the stop, police found methamphetamine on him and a loaded pistol in his vehicle. The second stop took place on May 5, 1995, after Barry was observed driving erratically. Following sobriety tests he failed, officers discovered packets of white powder in his wallet. An inventory search of his vehicle revealed significant quantities of cocaine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, leading to additional charges against him.

Barry argued that the subsequent search of his vehicle was pretextual and sought to suppress the evidence obtained from it. The court evaluates the legality of the traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion and probable cause, while assessing factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. The district court's rulings were upheld on appeal.

Officer Bennett observed Barry driving erratically and crossing the centerline at 3:00 AM on May 5, which constituted a violation of Missouri law. Bennett’s uncontradicted testimony supported the finding that he had reasonable suspicion Barry was also driving while intoxicated (DWI). Established precedent indicates that any traffic violation provides probable cause for a stop. Despite Barry’s claim that the stop was a pretext for an unwarranted search, the constitutional validity of the stop hinges on whether the officer acted within legal bounds and had probable cause. The court evaluates probable cause based on the totality of circumstances, which included Barry's erratic driving, his admission to drinking, and his failure on sobriety tests, justifying Officer Bennett's lawful arrest.

The court determined that there was sufficient probable cause for Barry’s DWI arrest regardless of any cocaine found in his wallet. Therefore, the argument concerning the magistrate judge's treatment of Officer Bennett's testimony about the cocaine was deemed unnecessary. Furthermore, a police officer can conduct a warrantless inventory search of a vehicle that is being lawfully impounded, which Bennett did, leading to the discovery of a shotgun and drugs. The district court's denial of Barry’s motion to suppress this evidence was upheld.

Regarding Barry's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for carrying a firearm in relation to drug trafficking, the court found the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States did not offer relief, as Bailey's definition of 'use' did not apply to Barry’s indictment for 'carrying' a firearm. The court clarified that 'carrying' includes possession of a firearm in a vehicle, which aligns with prior rulings. The court affirmed that the standard established in United States v. Freisinger remains valid despite Barry's arguments.

Barry's transportation of a shotgun in his glove compartment meets the 'carry' requirement under 924(c)(1). He contests the district court's denial of his motion for acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence to show he carried the firearm 'in relation to' drug trafficking. The court applies a narrow review standard, favoring the evidence that supports the verdict and allowing reasonable inferences for the government. The term 'in relation to' in 924(c)(1) is defined as requiring the firearm to have a purpose or effect connected to drug trafficking, not merely present by accident. The jury could reasonably conclude that Barry's loaded, unregistered shotgun, found alongside vials of cocaine in his unlocked glove compartment while transporting nearly $50,000 in illegal drugs, facilitated his drug dealing activities. 

Barry also challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss charges of firearm possession as a felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), citing the Commerce Clause based on United States v. Lopez. This argument is rejected, as precedent in United States v. Bates confirms the constitutionality of applying 922(g)(1) to firearms that have moved in interstate commerce. The parties acknowledged that the firearms involved had traveled in such commerce, affirming the district court's ruling against Barry.